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ABSTRACT

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Major: Political Science

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NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is about how the Thai government reacts to the problem of Malay-Muslim separatism in the southernmost provinces of the country. The study adopts a historical approach using a qualitative method. The dissertation traces the government's policies, the reactions of the Malay-Muslims, and the determinants of both the Thai policies and the Malay responses during the democratization period in Thailand that began in 1973. It focuses on the process by which the tensions between the Thai State and the ethnic Malay-Muslims are reduced. It stresses the importance of political rules and institutions that shaped both the government's approaches and the responses from the Malay-Muslims.

The study examines five policy dimensions: political socialization, socio-economic development, coercion, political participation, and administrative and personal management reforms. Because the Malay-Muslim separatist movements involve foreign support, the study also investigates Thailand's diplomatic effort to stop the support.

The study finds that Thailand's political integration had accelerated because of the effects of democratization on the political system that began in 1973 and had intensified from 1992 on. Democratization opened channels for Malay-Muslims to participate as equal citizens in Thailand's political life and to access to political power to protect the ethnic interests both at the national and local levels. It resulted in de-radicalization of ethnicity. Moreover, Thailand's diplomatic effort proved to be

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successful in reducing foreign supports to the separatist movements, hence weakening their capacity to mobilize.

The study concludes that political integration can be attained in a culturally fragmented society because the leadership of the majority group was willing to accept the principle of the rights for ethnic minorities, and the leaders of ethnic minorities were willing to engage in cooperative efforts to control ethnic competition. The study stresses the indispensability of institutional rules and arrangements that facilitated such cooperation. It notes that a democratic mechanism was used effectively as a means to deal with ethnic cleavages in Thailand. Thus, as Thailand's democratization progressed, its political integration also advanced.

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NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

POLITICAL INTEGRATION POLICIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE MALAY-MUSLIMS OF SOUTHERNMOST THAILAND (1973-2000)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

IN PARTIAL FULFULLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

ORNANONG NOIWONG

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DEKALB, ILLINOIS

DECEMBER 2001

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I am deeply indebted to the Royal Thai Government for financial assistance it had provided me throughout my academic career.

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All praises be to God! This dissertation has finally been completed.

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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

O Mankind! We created
You from a single (pair)
Of a male and a female,
And made you into
Nations and tribes, that
Ye may know each other
(Not that ye may despise each other)

Verily, the most honored among you
In the sight of Allah
Is (he who is) the most
Righteous among you.
And Allah has full knowledge
As is well acquainted
(With all things).

(Qur'an 49: 13, translated by A. Yusuf Ali)

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DEDICATION

To the memory of my father, Mohammad Said Khan

To my beloved mother, Bebe Hawa

To Djamel and Anisa

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

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research Problem

The traditional ideal conception of the modern political unit is a nation-state, i.e., a state incorporating a single national community. However, only a few states are homogeneous from an ethnic viewpoint.[1] Yet until recently, integration theorists held that heterogeneous states were inherently unstable and unnatural. To achieve consensus, social cleavages must be eliminated or neutralized.[2] Assimilation was not only the desired and natural outcome of interethnic relations but also the sin qua non of political stability.

Nevertheless, Arend Lijphart argues that a society segmented by strong, particularistic loyalties can be stable as well. He contends "political stability can be maintained in culturally fragmented systems, if the leaders of subcultures engage in cooperative efforts to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation."[3] Under this model, there must exist what he calls "conscious cooperation" among the elite drawn from all major social groups willing to control ethnic competition and willing to accept the principle of the right of political autonomy for other subcultures. This kind of system gives legitimacy to parochial loyalties, but it also requires an overlay of ideological national consensus. Under "consociational democracy," particularistic

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groups are incorporated into the larger political system. By giving each a stake in the perpetuation of the system, it produces a national political culture in the form of what Lijphart calls "moderate nationalism."[4]

Among the numerous problems confronting Thailand during the democratic transition in 1973, one of the most crucial has been the problem of Malay-Muslim separatism.[5] Since then, the Thai State has been wrestling with this problem. The State holds that the boundary of its nation-state and its sovereign principle are inviolable. However, there are some groups among the ethnic Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces of Thailand who claim that they have a right to self-determination. Such conflicting claims have led to political protest and violence.

How has Thailand preserved and enhanced its coherence while at the same time accommodating the legitimate demands advanced by the ethnic Malay-Muslims for their particular interests? How has the political development in Thailand from 1973 to 2000 shaped the State/ethnic-minority relations? Do regime types matter? What differences have political rules and institutions under authoritarianism, semi democracy, and democracy made in terms of the government approaches toward the Malay-Muslims?

Apart from political rules and institutions, other factors also play crucial roles in determining the policy choices and the outcome of the integrative efforts. The transnational character of ethnic conflict has an impact on both the Thai State and the Malay-Muslims. What influence does the contemporary Islamic resurgence and the external support from Muslim countries have on the ethnic Malay-Muslims and on the government's policy choices and the chance for success or failure?[6] How do factors,

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such as the historical legacy of the Patani Kingdom,[7] integrative experience of the Malay-Muslims, and primordial ties influence the relationship between the Thai State and the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces?

The questions asked above are significant and represent an unexplored aspect of Thailand's recent political democratization, economic dynamism, and social change. This dissertation aims to investigate the Thai government's strategies and policies to regulate ethnic relations and to integrate the Malay-Muslims into the Thai polity from1973 to 2000.[8] The investigation will describe factors that influence the government's approaches and the responses from the Malay-Muslims. The research findings cannot only be generalized to the theory of political integration but can also illuminate the policy debate regarding the future interethnic relationship between the Thai State and the ethnic Malay-Muslims of southernmost Thailand.

Literature Review

Most of the studies on the Malay- Muslims of southern Thailand[9] and their relations with the Thai government were finished and cover the period before the 1980s. This section selectively reviews some of the work dealing with this subject.[10]

Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud's *The Malay Unrest in South Thailand: An Issue in Malayan-Thai Border Relations* provides important historical accounts about the rise and demise of the Malay Kingdom of Patani, the struggle for autonomy led by Haji Sulong, and the response by the Thai government.[11] The book covers the period from 1785 to 1941. Essentially, the book discusses the history and development of the Malay

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separatist movements in southern Thailand in the context of Anglo-Malayan-Thai relations in the postwar era. It shows how external factors could have an impact on the Thai government integration efforts. It points out that the restrictions imposed on the Patani leaders by the Kelantan state authorities and the subsequent dissolution of the Association of Malays of Greater Patani (GAMPAR) in early 1949 made the political movement among the Patani Malays in Malaya inactive.

The history of the Thai efforts to dominate the Malay-Muslims is given by Nantawan Haemindra. Her study covers the period up to the 1970s. It describes the Malay resistance, the rise of modern separatist movements and their tactics toward the Thai State. She sets out six main reasons for the Malay "problem" in the southernmost provinces. They are: (a) the ignorance of the Thai officials about the Malay culture; (b) the inability of local officials to speak Malay, (c) the arrogance of officials, (d) the racial prejudice of officials, (e) the maintenance of close relations between Malays in southern Thailand and those in Malaysia, and (f) the poor economic conditions in the south when compared with those in Malaysia.[12] She concludes that the Thai State needs to improve the behavior of its officials because the Malay-Muslims "are hypersensitive people."[13] There is also a need for the country to match economic conditions with Malaysia, so that unfavorable comparisons by local Malay-Muslims cannot act as a source of disaffection.[14]

The problem of integration caused by Thai civil servants was also the focus of M. Ladd Thomas's article, "Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of Thai Muslims." He notes that Thai bureaucratic attitudes and behavior

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may pose serious obstacles to and delay political integration of the Thai Muslims.[15] He suggests that the Thai government make a systemic effort to modify such attitudes and behavior. In "Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand," he discusses at least eight factors that contribute to the alienation of Malay-Muslims and political unrest in the Malay-Muslim areas and how the Thai government responded to the problem.[16] His later work discusses the 1978 national security policy for the southern border provinces and evaluates developments that had impacts on political integration.[17]

The role of Islam in influencing the relationship between the ethnic Malay-Muslims and the Thai State is another important aspect in the literature. Surin Pitsuwan's *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand* illuminates the role of Islam in the resurgence of Malay nationalism. He maintains that Islam had been the most significant symbol that gave the Malay-Muslim protesters and separatists an inspiration and served as a goal toward which they would strive.[18] He points out that the degree of violence and lapse of time in between those violent protests depended very much on the gravity of government's effort to assimilate, integrate, and interfere with the religious community. He concludes that the issues of Malay-Muslims of Thailand will depend on the way and manner in which the Thai government handles them. He anticipates the wider path of violence unless an accommodation approach is found.[19]

In "Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the Four Southern Provinces, Thailand, 1976-1981," Chaiwat Satha-Anand argues that factors such as historical heritage, economic conditions, and bureaucratic attitudes and behavior may

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contribute to political unrest in the form of violence; however, they do not "cause" violence, but conflict.[20] He notes, "As a means, violence stands in need of guidance of justification" and the prime reason Islam can be used to justify violence is because it is an action-oriented religion.[21] By analyzing the underground leaflets issued by several Malay separatist groups, he insightfully explains a logical process by which the violent actors of the four southern provinces used Islam to justify violent actions.

W.K. Che Man points out in *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* that the colonization of the Malay-Muslims of southernmost Thailand and their incorporation into the Thai Buddhist State in the beginning of the twentieth century gave life to the contemporary resistance struggles.[22] He analyzes the leadership in the Malay society in Patani and notes that the religious elite constitutes the core of liberation politics. His work give insights into the emergence, organization, and transformation of the liberationist fronts, particularly of the Barisan National Pembebsan Patani (BNPP) that he views to be more powerful and less fragmented than the other fronts.[23]

Panompom Anuragsa's dissertation, *Political Integration Policy in Thailand: The Case of Malay Muslim Minority*, traces the government's policy of integration from the early 18th century to the beginning of the 1980s. The main goal of the government's efforts to create integration was to create loyalty among the minorities. However, such efforts created a backlash. She argues:

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> The conflict lies in the government's assimilation-oriented education programs, the exploitative and dependency-creating economic policy, the corrupt and abusive bureaucratic civil servants, and the government's severe suppression policy toward the separatist and their allies.[24]

In her view, the government played a significant role as a catalyst of conflict through its social and security programs.[25] Thus, while the government announced to the public and other Islamic countries that it would pursue an accommodative policy and support the continued existence of Islam, the government remained repressive in practice. She concludes that the government policy of political integration undermined any accommodation goal.

Astri Suhrke identifies four types of response by the minority Malay-Muslims towards the Thai government. They are: improving ethnic understanding, active resistance, participation in the administration and political process, and withdrawal.[26] She maintains that the rational response of a small minority group, such as the Malay-Muslims, might seem to be continued adherence to a withdrawal strategy.[27] This strategy could be achieved by minimizing contact with Thai officials and Thai institutions and seeking to protect indigenous values and institutions.[28]

In his detailed case study describing the interactions between Malay-Muslim rubber producers in Yala and local Thai government officials who sought to establish and promote a co-operative rubber marketing project, Andrew Cornish confirms Suhrke's prediction as mentioned above. Cornish found that leaders of the two communities took different interactive approaches toward the local bureaucracy. However, they both tried

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to preserve the existing economic structures in their villages and to exclude Thai officials from gaining any control over those economic structures. His study hypothesizes that:

> Malay separatism in the form of mass insurrection against Thai rule has occurred in the past, and will occur in the future, only when administrators are successful in taking the control of central activities in Malay village social life away from indigenous leaders. That is to say, overt Malay separatism and Thai administrative control of village life in Yala operates inversely to each other.[29]

The literature reviewed above is significant in helping one understand the past relations between the Thai State and the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand. However, from the early 1990s onward, patterns of the relationship have been fundamentally changed because of changes in the political context. There has been very little research done on the relations between the Thai State and the Malay-Muslims during this recent democratic consolidation period. Built upon the previous research, this dissertation emphasizes the impacts of democratization and civil liberalization on government integration policies toward the Malay-Muslims of southernmost Thailand. It hopes to illuminate not only the continuity and changes of the policies and strategies but also the relationship between democracy and political integration in the case of Thailand.

Theoretical Premises

The focus of this dissertation is the Thai government's efforts on political integration. Hence, theories or concepts of political integration, democratization, political development (such as political culture and political socialization), modernization, and nation building are employed in the study. Since the Malay-Muslim

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separatism has linked internal and external forces of conflict, the linkage between external environment and political cleavage is also discussed.

Modernization Theory: Social Progress and National Integration

For most of the earlier modernization theorists, the progress of industrial societies is characterized by the dissolution of the older social ties of blood and lineage. In order for a society to move into modernity, its traditional structures and values must be totally replaced by a set of modern values.[30] For instance, Talcott Parsons describes the evolution of societies as a shift from ascriptive status to universal considerations of achievement by social progress.[31] The modernization theory predicts that change within a society would be accompanied by a gradual decline in the political significance of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. The perspectives of these early modernization theorists popularize the view that social and economic changes correlate with a reduction of regional or ethnic tension.

To identify factors that facilitate the transformation process, some modernization theorists emphasize the importance of the growth of transaction and communication networks in political integration. For example, Karl Deutsch maintains that people begin to think of themselves as a country when "several population clusters are united through more communications or more economic activities."[32] However, the propositions of the modernization theory have been challenged by the heightening of ethnic conflicts in many countries up to the present. Walker Connor argues that the belief that an ethnic minority will not secede from a state if its living standards are improving is "an

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unwarranted exaggeration of the influence of materialism upon human affairs." Such an assumption "underestimates the power of ethnic feelings."[33] The contradiction between theory and reality leads to the challenge and modification of the modernization theory.

The Reemergence of Subgroup Identity and the Development of Political Cleavages

The critics of the modernization theory focus on its inadequacies and its oversimplification. First, the proposition that social progress will lead to the reduction of local loyalty has been inconsistent. Modernization might have an assimilative effect at the earliest stage of development but not necessarily on the later stages. Clifford Geertz calls the first stage of development that "encourages the integration of exclusively local identities into more encompassing ones to which the label of ethnic group is commonly attached" as the "integrative revolution." However, he maintains that it "does not do away with ethnocentrism; it merely modernizes it."[34] Second, national assimilation is an extremely slow process. The suggestive proposition that assimilation can be assisted by a deliberate effort of governments to eradicate ethnic loyalties and artificial stimulation of national sentiment is oversimplified. Ethnic loyalties show remarkable resistance to efforts aimed at their destruction. Connor contends that "nation building at the national or state level entails 'nation destroying' at the sub-national level," hence "ethno nationalism appears to feed on adversity and denial."[35]

Contrary to the developmental model associated with the integrationist school, which portrayed ethnicity as primordial anachronism that would disappear under the homogenizing impact of state building and capitalist economic development, competition

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theory's central postulate is that contemporary ethnic mobilization is inextricably tied to modernization.[36] Building upon the competition model, Francois Neilsen clarifies the conditions under which ethnicity becomes more important than other social cleavage as a basis for organizing collective political action.[37] Modernization produces a structural imbalance between the achieved status of political entrepreneurs aspiring to elite positions and the monopoly of the opportunity structure of the elite by either the dominant ethnic group or elite collaborators from the subordinate group. This imbalance gives political entrepreneurs the incentive to activate their ethnicity as a vehicle for their political ambitions. When an ethnic group occupies distinct territories, the uneven impact of both modernization and development policies increases the homogeneity of the interests of ethnic group members and thus promotes ethnoregional solidarity.

In his analysis of ethnic cleavages, Joseph Rothschild points out that the relationship of differentially positioned ethnic actors in the reticulated social space on the one hand and their interaction with the states on the other shapes the form, intensity, and outcome of ethnic politics.[38] Subsequent work by Donald Horowitz stresses the comparison of relative group position in the political and economic structure, the attendant evaluation of group endowments and attribution of group worth, and the resulting judgments and demands about group entitlement as important sources of ethnic conflict.[39] He argues that economic theories of ethnic conflict focus on the elite motivated by interest and cannot account for why followers who are motivated by passion will follow. By investigating acknowledged group differences with evaluative

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significance and emotional content, positional psychology triggers spontaneous and sentiment-driven ethnic conflicts that result in interethnic violence.[40]

Both Rothschild's work and Horowitz's theory focus only on ethnic conflict. It is unclear how they account for nonviolent ethnic group relations. They do not take into account the role of institutions in restraining conflicts. Shaheen Mozaffar points out that institutions "restrain as well as activate, channel, and mold ethnicity and its political dynamic."[41] Institutions are "configurations of rules that engender patterned regularity in political life."[42] The institutional framework allows for a systematic conceptualization and explication of four dimensions. They are: (1) the institutionally circumscribed choice of social actors in selecting the combination of ascriptive criteria to define ethnic identity, (2) the creation of the organization forms for the expression of reconstituted ethnicity, (3) the process by which ethnic leaders and followers negotiate quid pro quo to restrain their passions and promote mutual interests, and (4) the general pattern of interaction between these various processes and the state.[43]

Whether ethnicity will be mobilized depends on the institutional prescriptions that structure the otherwise rational choice of social actors. Mozaffar notes that "variations in the mobilization of ethnicity in politics will correlate with variations in institutional arrangements."[44] As social actors move from one rule-configured social situation to another, their structure of incentives and the accompanying behavioral repertoire change, as do their embedded identities, expectations, and interests, and patterns of interaction.[45]

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Thus, institutions shape the scope of ethnic politics. If institutional prescriptions are limited, or entirely absent, and correlated with a low level of social structural differentiation, ethnicity will be highly salient in political life.[46] Ethnic political demands which originate as moderate demands that are not resolved by pragmatic policies or innovative structural reforms can evolve into outright expressions of national identity and assertion of self-determination. Thus, from the theoretical point of view, as Thailand has moved away from an authoritarian rule to a democratic rule, one expects to see different institutional prescriptions and different policy approaches for the integration efforts. Such differences in institutional prescriptions should attract a different level, intensity, form, and pattern of ethnic politicization among the ethnic Malay-Muslims of the southern provinces of Thailand.

External Environment and Political Cleavage

Early integration literature excludes the global environment as a possible causal factor for national integration.[47] International systemic factors have not been considered an important variable in the integrative process. Clifford Geertz notes, "Unlike economic or class disaffection that threatens revolution, disaffection based on race, language, or culture threatens partition, irredentism, or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the state."[48] Nevertheless, he sees that "the immediate significance of primordial differences is almost everywhere primarily domestic."[49]

Astri Suhrke and Lela G. Noble's volume is part of an important effort to place the ethnic issue in the context of an external environment.[50] They point out that ethnic

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conflicts tend to link internal and external forces of conflict and cooperation and, to some extent, to result from such interaction. Part of the reason is that ethnic identities rarely coincide fully with state boundaries. "Ethnic conflict in one state has implications in other states where ethnic kin are located and affects official and unofficial transactions between or among these states."[51] They maintain that the less access to governmental power the ethnic group has, the more likely it will attract outside support.

The ethnic Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand are linked with the external environment through two main channels--the ethnic linkage with the greater Malay world and religious linkage with the Muslim world (*ummah*). Through these linkages, the conflict between the Malay-Muslims of the southern provinces and the Thai State has been externalized. By externalizing the conflict, the separatist movements have secured the necessary support to sustain the armed struggle. Thus, an analysis of the Thai government's policies and strategies to integrate the Malay-Muslims of the southern provinces into the Thai polity must take into consideration the external environment.

Political Integration Theory

The term "political integration" is used to cover a wide range of political phenomena, including political development, political stability, national unification, and nation building. Different theorists give political integration different meanings depending on the category and level of analysis with which they are concerned.[52] Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune note that, "full agreement on a definition [of the term] is neither likely nor necessary."[53]

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Myron Weiner suggests categorizing political integration into five subtypes: (1) National integration refers to "the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of national identity"; (2) territorial integration is the establishment of a "national central authority over subordinate political units or regions"; (3) elite-mass integration is the effort to link the government with the governed; (4) value integration refers to "the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain a social order"; and (5) integrative behavior refers to "the capacity of people in society to organize for some common purpose."[54]

However, in reviewing political integration literature, one finds that the definitions and distinction of different types of political integration are far from clear-cut. For instance, James Coleman and Carl Rosberg use the term "national integration" to refer to political integration and territorial integration. Political integration refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community. Territorial integration refers to the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuity on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogeneous territorial political community.[55]

Donald G. Morrison and Hugh M. Stevenson categorize national integration into four dimensions: vertical elite-mass integration, value integration, horizontal integration (which refers to communications and transactions among members who hold similar roles in the stratification of a political system), and centralization (which refers to the

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extent to which the individuals in a political system are subject to the decisions of a central institution).[56]

Integration analysis also varies in terms of what scholars emphasize. Some emphasize the process of integration, others stress integration in terms of a condition that either exists or does not exist. For Claude Ake, political integration is a process of "progressive development among members of a political system of a deep and unambiguous sense of identity with the state and other members of the civic body."[57] "Such integration takes place if the individual political actors develop in the course of political interaction a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behavior and commitment to the political behavior patterns, legitimized by these norms."[58]

For Karl Deutsch, the preconditions for political integration can be created by social communications, including mail flows, economic transactions, mass media communications, transportation, and tourism.[59] Robert Jackson and Michael Stein note that the analysis of integration can be identified in two major approaches--the "institutional-behavioral" and the "conflict management" approaches.[60] The former regards political integration as a condition of a political community, emphasizing the creation and maintenance of "preconditions" necessary for political integration. The latter approach regards political integration as a process of managing or containing the forces of conflict and disintegration in society, emphasizing the effort to curtail these disintegrative tendencies in societies. This study will adopt both approaches in analyzing the integration efforts of the Thai State.

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Political Integration and Democracy

"Democracy" is a term with a variety of definitions. In this study, democracy denotes a political system that meets the following conditions: (1) guaranteeing, both legally and in practice, freedom of expression, assembly, and association; (2) providing free and fair elections held regularly for the selection of leaders and policies with a majority of the adult citizens participating in the voting; and (3) using peaceful and legal procedures, rather than violence (including the misuse of coercion by the government), as a method of problem solving.[61] "Democratization" refers to a process by which a non-democratic political system adapts to meet these conditions. In this process, the authoritarian regimes gradually loosen their control over the people and extend political participation to those who were previously excluded from the political system.

Samuel P. Huntington categorizes two schools of thought on the study of democratization--the school of preconditions and the school of processes.[62] The first school of thought focuses on the correlation between socioeconomic conditions, a society's structure, and the development of democracy. Among contemporary scholars, Barrington Moore stresses the importance of the middle class and urban bourgeoisie in the development of a democratic system. He notes that "no bourgeoisie, no democracy."[63] Seymour Martin Lipset suggests that high levels of industrialization, urbanization and media exposure and equal income distribution are the social requisites of democracy.[64]

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The "process" school stresses the process leading to the development of democracy. While most scholars in this school accept the importance of socioeconomic conditions for political development, they believe that the nature of the political process affects its results. For example, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter maintain that in all the empirical cases examined, "the attainment of political democracy was preceded by a significant liberalization."[65] Adam Przeworski claims that "objective (socioeconomic) factors constitute at most constraints to that which are possible under a concrete historical situation but do not determine the outcome of such a situation."[66]

Thailand's socioeconomic development since 1973 has created an environment that has accelerated democratization. Political development in Thailand has played a critical role in shaping the policies and determining the result of the government's integration approaches toward the Malay-Muslims. Democratization has broadened the political participation of citizens. It has also enhanced the density and broadened the scope of political parties' competition to gain popular support. In the process, negotiation between political parties and the leaders of the ethnic community have enabled the accommodationists and communalists within the ethnic group to strike a favorable bargain for the group. Political liberalization has also strengthened civil society.[67] Under the recent political development in Thailand, new channels for citizens and dissident groups to express their interests and to communicate their demands have emerged. At the same time, the government's integration approaches have further moved away from what Clifford Geertz points out as one cause leading to primordial discontent--"a sense of political suffocation and a sense of political dismemberment."[68]

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Conceptual Framework: Integration Policies and Strategies

The major task of all regimes, whether authoritarian or democratic, is to attain both control and legitimacy. These needs underlie elite strategies toward achieving national and political integration. Generally, authoritarian regimes tend to place greater emphasis on the need for control, stressing the values of political stability and order. Democratic governments, on the other hand, require more popular support for their survival than do military governments. Democratic governments usually have interdependent relations with a network of civilian organizations. Under normal circumstances, the ruling civilian elite does not want to endanger its power base by upsetting too many ethnic groups by the use of coercion.[69]

In this study, "integration" is viewed as a measure of the ability of the Thai State to conduct its important and necessary business without disaffecting large bodies of the Malay-Muslim minority to the point that they are no longer willing to have their affairs regulated by or to participate in the Thai polity.[70] This definition allows us to focus on the role of various internal institutions and groups, such as national elites, subnational elites, government, and religion, as well as external influences, in alienating or accommodating the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand into the Thai polity.

Jyotirindra Das Gupta points out that there are three policy areas which greatly affect ethnic relations: cultural, institutional, and resource distribution.[71] The granting of autonomy is an institutional mechanism that promotes positive relations, while its obverse often results in alienation and unrest. In the cultural area, language is a major

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source of conflict when the dominant group's or minority group's language is made the only language for education and government administration. Moreover, religious intolerance is also an important source of conflict. In the area of resource distribution, problems arise when members of an ethnic group perceive that they are not receiving equitable treatment.

Gupta argues that the likelihood of implementation of policies and the degree to which these policies will be effective are both influenced by the political environment, particularly the willingness of the elite from the dominant ethnic groups to share power with minority ethnic groups, and the availability of and prospects for access to alternative political arenas for minority groups. [72] If the ideology of the elite does not transcend the boundaries of the major ethnic group and if the subnational elites are not allowed access to elite positions and political power, the prospects for solutions to ethnic group conflicts are dim.

Joseph Rothschild categorized integration policies into three dimensions: life-chances integration, cultural integration, and political integration.[73] Political integration depends on the existence of and commitment to a political culture regulating political behavior.[74] It is not merely a dependent function of the other dimensions of integration. Expanding from Theodore Lowi's typology of public policy, Edmond Keller proposes five types of policy in mediation of ethnic conflict in Africa. They include distributive policy, redistributive policy, regulatory policy, reorganization policy, and symbolic policy.[75] This dissertation adapts the concepts above to the study of the Thai government's integration policies toward Malay-Muslims.

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Themes of the Study

W.K. Che Man points out that among the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand, some groups believe that the Malay-Muslims will not be able to retain their identity under the Thai rule unless a meaningful cultural autonomy or independence is given. The other groups believe that the Malay-Muslims should adapt themselves to the Thai society and work with the authorities to enhance socioeconomic and political development of the Muslim provinces.[76] Scholars attribute the growth, decline, and persistence of separatist movements in the Malay-Muslim southern provinces of Thailand to a variety of causes, such as foreign support, economic disparity, Thai government officials' attitudes and behaviors, and deprivation of political power.

My contention is that ethnic differences or similarities per se do not necessarily lead to the disintegration of a multiethnic state. The set of factors that play significant roles are the strategies and policies of the governments, political rules, and institutional arrangements. Moreover, foreign intervention on the matter could also help resolve or aggravate ethnic conflicts. This dissertation demonstrates that political leaders, through policy choices they make, play a crucial role in directing the State-ethnic relations. Political integration can be achieved in a culturally fragmented society if, following Lijphart's argument, there exists "conscious cooperation" among the elite drawn from all major social groups willing to control ethnic conflict. This study stresses that political institutions and rules must exist to allow and facilitate this cooperation.

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The existence of democratic institutions provides a channel for moderate Malay-Muslims to access governmental power, enabling them to express the concerns of the Malay-Muslim community and assert its legitimate demands. The effectiveness of this channel, in turn, leads Malay-Muslims to regard the sociopolitical arrangements regulating their affairs under the Thai State as worth preserving, making separatism unnecessary. The uninterrupted process of political and civil liberalization from the early 1990s not only has weakened the sympathy and support of the Malay-Muslims for the separatists but has also accelerated the integrative process.

Since 1977, the military, to broaden its popular support and to legitimize its rule, has introduced a number of policies that accommodate the demands of the Malay-Muslims. The growing interest of the business associations and the competition between political parties to obtain the Malay vote during the period of democratization have accelerated the fundamental changes in the policy approaches to further the accommodation. The democratic elite is also more willing to share power and ready to compromise and to accommodate the demands and interests of various groups within society. Since the late 1980s, southern Malay-Muslim representatives have been given posts in the cabinet and the parliament and hence are able to influence the government's policy toward the ethnic Malay-Muslims. These domestic developments coincided with the reduction of foreign support to the ethnic Malay-Muslim separatist movements. Under these circumstances, ethnic conflict has been mitigated.

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Methodology and the Time Frame of Study

Given the nature of questions asked, this dissertation takes a historical approach, using in-depth analysis of a qualitative case study. The period of study is from 1973 to 2000. The study begins with the year 1973, for it signifies the first popular democratic transition that had a great impact on the political dynamics in the following periods.

The data sources come from an extensive literature review, observations, and open-ended interviews. The field research was conducted in Thailand between August and November 2000. Much of the general information regarding Thailand's political and economic development and the government integration approaches was found in books, academic journals and monographs, newspapers and magazines, and other printed sources in the libraries at various universities in Bangkok and at Prince Songkla University in Pattani. Information was also collected from the libraries of the Bangkok Post and the Thangnum (The Islamic Guidance Post) newspapers. Documents on the government policies and strategies were gathered from various governmental offices. They included the Administration Center for the Southern Border Provinces, the Office of Education (Region 2), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provincial offices in the southern border provinces, the Ministry of Interior, and the Office of National Security Council.

Interviews were conducted in Bangkok, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Interviewees include Thai elite and government officials who are involved in policy decision making or policy implementation; Malay-Muslims who are members of the

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parliament, cabinet, and bureaucracy; Malay-Muslim informal leaders; students; former members of separatist movements; owners and managers of private schools teaching Islam; and the general population in the southernmost provinces. The opinions of scholars, news reporters, and knowledgeable observers were also sought.

The human-subjects data used in this dissertation were collected without the required prior approval of the Northern Illinois University Institutional Review Board. Upon subsequent examination of the data collection, however, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that it appears the subjects were not harmed by the study nor were their rights or welfare infringed upon.

The period selected for this study is a 27-year period, 1973-2000. The extended period under study is to provide an opportunity to trace the continuity and change of government policies and strategies under different political regimes. The study begins with the first democratic transition after the nation-wide student demonstration in October 1973. The democratic period ended on 6 October 1976 with the return of direct military rule that lasted until 1977. The second democratic transition lasted from 1977 until 1988. This period has been characterized as "semi-democracy." From 1989 on (except for an interruption during 1991-1992), democratic consolidation has continued to evolve. By using this time frame, this dissertation will provide a better understanding of the processes of political integration and democratization as well as their interrelationship as they apply to the case of Thailand.

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Summary

This chapter states the research problem, literature review, theoretical premises, conceptual framework, theme of the study, and research methodology. The relationship between the Thai State and the ethnic Malay-Muslims of southernmost Thailand is the subject of investigation. Specifically, it seeks to examine the Thai government integration policies and strategies toward the Malay-Muslims from 1973 to 2000.

The theme of the study is that the political elite and political rules and institutions play the most crucial roles in dictating the direction of the government approaches toward ethnic minorities. However, other factors such as integrative experiences, historical legacy, primordial ties, relative position of the ethnic minority, and external elements influence both the policy direction and the responses of the Malay-Muslims toward the government approaches.

Details of the investigation and findings are presented in subsequent chapters. Chapter two is devoted to the analysis of internal and external factors affecting political integration of Malay-Muslims into the Thai polity. Chapter three discusses the integration experiences of the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces before 1973. Chapter four examines the political development in Thailand between 1973 and 2000 and the government political integration policies and strategies in five areas: socialization, coercion and control, political participation, socioeconomic development, and administrative reorganization and personnel administrative reform. Chapter five

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investigates the responses from the Malay-Muslims. Chapter six presents the conclusion and analysis.

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Notes

[1]Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 3.

[2]See James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966), 9.

[3]Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," Canadian Journal of Political Science (March 1971): 11.

[4]Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies 1 (1968): 29-30.

[5]In this dissertation, the term "Malay-Muslims" is used to describe the Malay Muslim population of the southernmost provinces of Thailand. The term "Thai-Muslims" will be used to refer to the general Muslim population of Thailand.

[6]See Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States: Lesson from Thailand (Dover, Massachusetts, 1987), 205-208.

[7]"Patani" is the Malay version; "Pattani" is transliterated from the Thai spelling. In this dissertation, "Pattani" is employed when referring to a province in the southernmost border of Thailand. "Patani" is employed when referring to the ancient kingdom. It is also used to refer to the Greater Patani Malay State which covers provinces where Malay-Muslims constitute a majority, including Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, Pattani, and part of Songkla.

[8]Following Claude Ake's conception, two major challenges for leadership in trying to promote political integration within a state are: " (a) how to elicit from subjects deference and devotion to the claims of the state, and (b) how to increase normative consensus governing political behavior among members of the political system." See Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), 1.

[9]Malay Muslims reside in provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and part of Songkla. The term "Muslim provinces" will be used to refer to these provinces which are sometimes collectively referred to as five southern provinces. The "Malay provinces" refers to the three provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala where the mother tongue of the population is Malay.

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[10]See an excellent literature review of the subject in Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Pattani in the 1980s: Academic Literature and Political Stories," in Muslim Social Science in ASEAN, ed., Omar Farouk Bajunid (Kula Lumpur, Malaysia: Yaasan Penataran Ilmu, 1994), 43-76.

[11]See Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, The Malay Unrest in South Thailand: An Issue in Malayan-Thai Border Relations (Malaysia: University of Kebangsaan), 1994.

[12]Nantawan Haemindra, "The Problem of Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7. 2 (September 1976): 98-102.

[13]Ibid., p. 104.

[14]Ibid., p. 105.

[15]M. Ladd Thomas, "Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of Thai Muslims," Southeast Asia 3. 1 (Winter 1974): 563.

[16]M. Ladd Thomas, "Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand," Occasional Paper No. 28. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975).

[17]M. Ladd Thomas, "Political Integration of Muslims in Southernmost Thailand: Recent Developments and Their Impacts," paper presented at the 33rd International Congress of Asian and North African Studies, Toronto, Canada, August 19-25, 1990, pp. 26-27.

[18]Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1985), 15.

[19]Ibid., 267.

[20]Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the Four Southern Provinces, Thailand, 1976-1981," USF Monographs in Religion and Public Policy, No. 2 (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 1987), 29.

[21]Ibid., 41.

[22]W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[23]Ibid., 97-112.

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[24]Panompom Anuragsa, Political Integration Policy in Thailand: The Case of Malay Muslim Minority. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1984, 54.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Astri Suhrke, "The Muslims of Southern Thailand," in The Muslims of Thailand, Vol. 2 (Politics of the Malay-Speaking South), ed., Andrew D.W. Forbes, (Gaya, India: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 8-17.

[27]Ibid., 18.

[28]Ibid., 13.

[29]Andrew Cornish, Whose Place Is This? Malay Rubber Producers and Thai Government Officials in Yala (Bangkok: White Lotus Co., Ltd, 1997), 118.

[30]Alvin Y. So, Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), 35.

[31]See Talcott Parsons, Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 21-25.

[32]Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Knopf, 1969), 6.

[33]Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics, 24 (April 1972): 342.

[34]Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Liberties in the New States," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 154.

[35]Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," Journal of International Affairs, 27. 1 (1973): 21; see also Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" 319-355.

[36]Modernization is defined broadly as the expansion of industrial and service sectors in the economy, the expansion of the education system; the extension of universal citizenship and civil and political rights; and the increasing differentiation of social structures, occupational specialization; and the accompanying interdependence of complex organizations. See Susan Olzak, "Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization," Annual Review of Sociology, 9(1983): 355-374.

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[37]See Francois Neilsen, "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarities in Modern Societies," American Sociological Review, 50. 2 (April 1985): 133-149.

[38]Joseph Rothchild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[39]Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 141-228.

[40]Ibid., 226-227.

[41]Shaheen Mozaffar, "The Institutional Logic of Ethnic Politics: A Prolegomenon," in Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa, Harvey Glickman, ed. (Atlanta, Georgia: The African Studies Association Press, 1995), 37.

[42]Ibid., 33.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid., 46.

[45]See Roger Friedland and Robert Alford, "Bringing Society Back In," in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, eds. Walker W. Powell and Paul J. Dimaggio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 232-263.

[46]Shaheen Mozaffar, 43.

[47]The terms "global environment," "external environment," and "international system" are used interchangeably. They are conceived in James Rosenau's terminology to consist of all "the human and non-human phenomena that are located external to the geographic space of the society, of which the polity is a part." See James Rosenau and N. Rosenau, eds., Linkage Politics, Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 45.

[48]Geertz, 111.

[49]Ibid., 116

[50]Astri Suhrke and Lela G. Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

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[51]Ibid., 7.

[52]Some studies focus on the international level, others focus on the national level. The former is concerned with political integration among states, such as the emergence of the European Community. The latter is concerned with an integration of political parts to a political whole within a state.

[53]Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in The Integration of Political Communities, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 11.

[54]Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 358 (March 1965), pp. 52-64.

[55]Coleman and Rosberg, 8-9.

[56]Donald G. Morrison and Hugh M. Stevenson, "Integration and Instability: Patterns of African Political Development," The American Political Science Review 66. 3 (September 1972): 904-906.

[57]Claude Ake, "Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis," World Politics 19. 3 (April 1967): 487.

[58]Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, 3.

[59]Karl Deutsch, "Transition Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion, " in The Integration of Political Community, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), 11-15.

[60]Robert J. Jackson and Michael E. Stein, Issues in Comparative Politics: A Text with Readings (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), 115-124.

[61]See Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 1-9, and Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3-15.

[62]Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99. 2 (Summer 1984): 198-204.

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[63]Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 418.

[64]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1963), 27-63.

[65]Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 10.

[66]Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Ibid., 48.

[67]Larry Diamond defines civil society as "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rule." Larry Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 5 (1994): 5.

[68]Geertz, 114.

[69]See Stephen P. Cohen, The Military in Indira Ghandi's India (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976), 235.

[70]Claude Ake proposes empirical indicators of the degree of political integration as follows: the legitimacy score, extraconstitutional behavior scores, political violence score, secessionist demand score, alignment pattern score, bureaucratic ethos score, and authority score. See Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, 8-10.

[71]For a discussion of the importance of these policy areas, see Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Language Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and Policy in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

[72]Ibid., 237-238.

[73]Joseph Rothchild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University, 1981), 108-109.

[74]Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, 99.

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[75]Edmond J. Keller, "The State, Public Policy and the Mediation of Ethnic Conflict in Africa," in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 251-280.

[76]W.K. Che Man categorizes the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand into two groups--liberationists and accommodationists. See W.K. Che Man, "Liberationists and Accommodationists: The Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand," paper submitted to the project coordinator for the Project on Redefining Identity: Malay Ethnicity and the State, 1988.

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CHAPTER 2

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THAILAND

Domestic structure and the international system are part of an integrative system. Domestic politics are constrained by the anarchic nature of the international state system and are affected by the world market forces.[1] This chapter aims at investigating internal and external factors affecting the political integration of Thailand. Domestic problems of political integration may come from two sources -- "attachment" and "civil discontent."[2] The former refers to those ties involving kinship, race, language, religion, region, and custom. Civil discontent may arise from consistent, severe, and widespread deprivations, particularly during the modernization period while a traditional system breaks down before an establishment of a new order. To endure, a new state must reward the population to preclude the development of large-scale dissident groups.[3]

Ethnic conflicts tend to link internal and external forces of conflict and cooperation and, to some extent, to result from such interaction.[4] This is partly because of the characteristic of ethnic conflict that stems from the fact that ethnic identities rarely coincide fully with state boundaries. Since its inception, the Malay-Muslim separatist struggle has involved neighboring Malaysia. Supports from some individuals, groups, and states in the Middle East also contributed to the strength of the separatist movements,

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especially during the 1970s and the 1980s. Hence, external factors have important impacts on the political integration of Thailand.

This chapter examines three internal factors and two external factors affecting Thailand's integration efforts. The three internal factors are the distinctive history of the Malays in southernmost Thailand, socioeconomic development of the southernmost provinces that in turn determines the relative position of the Malay-Muslims, and primordial factors. The external factors include support from the Muslim world to the Malay separatist movements and the contemporary Islamic resurgence.

Internal Factors Affecting Thailand's Political Integration

Historical Legacy: The Patani Kingdom

Smith defines the ethnic community as "a social group whose members share a sense of common origins, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity."[5] The myth of a common and unique origin in time and place is essential for the sense of ethnic community since it marks the foundation point of the group's history and hence its individuality. It is then necessary to begin with a review of the historical origin of the Patani Kingdom.

The Thai southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narithiwat, Satun, and part of Songkla were part of an ancient Malay settlement known as Langkasuka, which was founded as early as the first century. Langkasuka was "an important trading port for

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Asian sailors, particularly when mariners began to sail directly across the Gulf of Siam from the southernmost tip of Vietnam to the Malay Peninsula, which often brought them to a landfall in the region of Patani."[6] Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam were introduced to Langkasuka in the third, the eighth, and the tenth centuries, respectively.[7] The elite in Langkasuka society were comprised largely of Buddhists and Brahmins. Islamic influence during the Langkasuka period was restricted mainly to merchant communities.

As Langkasuka gradually disappeared around the fourteenth and the early fifteenth centuries, the kingdom of Patani appeared as its replacement. Patani became an important commercial center and served as a major European trading station. It also was involved in the China trade and in more localized trade with Siam and other Malay and Indonesian ports.[8] The initial contact of Patani with Islam was a by-product of Arab trade with China. Most specialists assume that local inhabitants converted to Islam during the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The court of Patani embraced Islam and declared the kingdom an Islamic state in 1457.[9]

As Islam spread, it supplanted some of the people's old cultural observances, such as ceremonial practices and eating and clothing habits. The Jawi script of the Malay language was to replace the Indian script, and liturgical Arabic entered the Malay language.[10] The Islamization of Patani also led to the emergence of a new sense of identity that helped to distinguish the Patani Muslims from the non-Muslims.[11] The prosperity and the population of the Kingdom of Patani grew continuously. Patani became the largest and most populous of the Malay states on the peninsula.[12] However,

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after the outbreak of the civil war during the reign of Alung Yunus in 1728, the kingdom became weaker and later fell under the control of the Thais.

The Malay sources maintained that Ayudhya had established her "wide political orbit within the Malay world" by the fourteenth century.[13] Siam was portrayed as "a powerful neighbor that was keen on expanding her political power through the great strength of her military."[14] During the reign of Sultana Hijau, the Queen of Patani (1584-1616), flowers of gold were sent to the king of Siam in her name. This was an indication of Pattani's acceptance of some degree of tributary or vassal state status of Siam.[15]

Based on the study of Malay historical sources, Kobkua notes that the acceptance of tributary status was voluntary; hence, the withdrawal from such commitment should be on a voluntary basis as well. The Malays saw "neither moral obligations nor ingratitude being involved if they saw that the transaction did not serve mutual interests." [16] Thus, they attempted to release themselves from Siamese control whenever the opportunity arose and revolts against the Siamese to restore Patani's sovereignty occurred from time to time.

However, through the Thai historical prism, the objective of the suzerain-vassal diplomacy stressed the essential role of the suzerain to provide assistance and protection; in return, it expected the vassals to recognize that within their own territory, the vassal lord's power was supreme.[17] The attempt to be free from the powerful grip of its overlord was perceived as "an ungrateful act of a man who bit the hand that had fed

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them," hence, deserved to be severely punished.[18] This explains why from the Thai State's view the history of Patani is seen as a history of rebellions.

Satha-Anand maintains that there is "a discrepancy of views" between the Thai State and the Malay-Muslims concerning the history of Patani. He points out that a history of Patani in the State's point of view, as reflected from a large amount of literature, was "plagued with rebellions," but for the people of Patani, it was a history of "continuous struggle for independence."[19] The state's lack of an adequate understanding of "the power of the history" was one of the basic reasons why the problem of the Muslim South is "so difficult to solve."[20] The perception that this part of Thailand is the land of the Malays, not the Thais, shaped the actions of rural Malays in their dealings with the Thai bureaucracy and in trying to keep the Thai bureaucrat's interference to a minimum.[21]

Malays take great pride in the glorious past of the Patani Kingdom. They perceive this part of Thailand as their land, or *negri Malayu* (the Malay state or settlement), where the Thai are the invaders and outsiders. Khun Den Tohmeena, a well-known politician and a son of Hajji Sulong, noted that the "struggle" of the Malay-Muslims is not a new phenomenon. It is the struggle of the people of a land that used to prosper "as equal as those of Sri Ayuthaya Kingdom and Malacca Kingdom." Thus, they are resentful that some Thai bureaucrats in the southernmost provinces look down upon them and refer to the Malay-Muslims as "*Khake*" (visitor or foreigner).[22] From the perception of the Malay-Muslims the Thais are the outsiders who came to live in their land.

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The young Malays are quite well informed about the history of the region. A Malay university student described the history of Patani as "a highly prosperous trade center that was later destroyed and burned down by the troops from Bangkok during the reign of King Rama I."[23] Another student gave a historical account that the Malays "were chained and forced to walk to Bangkok as prisoners of war."[24] For the Malays, the history of the Patani region as reflected in Thai official accounts and in the school textbooks is "an outright lie," as a former Malay-Muslim official put it. Hence, "it is the duty of all Malay-Muslims to learn the history of their land and their people."[25] Some members of the Malay-Muslim intelligentsia take part in rediscovering and publicizing the "correct" historical accounts of the Patani region, accounts that challenge the official historical version of the Thai State.

Omar Farouk Bajunid notes that the pride in Patani's past is nearly universal among the Malay-Muslims in general and the issue of Patani's past "invariably serves as a rallying point for their political cause of the Malay-Muslim separatists" in particular.[26] There is "a thread of continuity" in the past and the collective memory of the history that "binds the Malay-Muslims into a viable and cohesive ethnic entity."[27] This legacy also shapes the Malay-Muslims' perceptions toward Thai officials as the outsiders; hence some resist the Thai officials' efforts to intervene in the life of the community.

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Socioeconomic Factor

Edward Shils argues that the political integration of the new state depends primarily on the closing of the elite-mass gap.[28] In other words, political integration is a systematic bridging of the socioeconomic and cultural gap between the ruling elite and the masses. The Thai governments since the 1950s engaged in a variety of campaigns to bridge the socioeconomic gap between the elite and the masses by implementing national development programs throughout the country. In the Malay-Muslim provinces, economic conditions had not improved much by the 1970s. On the contrary, it appeared that the government's modernization scheme exacerbated ethnic mobilization in southernmost Thailand.

Anthony Smith argued that although factors such as historical development and primordial factors must be taken into account, socioeconomic factors are important, for they act as catalysts of ethnic movements.[29] The following section will illustrate the impact of socioeconomic development of the southernmost provinces on ethnic mobilization of Malay-Muslims.

The Economy

The southernmost provinces are known for their abundance in natural resources;[30] however, prior to 1973, the economy of the Malay-Muslims was in a very unsatisfactory condition. Most of the Malays were village fishermen, rubber smallholders and tapers, small-scale farmers, small shopkeepers, vendors, and laborers, whereas the Thai and the

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Chinese owned most of the tin mines and the large rubber and coconut plantations.[31] The Chinese, who constituted less than six percent of the total population in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun, owned and operated most of the business concerns.[32] Most of the Thai and the Chinese resided within municipal areas, while about ninety-four percent of Malays lived in rural areas.[33] Based on surveys in 1962-63 and in 1975-76, Suhrke noted, "The poverty in rural areas of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani approximates, and in some cases exceeds, poverty in northeast Thailand -- the traditional reference point for extreme rural poverty in the country."[34]

Before 1950, economic conditions and standards of living in the rural areas of the southernmost provinces were about the same as those in neighboring Malaysia and better than rural areas in other parts of Thailand.[35] Thomas notes that by the mid-1950s, economic conditions had deteriorated due to various factors including: the growing population and the limitation of land for cultivation, the decrease in the price of natural rubber in the world market, the decrease in the fish catch of villagers, and the rising cost of living.[36] Partly, poor economic conditions in the region were blamed on the neglect of the government.[37] Although in the early 1960s, the government embarked upon a full-fledged national development program, its efforts had limited success and, in some cases, failed. By 1978, per capita income of people in Patani area was only 6,986 baht, in comparison to 10,277 baht for those in the southern region as a whole and to 9,797 baht for national per capita income.[38]

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David Brown attributed the economic failure of the agricultural regions of the North, Northeast, and South to the policy of "internal colonialism" of Bangkok.[39] The internal colonialism thesis, proposed by Michael Hechter in a study of Celtic nationalism, predicts reactive ethnic solidarity when economic activity within the periphery is concentrated in the hands of the core ethnic majority or when a pattern of structural discrimination exists.[40] Hechter calls this arrangement a "cultural division of labor,"[41] which occurs "when individuals are assigned to specific types of occupations and other social roles on the bases of observable cultural markers. Che Man argued that Bangkok's policy of internal colonialism stimulated the growth of separatist movements in the Patani region.[42] Cultural differences had come to form the basis for an economic and political division of labor not only at the national level but also at the regional level in southernmost Thailand.

A close look at economic activity in the southernmost provinces supports Che Man's argument. The majority of the population of the region, the Malay-Muslims, live in rural areas. They are small farmers or fishermen along the coast. As more Chinese and Thai Buddhists lived in urban areas and their household incomes were much higher than the Malay-Muslims, there was a tendency for ethnic and class divisions to coincide in these provinces.[43] At that time, the Chinese owned, and still do, almost all big business concerns, larger rubber plantations, and the big fishing boats.[44]

The Malays believed that the failure of the economy was because this region was being ignored and "exploited" by the Thai government.[45] They perceived government

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developmental strategies as benefiting the Chinese more than the Malays. For example, the government's rubber plantations subsidy benefited large rubber plantation more than the small ones.[46] The failure of the government to improve the economic well-being of the Malays made them suspect the sincerity of the government. Nevertheless, some perceived the efforts to develop the region as "an intrusion of colonial power that threatened their identity and socio-cultural values."[47]

Today, Malay-Muslims still suspect the government's intention and sincerity to develop this region. The government appeared to neglect this region with respect to economic development.[48] While an official at the National Security Council explained that this "negligence" was because the Thai government in the past emphasized the development of the northeastern region to fight communism,[49] some Malay-Muslims associated this negligence with the insincerity of the Thai State toward the Malays. The government's insincerity is explained by the prejudices the Thai officials have against the Malay-Muslims. Consequently, government development projects are not always well received because people question the government's real intention. For example, a Malay official recently declined involvement in a government development project because he thought that the project was merely a strategy to penetrate the Malay community and its goal was primarily to serve the interest of the State, not the people.[50]

Both the reality and the perception of economic conditions of the Malays are important factors in political integration. One of the government's primary agendas in its

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integrative efforts from 1973 on has been the economic development of the southernmost provinces. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Society

In the southernmost provinces, economic division reinforced social divisions within society. Social roles were assigned based on observable cultural traits. A rough division of professional categories in the southernmost provinces tends to reflect the division of ethnic lines. Prior to 1973, government officials were mostly Thais or descendents from long-resident Sino-Thai families. Commercial elites were predominantly Chinese. These two groups mostly lived in district towns of the provinces. Fishermen, small-scale rubber plantation owners, small farmers, and fishermen who made up the mass of rural villagers were mostly Malay-Muslims. In Thai society, the Chinese (business owners) and the Thai (government officials) were superior to the Malay-Muslims in power, wealth, and social status. The social role in this society reflected what Cynthia Enloe called a "vertical ethnic system," in which economic and political cleavages do not cut across ethnic lines. She argues the vertical ethnic system tends to promote revolution.[51]

Cornish observed that in the southernmost provinces, town dwellers thought of Malay and Thai villagers as having a lack of sophistication, poor education, an inferior command of language, as less clean, and conservative.[52] Thai town dwellers regarded the Malay villagers as lower down the scale on any of these attributes.[53] In Thailand, as

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observed by Herbert Rubin, interactions between the civil servants and the villagers are seen by both sides in terms of a meeting between a superior and an inferior.[54] In general, state officials tended to perceive themselves as being higher in social status and having more knowledge when compared to the villagers. This perception is even stronger when the Thai officials look at the rural Malays.[55] As the Thai government expanded its development projects to the rural areas, more state officials came into contact with Malay rural dwellers. While most government workers or officials had little knowledge of Malay language and culture, they carried with them negative attitudes against rural Malays. Thomas pinpoints bureaucratic behaviors as one of the main obstructions to government integrative efforts.[56]

Within the Malay communities, a village head tends to have influence on matters regarding economic life of the village. The source of his power comes from his personal wealth and his role as a mediator between the village and the State. Nevertheless, religious leaders are leaders of the communities. They play a leading role in most community activities, ranging from prayers to festivals. They also act as the highest level of mediation within the community.[57] Religious leaders include members of the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs, members of the Council for Mosques, and religious teachers. The nature of Muslim society in the southernmost provinces is that of a close-knit community with much activity revolving around the mosques and *pondoks* (traditional Islamic schools).[58] In 1981, there was an average of 1.4 *pondoks* and 4.8 mosques per commune.[59]

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The religious teachers play a role as religious educators at *pondoks*, mosques, and *balaisas* (smaller prayer houses).[60] Most of the traditional religious leaders, the *tokguru*, acquire their knowledge through traditional religious education in local *pondoks* and mosques in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. They are considered the most authoritative source in matters concerning Islam and are the most influential and respected. The nontraditional religious teachers (*ustaz*) are mostly educated in formal Islamic schools and universities. Many are graduates of Middle East or North African universities. They are the second most respected and influential religious elite.[61] Religious education is important in the Malay society. The roles of religious teachers as educators, together with other roles mentioned above, have made them the most legitimate leaders in Patani society. They are the "informal leaders" that Thai government seeks to control and to co-opt into its integration efforts.

During the democratization period in Thailand that has taken place since 1973, there also emerged new groups in Malay society who play an increasingly important role in the society. Their leadership derives from their secular educational background and their knowledge and skills in working within the Thai system. This new force is a result of Thailand's modernization, specifically the expansion of secular education opportunity to Malays. These educated Malays would later become "agents of change" that facilitated integration between the Malay minority and the Thai majority.[62] They are politicians, professionals, and civil servants. This will be discussed in the later chapters.

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The Primordial Factors

The primordial factors include kinship, race, language, religion, region, and custom. Anthony Smith argued that for an ethnic group to emerge, there must be some "primordial" factors around which to build a sense of community.

> Ethnic separatism is based upon cultural differences and the sense of cultural distinctiveness. Ethnic movements make their claims in virtue of an alleged 'community of culture,' in which the members are both united with each other by a shared culture and differentiated from others by the possession of that culture.[63]

Muslims of the southernmost provinces are of Malay ethnicity. While they are the country's minority group, they are the majority population of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun. Unlike the Thai Buddhists, they speak Malay as their mother tongue (except in Satun) and profess Islam. In terms of culture, they belong to what Pitsuwan called "the Malay cultural world." This section will explore the primordial factors and its impact on political integration.

Religious Factor: Islam

Khajatphai Burutphat argued in 1973 that Islam is "the most important factor" that alienates the Malay-Muslims from the Buddhists.[64] He stressed, "Islam influences the perception of these Thai-Muslims to think that they are not Thai (*Khonthai*) but they are Malays like the Malays in Malaysia."[65] Thomas noted that, among other factors, "some of the religious beliefs and practices of the Muslims" resulted in little social

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interaction between Muslims and Thais. Pitsuwan also emphasized the "cosmological roots" for the conflicts between the Thai State and Malay-Muslims in the southernmost provinces."[66]

It is important to note that the history of Thailand, particularly during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, reveals that not only ethnic Malay-Muslims struggled against Siamese rule. The Buddhist Laotians of the northeast and *Khonmuang* of the north also struggled for the rights to their own political sovereignties. The leaders of the movements in the north and northeast were found among the Buddhist monks, such as Kruba Srivichai of Chiangmai. An investigation of the ways the State intervened with religious affairs, both in Buddhism and Islam, will illuminate the process that led to resistance by religious figures.

The State Control of Religious Hierarchy

During the reign of King Chulalongkorn, one of the instruments to unify the state was Buddhism. The Thammayut Order was used as the basis for a reform and unification of the entire *sangha*. A standard curriculum, written in "standard Thai," was created for the education of novices and monks. In 1902, the King promulgated a law that created a unified *sangha* under the supreme patriarch, appointed by the King. Provincial *sangha* heads were appointed to ensure that local members of the *sangha* would begin to conform to the dictates of the law.

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The efforts to replace many local practices by ones prescribed by the Thai *sangha* authorities created resentment and resistance, such as the protest led by Kruba Srivichai in 1935. Although the State eventually gained control over the religious hierarchy,[67] monks continue to be influential figures in the rural areas until the present. In many cases, the monks led their countrymen to oppose government projects that created negative impacts on the livelihood of the villagers, such as the case of the Dongyai Forest in the lower northeast during the 1990s.[68]

The State tried to intervene with religious affairs and to control Malay-Muslim religious leadership in southernmost provinces by different means. For example, the provincial Islamic councils had to be approved by the Ministry of Interior, the government converted *pondoks* into semisecular "private schools teaching Islam," and the state bureaucracy patronized religious affairs.[69] When the State power extended its domain to include the Malay-Muslims and to interfere with their religion, protests and rebellions began. Pitsuwan concluded that "the more it [the State] invests, the deeper sense of alienation the Malay-Muslims feel from the state."[70] The more the State imposed change, the more resistance it received from the Malay-Muslim community.[71]

The Role of Islam as an Ideological Source

The messages of the Qu'ran to the Muslims are clearly worship and submissiveness to God (Allah). Islam's insistence on viewing religion as an overarching way of life is the Arabic word "*deen*," the equivalent of "religion" but also meaning "a

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whole way of life."[72] Islamic righteousness therefore encompasses all fields of human existence -- political, moral, social, religious, cultural, economic, and legal. Thus, politics and religion are enmeshed, or are rather viewed as "two sides of a single coin."[73] However, it must be noted, when Islam came to Southeast Asia, it was a non-aggressive belief that allowed its followers to retain their traditional ways. The Arab and Indian traders who brought Islam to the region identified themselves with their new home, adopted local ways, and fused with the local population.[74] Ronald Provencher maintains that older religious beliefs and practices were not totally cast aside, and these varied from place to place.[75]

Theoretically, each individual Muslim, in order to feel fully a Muslim, seeks to be part of the *ummah* (literally, the nation) on the local level.[76] One feels the need to belong to a local Muslim community to maintain the essentials of an Islamic order. Since the Patani Kingdom has fallen under a non-Muslim kingdom, the Thai rule, the Malay-Muslims struggle to preserve such aspects of *ummah* as remain to them in the area and recover, if possible, those aspects of *ummah* they have lost. Islamic law recognizes that a country which passes into the hands of non-Muslim conquerors does not *ipso facto* become *dar-al-harb* (the abode of war or the territory of nonbelievers). The general view maintains that if Islamic laws are enforced for Muslims, then the country retains its character as *dar-al-Islam* (the abode of Islam).[77] Since the ultimate religious aim for a Muslim is to submit himself to the will of God as manifested in the form of the divine

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law, legal and cultural autonomy of the Malay-Muslim community is a cause that the Malay-Muslims have strived for, as reflected in Hajji Sulong's demands in 1947.

From the time that Malays came under the Thai rule, the Thai State, for most of the time, has allowed the Muslims in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun to be governed by Islamic law in matters of inheritance and marriage where both of the involved partners are Muslims. However, according to the law and in its practice, the Islamic judge could only give "advice" to the Thai judge.[78] The court decides what matters will involve the Islamic judge.[79] The implementation of Islamic law can also be challenged by one of the parties who does not wish to use Islamic law but the Thai law. Moreover, Islamic law encompasses not only the family and inheritance matters but also other aspects such as economic and social regulations. The Malay-Muslims have attempted to expand the implementation of the Islamic law into other issues, especially in the economic realm.

The desire to live one's life according to what is prescribed in the Qu'ran and the *Sunnah* preoccupies the minds of many Malay-Muslims because this is "to serve the will of God."[80] When the Thai State appeared to obstruct their aspiration, they strove to protect their basic human rights of religious practices. As an ideology, Islam unites the local populations of Patani into a unique community and reinforces them with a spirit of independence. Islam has been used as an ideological force to struggle against the encroachment of the Thai State.

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One of the outstanding characteristics of Islam is that it advocates that its followers fight against injustice. While Islam prohibits Muslims from engaging in wars of aggression, Islam sanctions Muslims to fighting injustice. As stated in the Holy Qu'ran:

> Let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter. To him who fights in the cause of Allah, whether he is slain or gets victory, We soon shall give him a reward of great (value). And why should ye not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are ill treated (and oppressed)? Men, women, and children whose cry is "Our Lord! Rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from Thee one who will protect, and raise for us from Thee one who will help.[81]

Since Islam strongly disapproves injustice, it stands ready to be used to legitimize actions against the authoritarian governments of the Thai State. During most of the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, two of the reasons that leaders of separatist movements gave for calling upon Malays for *jihad* (striving) against the Thai government were to restore justice and to protect Islam. Satha-Anand pointed out that while fighting against injustice is obligatory upon Muslims, it could be violent or non-violent and a variety of alternative actions would be open among which political actors may choose."[82]

Which political actions are taken depend upon what choices are available. Choices given by a dictatorship regime would be significantly different from those given by a democratic one. For the greater part of its recent history, Thailand has been under military rule that generally encouraged local repression by intolerant, irresponsible, and corrupt officials.[83] From the surveys of underground pamphlets issued by various

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authors of different movements, Satha-Anand found that there was a pattern to their rationalization of the acts of violence as reactions to the government's violence.[84]

From the interviews with a former separatist and a former "agitator," they gave reasons for their decisions to use violent acts against the government as "a reaction against government's oppression and injustice." They turned to violence as a means to fight the State because there was no other option available for them.[85] The former joined a separatist front after being accused by the police of robbery in 1974. The latter took violent actions against the government after the government committed violence against "our Muslim brothers" during the Pattani Demonstration in 1976. What these two individuals did was a response to injustice and violence that the State committed.

Another important dimension of Islam that needs to be taken into consideration is its flexibility and adaptability. Suthasasna argues that Islam is capable of changes and adaptation but when there is force to change from the state, the Malay-Muslims will resist changing.[86] To pinpoint that Islam is "the" factor that yields a specific effect on political integration underestimates the power of *ijtihad*, or personal reasoning in the form of reinterpretations by religious, legal experts, and individuals, that has taken place throughout the history of Islam. It also, as Geertz pointed out, can be difficult to presuppose an automatic union of religion and politics among all Muslims for there exists a breadth of diversity and opinion that one can find wherever there are Muslims.[87] More important, it might divert us from looking at other important elements that may

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yield a more powerful explanation, such as cultural identity, language, integrative experiences and political rules and institutions, governing the ethnic relationship.[88]

The Qur'an offers the principle of *al-amr bi-l-ma'ruf*, or to do good toward all humanity. This principle allows those which Imtiyaz Yusuf refers to as the "Islamic accommodationists" to accept different Thai political viewpoints while advocating religious coexistence with the Buddhists and other religions in keeping with the Qur'anic principle, "There is no compulsion in religion."[89] One good example is in the writing of Winai Sama-un, a well-known Thai-Muslim Islamic scholar. In his writing entitled "The National Development Plan (Number 9) and the Muslim's Ways of Life," he advocated co-existence with non-Muslims and encouraged the Muslims to learn "foreign languages" by referring to Qur'anic verse and al-Hadith for justification.[90]

Moreover, within the Islamic framework, the idea of war for religious causes (jihad) is "associated with continuous striving in the path of faith."[91] "Striving by the sword" represents the lesser jihad while the greater jihad are those that take place at a more personal level within the heart, the tongue, and the hands.[92] For Muslims, striving for the cause of God need not be in the form of war and violence. Thus, Islam, like Buddhism, Christianity, and Judaism, provides powerful ideology that one can use to justify different views and actions. As Abner Cohen argued, "The system of myths and symbols which religion provides is capable of being continuously interpreted and re-interpreted in order to accommodate it to changing economic, political and other social circumstances."[93]

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It can be concluded that Islam plays a crucial role in influencing the formation and the direction of views, actions, and goals of the separatists, the communalists, and the accommodationists. Hence, one of the State's tasks is to find ways to accommodate and utilize religious elements that will foster the State's goal of integration. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

Cultural and Language Factors

The linkage between Islam and Malay culture is that it serves as a means of defining the identity of the Malay-Muslims. Islamic culture is a basis for the lifestyle or behaviors of the Muslims. As mentioned earlier, the Arab and Indian traders who brought Islam to the region identified themselves with their new home, adopted local ways, and fused with the local population.[94] Nevertheless, Islam has supplanted a number of cultural practices, such as eating and clothing habits, social interaction between men and women, and ceremonial observances. The use of Jawi script is also another evidence of the direct effect of Islamic influence in the region. The influence of Islam helps distinguish the Malays from the Thai in their cultural realm. Differences in culture tend to create division among groups of people and to create the feeling of “they” versus “we.”[95] Moreover, it is common that each group will feel that their culture is superior to another.

Donald and Elise Tugby noted that although the formal structure of the Thai administration was derived from a Western model, its informal structure and the actions

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of the administrators were suffused with Buddhist values and belief.[96] They argued that the Buddhist values "provide the cultural continuity which enabled the administrators to operate successfully in Thai Buddhist villages and which aligns Buddhism against Islam."[97] Chaveewan Vannaprasert and colleagues maintained that Muslims had "a difficult time following Islamic requirements in a predominantly Thai Buddhist society."[98] They noted that one of the problems Malays faced was that the provincial government officials failed to understand the Islamic religion and customs; hence they could not obtain cooperation from the majority of Muslims.[99]

Burutphat noted that until 1972, most Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand, except for those in Satun, did not know Thai language and those who knew Thai did not like to speak Thai.[100] This circumstance has been an obstacle to any meaningful communication between the State officials and the ethnic Malay-Muslims. Thus, the widespread use of Malay language constituted a major obstacle the State had to overcome. Moreover, this situation made the Thai bureaucrats with whom the Malays came into contact for official business appear to be outsiders living in the periphery of the Malays' world. A recent survey also confirmed that language is the most important factor that directly contributes to the distrust of Malays toward the Thai authorities.[101]

The importance of Malay language for the Malay-Muslims of southern provinces is twofold. First, it is the language of communication within households and the community and with their brethren across the border in Malaysia.[102] Second, it is the language used for teaching Islam, especially in *pondoks*. Most religious books that are

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written by Muslim scholars that are used in *pondoks* are written in Malay (Yawi) and Arabic.

The Malay language is not only a part of the Malay-Muslim identity but also a part of their religion. This feeling is deeply embedded in the minds of Malay-Muslims up to the present time; hence, the term "Islamic language" (Pahasa Islam) is used interchangeably with "Malay language." This linkage between religion and the language makes Malays feel obliged to protect their language.[103] For the Malay-Muslims, the Thai government policies such as the banning of the Malay language (during the Phibun's regime), the requirement that the language of instruction in private schools teaching Islam must be in Thai, and the changing of street names from Malay to Thai show that the Thai State has tried to eradicate the Malay culture and language, which is the heart of their identity. Thus, they opposed the government policies.

The direct Thai political rule in the Patani region led to an unprecedented cultural confrontation in the area between the Malay population and the new Thai bureaucrats sent to rule them from Bangkok.[104] As the Thai State tightened control over them and tried to suppress their religion, cultural, and language identities, they strove to protect their identity and their basic rights.[105] In turn, as Ronald Provencher noted, Malays' efforts to maintain their own religion and language were "inevitably suspected of being linked with separatist movements."[106]

To summarize, the uniqueness of the historical background of the southernmost provinces, socioeconomic development of the region, Islam, and cultural and language

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identity played significant roles in supporting the maintenance of a separate Malay ethnic community within the Thai State. These factors attracted special attention from the State and required different policy strategies to incorporate this ethnic group into the Thai polity. The history of the Malay provinces and primordial factors alienated Malays from the Thai majority but facilitated the linkage of Malays to the outside world. It is now that we turn to investigate external factors affecting the government's integrative policies and strategies.

External Factors Affecting Political Integration in Thailand Prior to 1973

The pattern by which external forces influence domestic politics can be either direct or indirect. Foreign powers may directly intervene to support dissident groups in another country. External actors that can influence a country's domestic politics include governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

The indirect pattern can be called a "spillover effect." Dramatic events in other countries might cause political changes. Samuel Huntington highlights the "snowballing" effect of democratization in countries that was caused by democratic developments in other countries.[107] The domino theory, popularized by the Vietnam War, also predicted a snowballing effect of an expansion of communism to countries in Southeast Asia. The Iran Revolution that signified the power of Islamic ideology awoke the Islamic identity of the general Muslim population in many parts of the world. During

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the beginning of the 1980s, many observers predicted that this revolution would have a spillover effect on Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States.

Ethnic mobilization in one country might also have spillover effect on ethnic politicization in other countries. The Malay nationalist movement in Malaya and Indonesia, after the end of World War II, and separatist movements in the Philippines (the Moro) and Indonesia (the Achenese) set examples for Malay-Muslim irredentist and separatist movements in Thailand.[108]

Thailand has been particularly sensitive to the changes in the international environment because they have important effects on the Thai government's integration efforts. M. Alagappa notes that the Thai government diagnosed external support as "the root cause" of armed separatism.[109] It believed that armed separatism could not be sustained with local means alone and that without external support, the Malay-Muslim community would have no choice but to integrate into the Thai polity.

As the Malay-Muslim separatist movements were able to draw foreign attention and support from their coreligionists in the Muslim world, the Thai government needed to adjust its approach toward Malay-Muslims to delegitimize the claims made by the movements abroad. It also had to seek cooperation from the other governments to find ways to stop the support of separatist groups. This section examines two external factors--support to separatist movements from the Muslim world and the temporary Islamic resurgence--that have had an impact on Thailand's integration policies and efforts and the Thai government foreign policy in dealing with this issue.

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Support from the Muslim World

Islam has established linkages between the Malays of southernmost Thailand and the outside Muslim political communities that facilitated the Islamic struggles.[110] The Malays of southern Thailand are part of the Muslims of the Malay ethnicity in Southeast Asia and are part of the general Muslim community (*ummah*) who provide sources of material and morale support for their struggle. The Patani resistance has, since the 1960s, greatly relied on support from Malays of Malaysia, specifically from the northern states, the Islamic world as a whole, and radical regimes in the Middle East in particular.[111] Kitti Ratnachaya, a former Fourth Army Commander of Thailand, maintained that the survival of the separatist movements would be difficult if they did not receive support from the outside.[112] This support came in different forms, including providing safe havens, military training, financial support and moral support.[113]

External forces have influenced the Thai government approach toward the Malay Muslims of southernmost Thailand. These external forces include international organizations and foreign states and groups. The most important international organizations are the International Council of Muslim Foreign Ministers and the Arab League. The internationalization of the Malay separatist issue, on the one hand, made Thailand vulnerable to outside pressure; on the other hand, it increased the morale and capacity of Malay-Muslim separatist movements. Hence, it affected Thailand's integration efforts and approaches toward the Malay-Muslims.

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Malaysia

Syed Husin Ali maintains that what set the Malays of Malaysia apart from the rest of peninsular Malaysia, including the Malays of southern Thailand, was the "result of recent colonial history."[114] Omar Farouk Bajunid emphasizes the geographic location of the Malay provinces, the Malay majority status within these provinces, and the close affinity that Malays of the southernmost provinces have with their ethnic brethren across the border in Malaysia as the principal sources of the birth and growth of Malay-Muslim secessionism and irredentism in the Patani region.[115] From their inception, irredentist movements and separatist fronts have depended on both material and moral support from their ethnic brethren in the northern states of Malaysia.

When Japan surrendered in August 1945, Britain assumed responsibility for post-surrender tasks in Thailand, Malaya, southern Indochina, Sumatra, and Java. This period of interim British military control offered the Patani Malay leadership an opportunity to push for irredentist demands. The end of the war also coincided with the surge of nationalism and a self-determination sentiment that was taking place in Southeast Asia. It had a spillover effect on the rise of political consciousness of the Malay-Muslims and their aspiration for a return to Malaya.

Seven members of the traditional elite of Patani signed and sent a petition outlining their grievances against the Thai government to the British government. They requested the British government and the Allied Nations to "release our country and ourselves from the pressure of Siam...[and] to help the return of this country to the

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Malays, so that they can have it united with other Malay countries in the peninsula...."[116] However, the demand did not receive support from Britain. In addition, the United States' anticolonial suspicions toward Britain made it stand firm in preventing any attempt that would impair Thai sovereignty.[117]

The Greater Patani Malay Association (Gabungan Meleyu Patani Raya or GAMPAR) that had its offices in Kelantan, Kedah, Penang, and Singapore made a series of appeals to the United Nations and other international organizations, such as the Arab League and the Asia Relations Organization. It called for support from Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and the states of the Arab League.[118]

On the Malaysian side, the Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM) was first to take the view that the four Muslim provinces of southern Thailand should be included in the formation of Malaysia in the early 1960s.[119] However, it was the leaders of the Partai Islam se-Malaysia (PAS) with a power base in the northern states of Malaysia who had been "vociferous in their support of the Patani Muslims."[120] The PAS members raised the Patani issue many times in the Malayan parliament. Datok Mohammad Asri, who was a leader of the PAS, the chief minister of Kelantan in 1970, and the minister for religious affairs in the federal government in 1974, openly announced support for the separatist movements of Patani on several occasions.[121]

The Malay villagers, especially in Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis, Perak, and Trengganu, were strong supporters of the Patani struggle.[122] When leaders in Patani realized that the hope for irredentism had come to an end, some of them began to prepare themselves for

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integration into the Thai nation. Some moved to Malaysia, especially to the northern states of Keddah, Kelantan, Perak, and Trengganu, while others sought refuge in Saudi Arabia.[123] The overseas Patani Muslims would later provide valuable support for the separatist fronts organized to challenge the Thai State.[124] There exists an extensive kin network between the Malay-Muslims in the Patani region and the Malays of the northern Malaysian states through intermarriage. A number of Malay-Muslims in the southernmost provinces of Thailand hold dual nationalities--Thai and Malaysian. There have been seasonal labor movements from the southernmost provinces of Thailand to these states. Up to the present, many parents like to send their children to Malaysia for education. These factors contribute to and reinforce the cultural, social, and political linkages between the Malay-Muslims of Patani and their ethnic counterparts across the border in Malaysia.[125]

Up to the mid-1990s, these northern states of Malaysia served as a safe haven for members of the separatist fronts. Those who went for military training in the Middle East used Malaysia as the transit point before crossing the border back to Thailand.[126] The PULO used its office in Kota Baru, about 30 kilometers from the Thai border, as an "operations office" where instructions were given to leaders and guerrillas.[127] The Thai officials confirmed that some Malay separatists held dual citizenship and worked in Malaysia while their operations bases were sanctioned by local Malaysian officials.[128] A key National Security Council official remarked, "Without assistance from Malaysia, it is unlikely that terrorism in the southernmost area could be effectively rooted out."[129]

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Moreover, moral support also came from *da'wah* organizations. The largest and most important of private Muslim organizations that work to spread the message of Islam by preaching (*da'wah* organizations) in Malaysia is the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or ABIM). It received a great deal of support from Islamic student organizations. One of the major strands in ABIM ideology has been its commitment to Muslim internationalism. Funston notes that at least 20 % of its Malay-language monthly magazine, Risalah, is "concerned with Islamic development outside Malaysia."[130] Much attention is given to the needs of oppressed Islamic minorities in countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, China, Thailand, and the Philippines and the struggle of Palestinians. A Malay-Muslim graduate student at a university in Kuala Lumpur observed that Malaysian student activists have great sympathy with the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces of Thailand.[131] A good example of this sympathy was the publication in a student's journal, Suara Siswa (The Students' Voice), about the grievances of the Patani people and a harsh criticism of the Thai State's oppressive measures against Malays.

The Thai government in the past blamed Malaysia for giving support and providing safe haven for the separatists. The Malaysian government repeatedly refuted that it had any involvement in supporting the movements. At the same time, Malaysia suspected that Thailand tacitly tolerated the Communist Party of Malaya so that a bargaining chip remained to exert influence on Malaysia.[132] From the early 1960s, demonstrations of good faith and consultations have helped to contain suspicion between

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the two governments. In 1965, the two countries concluded an agreement on border patrols that institutionalized consultation and collaboration against insurgency operations between the borders of their states. The subsequent establishment of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 also helped promote cooperation between the two states.

The Malaysian government realized that Malaysia is a multiethnic state. Thus, it shared a common interest with Thailand in not roiling each other's ethnic waters. Violation of this principle by one country invited retribution by the other, using the same justification for intervention.[133] The Malaysian government also needed cooperation from Thailand in its effort to fight the Communist Party of Malaya. Moreover, it had a common interest with Thailand in pushing forward the ASEAN spirit.

Leadership in Kuala Lumpur played a significant role in shaping the Malaysia-Thailand relations. When Prime Minister Abdul Rahman of Malaysia, who was educated in Bangkok and married to a Thai lady, was the secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC), he indirectly helped Thailand prevent the activity of the separatist movements in the OIC circle. Personal contacts between him and the Thai officials enabled the latter to give him "correct" information about the just and fair treatment given to Muslims in Thailand hence, influencing the OIC's decision not to include the movements' petitions in its agenda.[134] When Abdul Rahman completed his term in the position of the secretary general of the OIC, Malaysian and Indonesian diplomatic corps in Riyadh helped Thailand by informing the Thai diplomats about the

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status of the petition in the OIC. This helped enable Thailand to plan and adjust its strategies.[135]

Omar Farouk Bajunid noted that when PAS members in the Malaysian Parliament tried to condemn the Thai government for its repressive actions against Malay-Muslims of southernmost Thailand, the Malaysian government authorities and parliament members defended Thailand by blaming the communists for creating unrest in the region.[136] Although the Malaysian government made it clear that "Islamic issues will not be pursued at the expense of regional co-operation,"[137] support from the northern states remained. Hence, the Thai government officials on many occasions urged the Malaysian government to "pressure" the northern states to stop giving support to the separatist movements so that economic cooperation between the two countries could be realized.

It was in the mid-1990s that the Malaysian government's position toward the Malay-Muslim separatist movements changed drastically. After accepting the principle of cooperation in the growth triangle project (the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle or IMT-GT), proposed by the prime minister of Malaysia in 1993, Thailand has repeatedly requested the Malaysian government to help solve the problem of separatism.[138] Peace and security in the southernmost provinces of Thailand became "a prerequisite" for economic cooperation under the IMT-GT project, i.e., there had to be peace before the project could be realized.[139] After economic crisis hit Southeast Asia in

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1997, Malaysia had actually stepped up its cooperation to resolve security along the common border.

In January 1998, the three leading figures of the new PULO (the Patani United Liberation Organization) and the military leader of the mainstream PULO were arrested in Malaysia and were handed over by Malaysian forces.[140] Following this close cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia, leading separatist figures, feeling insecure in Malaysia that was once their safe haven, left Malaysia for Saudi Arabia and Sweden.[141] This development of Thai-Malay cooperation has significantly weakened the capacity of the separatist fronts while strengthening the Thai State's position.

Other Muslim States

From the early 1970s, sharp increases in oil prices brought economic wealth to oil-exporting countries like Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, and Kuwait. Their ability to force the Western companies, hence the world, to accept higher oil prices and their newfound wealth added to the prestige of these exporting nations.[142] The emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose majority members are Muslim states and who operate as a powerful cartel, influenced Thailand to adjust its relations with the ethnic Malays of southernmost Thailand and with the states in the Muslim world, especially in the Middle East.[143]

Thailand, like many countries, became dependent on the Muslim oil-exporting countries for its oil supply, especially from Saudi Arabia. As these countries became

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richer, they asserted their role in protecting Muslims around the world.[144] This has been done through various organizations such as the World Muslim League and the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC). These organizations, at the very least, provided channels through which the Malay separatist movements could voice their grievances and call for supports from the Muslim world. The PULO's policy-making headquarters was located in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, where the Office of the Secretariat of the World Muslim League is located. Its office in Damascus served as a point where selected guerrilla leaders were sent for military training.[145] Some of them were recruited during their pilgrimage in Mecca and sent to Damascus for orientation before their training along the border of Lebanon.[146]

During the oil crisis, Thailand was highly dependent upon the oil supply from the Muslim states. It had to seek cooperation from Saudi Arabia to sell oil to Thailand at the "friendship" price. At the same time, Thailand anticipated possible economic punishment from these Muslim states, as when the OIC threatened to boycott the Philippines in 1975 for its mistreatment and oppression of Muslims in Mindanao.[147] Thailand recognized that through international forums such as the OIC, the Malay separatist movements had accused Thailand of oppressing its Muslim population, thereby damaging Thailand's image and reputation. Moreover, these forums enabled the separatist movements to attract support from Muslim countries to fight against the State. To alter this situation, Thailand tried to give counter information and to persuade the Muslim countries that the modernization and development schemes in the Muslim

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provinces introduced by the Thai government were "the right direction" to take.[148] Hence, they should stop giving support to the separatist movements.

A Thai diplomatic officer commented that the separatist movements' strategy of taking the issue to an international level made it "necessary for the Thai government to adjust its approach towards the Malay-Muslims."[149] The external support to the Malay-Muslims damaged Thailand's reputation in the international community. Thailand also feared that it would jeopardize Thailand's oil imports from the Arab oil-exporting countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.[150] Moreover, Thailand also worried about alleged assistance given to the Malay-Muslim separatist groups from some Muslim countries, such as Syria and Libya. Thus, one of the measures stipulated in the national security policy for the southern border provinces has been to use diplomatic channels to "correct the understanding of the Muslim countries regarding Thailand's policy [toward the Malay-Muslims]."[151]

One of Thailand's strategies regarding this issue was to invite representatives from the Muslim World League to visit the southernmost provinces. On 7 July 1973, the league delegation led by Datoh Sayid Ibrahim Al-Saguf visited Thailand. The delegation suggested the Thai government provide the Muslims with job opportunities in government offices, especially the executive positions; provide education for the Muslim youth, especially at the university level; uplift economic conditions of Muslims in the southernmost provinces; and establish Islamic courts to deal with cases in which both parties are Muslims.[152]

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also produced pamphlets in Arabic and English entitled "Muslims in Thailand" to be distributed in Muslim countries. The pamphlets describe the government efforts to promote the status of Muslims in Thailand and the role of the monarch as the upholder of all religious faiths. Ambassadors from Muslim countries have been invited to visit Malay-Muslim communities in the southern border provinces. In 1998, Thailand obtained observer status in the OIC and used it as a public relations channel "so that the Muslim countries would know Thailand better, especially that the Thai State guarantees freedom of worship."[153] In 1998, when the Thai Foreign Minister, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, paid a visit to Libyan President Mu'amar Kadhafi, the latter said, "Your country [Thailand] no longer has a problem."[154] This recognition gave relief to the Thai government and proved the success of Thailand's diplomatic policy.

A retired Thai-Muslim diplomat commented that what made Thailand successful in solving the separatist problem was that the Thai leaders "recognized and accepted" the existence of the problem. They were "very fast" to adjust their approaches toward the Malay-Muslims.[155] The movements found less support from the Muslim countries. The Muslim countries and organizations are now offering more assistance and financial support to the Thai government in its efforts to develop the southernmost provinces, especially in education and social development programs.[156]

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Islamic Revivalism

Fred R. Von Der Mehden notes that over the past three decades, a variety of indigenous factors facilitated the increased influence of Islam in Muslim societies. They are: the dissatisfaction with Western secular solutions to social and political problems, a rejection of what are seen as undesirable aspects of the modern Western value system, a greater sense of pride and identity among Muslims fostered by the Islamic world's greater prominence in global economic and political affairs, and the expansion of efforts by foreign Muslim governments and groups to spread the faith.[157]

As communication technology progresses, ideas and events in any Muslim country are readily transmitted across the Islamic world. Like many parts of the Muslim world, the writings of the Pakistani Abul Ala Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Society); the Egyptians Syid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood; and the Iranian Dr. Ali Shariati reached and influenced Muslims in Thailand, particularly Muslim university students.[158]

Moreover, an increasing number of Malays and Thai-Muslim students have studied in universities in the Middle East and Indian subcontinent. Upon their return, many become teachers in the religious schools (*pondoks*) and in private schools teaching Islam in the southernmost provinces. These elements have fostered revivalism among Muslims in Thailand. In response to the growth of Islamic revivalism and danger that might come with it, the Thai government sought to contain the possible negative effects through a combination of co-optation and greater surveillance of religious activities.

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The Iranian Revolution in 1979 had an important influence on devoted Muslims all over the world, including the Muslims in Thailand. The revolution came at a time when the Islamic revivalism was gaining momentum in Thailand, especially among the Muslim college students.[159] The Islamic revolution appeared at first to be an example of the victory of Islam over forces of Western materialism, morality, and ideologies. Nowhere else has Islam been so decidedly victorious over the economic, political, and moral forces of the West. The revolution was an example for Muslims that modern states could apply the principle of governance that Islam stipulated.[160] It generated a greater sense of pride and identity among Muslims in Thailand.

The Thai government was uneasy with Imam Khomeini's policy to export Islamic revolution. There was a concern that Iran might serve as an inspirational model for Malays of southernmost Thailand. Moreover, some Thai officials believed that Iran supported the Malay-Muslim separatists. The wave of Islamic revivalism, which was reflected in the assertion of Islamic identity of many Muslims in Thailand that came after the Iranian revolution, also created an uneasy atmosphere among some Thai bureaucratic elite. The manifestation of Islamic revivalism in Thailand came in a variety of ways, such as the wearing of modest clothing by more and more women; the greater attention given to prayer, fasting, and other Islamic rituals; more religious lectures and summer camps organized by different groups in society, particularly by college students; and the growth of *da'wah* groups.[161]

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Von der Mehden maintained that the revolution is still upheld by a wide spectrum of Southeast Asian Muslims as one of the most important phenomena of the twentieth century.[162] From the Thai government's perception, the most concrete evidence of Iranian influence on Muslims in Thailand was reflected in the gathering of over 50,000 people at the Kru-se Mosque in Pattani province in 1995. The demonstrators demanded the government to withdraw the registration of the mosque as a historical monument.

Some external elements have been supportive of Thailand's integration efforts. The American support to the Thai State, especially during the Vietnam War, made Thailand view the United States as a close ally. This relationship continued throughout the period of the Cold War and it has impacted Thailand's integration efforts. The American military assistance to Thailand strengthened the military capacity of the Thai State. The United States also supported Thailand's efforts at infrastructure development, such as road construction, that helped connect Bangkok with other regions of the country. The Thai-American alliance also had an indirect impact on the morale of the Malay-Muslim separatists. A former guerilla trainer explained that the close alliance between the United States and Thailand influenced his perception about the likelihood of the eventual triumph of the Thai State over the movement. He said:

> The PLO had far more advanced technological weapons and was much better organized than our movement but could not win Israel because of the American support to Israel. A number of us, who were trained in Syria, came to realize that we would not have a chance to win the Thai State. If there was a civil war [in Thailand], the US would jump in and side with Thailand.[163]

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When the Cold War was over, the New World Order also supported the status quo in the international system. A good example is reflected in the statement of UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali. He said, "If every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become even more difficult to achieve."[164] These international elements, to a certain extent, are supportive of Thailand's integration efforts. It can be concluded that the morale and material support from the Muslim states and groups served to boost the strength of the separatist fronts and hence worked against Thailand's integration effort. Islamic revivalism increased Muslims' pride and sense of identity. These external factors, in turn, influenced Thailand's approaches toward the Malay-Muslims.

Summary

The unique history of the Malay-Muslim provinces as well as internal and external factors influenced the Thai government's policy toward the Malay-Muslims of southernmost Thailand. On the domestic side, the government had to try to deal with the challenges of political integration that came from "attachments" and "civil discontent" as described above. While the government's main efforts continued to include suppression of the separatist fronts and the development of the region, the greatest challenge for the Thai State was to "bring back trust, a positive attitude, and willingness to cooperate" on the part of the Malay population.[165] Thus, after the democratic transition period,

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beginning in 1973, some old policies and strategies were revised and new strategies were initiated. On the international side, Thailand had to find ways to stop the flow of support from Muslim states and groups to Malay-Muslim separatist movements. These were the challenges that the Thai State faced when the new administration came into office in 1973.

It is important to note that both internal and external factors are not static. Their dynamics are consequences of changing domestic and international contexts. As time passes, domestic politics, socioeconomic development of Malay provinces, the characteristic of primordial factors, the support from Muslim countries and groups, and the intensity of Islamic revivalism have changed. Some of the changes are the results of the government's previous policies. The responses or feedback from the Malay-Muslims toward the government's policies, in turn, became inputs into the system that influenced the government's approaches. These dynamics will be discussed when investigating the government's integration policies in the following chapters.

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Notes

[1]Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 22 (Autumn 1981): 881-912.

[2]Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 105-157.

[3]Henry Teune, "The Learning of Integrative Habits," in The Integration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Tosano, 272-282.

[4]See Astri Suhrke and Lela G. Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

[5] Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 66.

[6]Andries Teeuw and David K. Wyatt, The Story of Patani (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 1-2.

[7]A. Bangnara, Patani: Adeet-Pajjuban, Patani: Past-Present (Bangkok: Chomrom Saengtian Press, 1976), 4-15.

[8]Teeuw and Wyatt, 7.

[9]Ibid., 75.

[10]Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press and the Hebrew University, 1979), 7.

[11]Gesar A. Majul, "Theories on the Introduction and Expansion of Islam in Malaysia," 2nd Biennial Conference, Proceedings, Association of Historians of Asia (October, 1962), 394-95, quoted in Wan Kadir bin Che Man, Muslim Elites and Politics in Southern Thailand, Master's thesis, University of Malaysia (1983), 25.

[12]T.J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, Vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 67.

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[13]Kobkuea Suwannatat-Pian, "Siam as Portrayed in the Indigenous Malay Sources," Paper presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies, 22-24 August 1984, Bangkok, 5.

[14] Ibid.

[15]Arong Sutthasasna, Panha Khuam Khad-yaeng Nai See Changwat Phaak Tai [The Problems of the Conflict in the Four Southern Provinces] (Bangkok: Phitakpracha, 1976), 127-28.

[16] Suwannatat-Pian, 14.

[17]Ibid., 1.

[18]Ibid., 2.

[19]Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the Four Southern Provinces, Thailand, 1976-1981," USF Monographs in Religion and Public Policy, No. 2 (Tampa, FL, University of South Florida, 1987), 25-26.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Andrew Cornish, Whose Place is This?

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ali Minsana (pseudonym), student, Bangkok University, interview, 1 October 2000.

[24] Kareem Chnagyiwa (pseudonym), student, Bangkok University, interview, 1 October 2000.

[25]Interview with a Malay-Muslim former district official, Pattani, Thailand, 24 October 2000.

[26]Omar Farouk Bajunid, "The Muslims of Thailand," in Islamika (Kuala Lumpur: Hakcipta Sarjana Enterprise, 1981), 18.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Suspension of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," World Politics 11 (October, 1958): 2ff.

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[29]Smith, 26-44.

[30]The region consists of fertile land, fishing grounds, and mineral resources such as tin, gold, manganese, and natural gas.

[31]W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 38.

[32]M. Ladd Thomas, "Political Violence," 7.

[33]Astri Suhrke, "The Muslims of Southern Thailand," in The Muslims of Thailand, vol. 2, ed. Andrew D.W. Forbes, (Bihar, India: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 2.

[34]Ibid., 4. Andrew Cornish maintains that the economies on the border of the southernmost provinces are often healthier than other regions of Thailand and there is no stark poverty, which is often obvious in the north and the northeast of Thailand. Cornish, Whose Place is This?, 10.

[35]M. Ladd Thomas, "The Thai Muslims," in The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Major, ed. Raphael Israeli (London: Curzon Press, 1982), 157-158.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Chomrom Muslim Tai (The Southern Muslim Club), Kho saner nai khan kha phanha changwat paktai [The proposal to solve problems in the southern provinces], manuscript, 1973.

[38]Surin Pitsuwan, "Issue Affecting Border Security," 18.

[39]David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1994), 167. The focus of Brown's work is limited to the case of the northeastern region.

[40]See Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

[41]He defines the term as a "system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines." Ibid., 30.

[42]Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 37.

[43]Astri Suhrke, "The Muslims of Southern Thailand," p. 4.

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[44] Thomas, "The Thai Muslims," 160.

[45]Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 38.

[46] Ibid., 167-8.

[47]Pitsuwan, "Issue Affecting Border Security," 167-8.

[48]Prinya Udomsab, governor, Narathiwat, interview, 21 October 2000.

[49]Pornchat Boonnak, official, The Office of National Security Council, interview, 26 September 2000, Bangkok.

[50]Interview with a Malay official in Pattani. October 17, 2000. (Source declined to be identified.)

[51]Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973), 28-30.

[52]Cornish, 2.

[53]Ibid.

[54]See Herbert Rubin, "Will and Awe: Illustrations of Thai Villager Dependency Upon Officials," Journal of Asian Studies 32. 3 (May 1973): 425-44.

[55]Dr. Ananchai Thaipathan, physician, Provincial Hospital, Yala, interview, 17 October 2000.

[56]M. Ladd Thomas, "Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of Thai Muslims." Southeast Asia Winter 1974: 545-565.

[57]Thomas M. Fraser, Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing Village. (New York: Conell University Press, 1960), 164.

[58]A *pondok* is a traditional private Islamic school, offering both basic and advanced Islamic studies. Instruction is in Malay and, for advanced courses, in Arabic. It is normally owned and administered by well-versed and respected traditional religious teachers. This definition is given in Che Man, Muslim Elites and Politics in Southern Thailand, 45.

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[59]Ibid., 109.

[60] The argument of this section owes much to Che Man.

[61]Ibid, 110-11.

[62]Surin Pitsuwan, "Kyeunkhai thang karnmuang thi nam phai su kharn lamerd sitthimanusyachon nai changwat chaidantai," in Surin Pitsuwan and Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Sii changwat paktai khab sitthimanusyachon (Thammasart University, 1984), 38.

[63]Smith, 66.

[64]Khajatphai Burutphat, "Phanha lae ooppasak nai karn phasom klom kleun chao thai muslim nai changwat chai dane paktai," Rattha phirak 15 (January 1973) : 130.

[65]Ibid., 102.

[66]He notes that the differences of perception of the role of the religious leadership in the state, the ultimate origin of law, and the role and authority of the state in the affairs of the religious hierarchies in the Buddhist and Islamic societies account for the growing conflict in the Greater Patani area. See Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 12.

[67]See David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform, Reaction, Revolution. (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Crunn and Hain, 1981), 147.

[68]See a discussion of the issue in Phasuk Phongpaichit and Christ Baker, Thailand's Boom and Bust (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1998), 202.

[69]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 12-13.

[70]Ibid., 13.

[71]Dr. Arong Suthasasna, associate professor, Department of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, interview, 9 October 2000.

[72]W. Montgomery Watt, What Is Islam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 3.

[73]G.H. Jansen, Millitant Islam (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 17.

[74]Ronald Provencher, "Islam in Malaysia and Thailand," The Crescent in the East, ed. Raphael Israeli (London:Curzon Press Ltd., 1982), 143.

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[75]Ibid.

[76]Peter G. Gowing, "Moros and Khaek: The Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand." In Ahamad Ibrahim, et. al. Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 187.

[77]Ibid., 188.

[78]Dr. Arong Suthasasna, interview.

[79]Addulloh Yodeh, judge, Islamic Court, Yala, interview, 17 October 2000.

[80]Abdulloh Yodeh, interview and Den Tohmeena, interview.

[81]The Holy Qu'ran 4: 74-5.

[82]See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Islam and Violence," 30-39

[83]Omar Farouk Bajunid, "The Muslims in Thailand: A Review," 225.

[84]See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Islam and Violence."

[85]Walid Buduo (pseudonym), former member, BNPP, Pattani, interview, 18 October 2000; Khalid Wasaya (pseudonym), former member, Agitator Group, Pattani, interview, 19 October 2000.

[86]Arong Suthasasna, 138-139.

[87] See Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1971).

[88]A current study by the Department of Humanity and Social Science, Prince Songkla University, found that cultural identity and language played the most significant roles in shaping Malays' perception toward the Thai State. See Prince Songkla University (Pattani), Rai gnan karn samruot prajam phii: Krongkarn suksa wikhror stanakarn karn pleanplang dan sangkhom jitwitya settakit lea khoam mankhong kong changwat chaidan paktai, 1999.

[89]Imtiyaz Yusuf, "Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming the Office of *Chularajmontri/ Shaikh Al-Islam*," Journal of Islamic Studies 9.2 (1998): 282. Other Qu'ran verses that have been used to justify the accommodationist approach are, for example: "And if thy Lord willed, all who are in the earth would have believed together.

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Wouldst thou [Muhammad] compel men until they are believers?" and "Unto you your religion, and unto me mine" (verses 10:99 and 109:6, respectively).

[90]Winai Sama-un, Phan khao khab withii chiwit muslim, manuscript, not dated, 9.

[91]Sarah Ansari, "Islam," in Gary Browning, et. al (eds). Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present, (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 376.

[92]Ibid., 377.

[93]Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 210.

[94]Provencher, "Islam in Malaysia and Thailand," 143.

[95]Suthasasna, 141.

[96]Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, "Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations in the Pattani Region: An Intepretation," in The Muslims of Thailand, Vol 2, ed. Andrew Forbes (Bihar, India: Centee for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 77.

[97]Ibid.

[98]Chaveewan Vannaprasert et al. The Tradition Influencing the Social Integration between the Thai Buddhists and the Thai Muslims (Pattani, Thailand: Prince Songkla University, 1986), 41.

[99]Ibid.

[100]Khajatphai Burutphat, "Phanha lae ooppasak nai karn phasom klom kleun chao thai muslim nai changwat chai dane paktai," 102.

[101]Prince Songkla University, 110.

[102]There is a difference between the Patani Malay and the Malay language of Malaysia.

[103]Arong Suthasasna, "Itthipon khong satsana lae wattanatham toh phanha sii changwat paktai," Warasarn khan suksa hang chat 16 (February-May, 1982) : 21.

[104]Omar Farouk Bajunid, "The Muslims in Thailand: A Review," Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 37. 2 (September 1999): 221.

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[105]Phirayot Rahimula, quoted in Phiyanat Boonnak, Nayobai karn pokrong khong rataban thai toh chao thai muslim in jankwat chaidane paktai (poh soh 2475-2516) (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1991).
[106]Ronald Provencher, "Islam in Malaysia and Thailand," 140.

[107]Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1991), 33.

[108]Interview with Mr. Mahadi Wimana, a former ambassador to Iran and former director of the Department of Africa, Middle East, and South Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 November 2000, Bangkok.

[109] M. Alagappa, The National Security of Developing State, 217.

[110]Suhrke and Noble, 182.

[111]Geoffrey C. Gunn, “Radical Islam in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 16. 9 (1986): 37-38.

[112]Kitti Ratnachaya, Fouth Army Commander, Quam khauchai kiue khab khan kaey phanha quam mankong nai pheun thii 5 changwat chaidan paktai [Understanding Security Solutions in the Five Southern Provinces Region]. Monograph 7, not dated.

[113]Ibid., 7.

[114]Syed Husin Ali, quoted in Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 259.

[115]Omar Farouk Bajunid, “The Muslims in Thailand: A Review,” 224.

[116]“Petition to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, through the Commander-in-Chief, British Forces, Malaya,” 1 November 1954. In Barbara Whittingham-Jones Collection, SOAS Library, MS 145 9982, in Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 227-229.

[117]Ibid., 181.

[118]Haemindra, 214-224.

[119]Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 159.

[120]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 260. See also ibid.

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[121]Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 159.

[122]Ibid.

[123]Ibid.

[124]Ibid, 160.

[125]Maitri Boonyoungrod, deputy-governor, Pattani, interview, 24 October 2000. See also Omar Farouk Bajunid, "The Muslims of Thailand," 109.

[126]Walid Budou, interview.

[127]Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 108.

[128] Kitti Ratnachaya, Quam khauchai kiue khab khan kaey phanha quam mankong nai pheun thii 5 changwat chaidan paktai, 8.

[129]Bangkok Post, 16 January 1995.

[130] N. John Funston, "The Politics of Islamic Reassertion: Malaysia." Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. Ahmad Ibrahim (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 172

[131]Interview with a graduate student at a university in Malaysia, Pattani, 21 October 2000.

[132]Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990), 53.

[133]See a discussion about the situation contexts that influence the decision a state may be for or against intervention in Joseph Rothchild, Ethnopolitics, 184-186.

[134]Ibid.

[135]Ibid.

[136]Omar Farouk Bajunid, "The History and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand," in Lim Joo-Lock and Vani S. (eds.) Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 241.

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[137] Ibid.

[138]Saran Khasuwan, diplomatic official (Thailand-Malaysia Relations Desk), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview, October 2000. The IMT-GT project was developed from the conceptual framework of regional economic development and was initiated by Malaysia in 1993.

[139]Ibid. See a detailed study about the IMT-GT project in Srisompob Jitpiromsri et al., "The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) Project: Implications of "Open Regionalism" to the Local Economy," Songklanakarin Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 6.1 (Jan.-Apr. 2000): 40-48.

[140]Bangkok Post (12 February 1998).

[141]Bangkok Post (22 February 1998).

[142]Chandra Muzaffar, "Islamic Resurgence: A Global View," in Taufik Abdullah and Sharaon Siddique, eds., Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 20.

[143]Mahadi Wimana, former ambassador to Iran and former director, Department of African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview, 7 November 2000.

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[146]Walid Bodou, Interview.

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[148]Poksak Nilubol, director-general, Department of South Asian, Middle East, and African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview, 6 November 2000.

[149]Interview with a diplomatic officer, Department of African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 6 November 2000.

[150]Mahadi Wimana, interview.

[151]Ministry of Interior, Coordination Division, Department of Governance, Chaidane paktai 2534 (The southern border provinces, 1991) September 1991, 19.

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[152]Office of National Information, letter no. 0305/3617, the Communist Malaya and the Thai Muslim movements, 16 April 1993.

[153]Poksak Nilubol, interview.

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[155] Mahadi Wimana, interview.

[156]Abdul Roheem, diplomatic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview, 6 October 2000.

[157]Fred R. Von Der Mehden, "Malaysian and Indonesian: Islamic Movements and the Iranian Connection," in John L. Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), p. 224.

[158]Ibid.

[159]Omar Mustafa (pseudonym), a former Thai-Muslim student activist in the 1970s, telephone interview, 5 April 2000.

[160]Von Der Mehden, 224.

[161]Omar Mustafa.

[162]Von Der Mehden, 251.

[163]Walid Boduo, interview.

[164]Gidon Gottlieb, "Between Union and Separation: The Path of Conciliation," in Edward Mortimer and Robert Fine, eds., People, Nation, and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism, (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 121.

[165]Pornchat Boonnak, assistant director, Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, interview, 26 September 2000.

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CHAPTER 3

THE INTEGRATION EXPERIENCES OF THE MALAY-MUSLIMS OF SOUTHERNMOST THAILAND

Scholars have extensively studied factors affecting a country's political integration. For example, Dunstan M. Wai identifies eight conditions that led to secession and communal conflicts in African states.[1] These factors ranged from cultural pluralism and value incompatibilities through government ineptitude and closed channels for dissent. Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune also identify ten integrative factors: proximity, homogeneity, transaction, functional interest, mutual knowledge, communal character, political structure, autonomy, governmental effectiveness, and integrative experience.[2] Nevertheless, factors affecting political integration may vary from case to case. A factor that has a strong effect on political integration at one time may become irrelevant to it at another time.

Dov Ronen notes that two different ethnic groups could live peacefully together while the collection of the groups' languages, cultures, religions, and skin colors remained merely a "functional aggregation."[3] An ethnic group may remain invisible or tend toward assimilation within a larger society as long as its interests are not directly threatened and its aspirations are not blocked or frustrated by another group.[4] If awareness of other groups as obstacles to their aspirations increases, the level of conscious self-identity increases and the "we" versus "they" syndrome intensifies. At this

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stage of the integration process, ethnic characteristics are transformed into symbols of their identity as badges of honor and pride that must be defended.

This chapter investigates the Thai State's integration policies and strategies prior to 1973. By doing so, it will reveal the integration experiences of Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces into Thai polity. The study of integration experiences is important to the understanding of three related dimensions. They are the continuity and the changes of the Thai State's policies and strategies, the relationship between the Thai State and Malay-Muslims, and the emergence and the intensification of ethnic mobilization of the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces of Thailand prior to 1973 that in turn produced negative effects on political integration of Thailand in the following period.

The Absolute Monarchy

As mentioned earlier, the Thai historical accounts claimed that the four southern provinces have been integral parts of Thailand since the reign of King Ramkhamhaeng in 1377.[5] However, the Malay sources only acknowledged that Ayudhya established her "wide political orbit within the Malay world" during the fourteenth century.[6] This relationship was in the form of tributary or vassal states in which the flowers of gold were sent from the Patani Kingdom to the kings of Siam.

The ascension of King Rama I to the throne in 1782, which marked the beginning of the Chakri dynasty that has ruled Siam (later Thailand) to the present day,

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brought about a firmer control of Patani and the other Malay vassals by the Siamese overlords. After the Siamese troops defeated and killed Sultan Muhammad, the ruler of Patani, in the battlefield in 1785, Patani was annexed under Siam.[7] Prisoners of war and arms were transferred to Bangkok. Bangkok appointed the lineage of Sultan Muhammad as Raja to govern Patani under the supervision of a Buddhist governor in Songkla. In 1791, the ruler of Patani (Tengku Laminin) rebelled. However, he and his men were suppressed by Bangkok. He was sent to prison in Bangkok where he remained until his death. The next appointed ruler, Dato Pengkalan, also rebelled in 1808. These rebellions prompted Bangkok to adopt a policy of divide and rule to maintain control over Patani. Patani was divided into seven separate mini-states[8] and administered as third-class provinces (*muang tri*) of Siam.[9] Though Bangkok directly appointed the governors of these mini-states,[10] its rule was an indirect one. Except for Yaring, the newly set-up mini-states were all ruled by appointed local Malays as rajas. Thus, Patani still enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy in local administration and religious affairs.

During the reign of King Rama V (1868-1910) the expansion of the colonial dominions, specifically Britain and France, was seen as a threat to the territory and sovereignty of Siam. To avoid falling prey to colonialism, Siamese ruling elite undertook the tasks of diplomatic maneuver[11] and domestic reform that aimed to bring the country into a modern nation-state.[12] The measures taken to bring about a strong central government with a modernized administrative bureaucracy and administrative system included general reform (such as the abolition of certain customs), administrative

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reform, fiscal reform and centralization of tax-collection, legal and judicial reforms, military reform, and education reform.[13]

The significance of these reforms was that they entailed the arrogation to the central government in Bangkok of almost all powers originally vested in vassal rulers and local lords. Initially, the former lords were often given offices as "governors" or "district officers" or "advisors." Under the new system of provincial administration, they were replaced by Thai officials appointed directly by Bangkok.[14] Moreover, the administrative reforms involved a total restructuring of the bureaucracy in Siam. The reforms resulted in a radical expansion of the scope of the central government in its relationship with the populace.[15]

Local ruling elites in the Malay provinces, like those in other regions of Siam, were against the reform.[16] These local elites were replaced by Bangkok-oriented Thai bureaucrats for administration and for tax collection. They resented Siam's policy that took ruling power and financial control away from them.[17] Another policy that created resentment among the Malay-Muslims was the attempt by Bangkok to assume all legal matters under a new system of Thai law. This attempt meant that the legal code structured by the Shari'a (Islamic law) and administered by the local *Qadi* (Muslim judges) were to be controlled by the Thai Buddhist bureaucrats.

As the Malay rulers found no channel to negotiate with the absolute king of Siam, they externalized the issue by turning to Britain for support and protection. In August 1901, Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin, the ruler of Patani wrote to Sir Frank

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Swettenham, governor of the Straits Settlements, and sought support against the new encroachments on his authority.[18] His letter also complained about the efforts by the Thai officials to violate Muslim religious convictions. The Malay rulers of Saiburi and Reman also sent similar appeals to Swettenham. Swettenham replied to Tengku Abdul Kadir's appeal by advising him to be patient and to avoid violence.[19] Meanwhile, he made private representations to King Chulalongkorn, suggesting that he moderate his policy. Britain apparently did not want to displease Siam by her interference with the Patani region under the Siamese rule.[20]

The measures of control were tightening in late 1901 and early 1902. Resistance by the local rulers and rebels were suppressed by the use of force. The Raja of Patani (Tengku Ubdul Kadir) was arrested and imprisoned in Pitsanulok.[21] He was released two years later and was allowed to return to Patani on the condition that he would not engage in political activities. In 1905, he and his family retired to Kelantan. When the Anglo-Siamese treaty was concluded in 1909, Siam transferred to Britain all rights in Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, Perlis, and the adjacent islands. The consequence of this agreement was the separation between ethnic Malays of the southernmost provinces of Thailand and their Malay brethren in Malaya by territorial lines that were drawn without their approval and consent.

Likhit Dhiravegin maintained that during the reform period, the Ministry of Education was founded to facilitate popular education and assimilation different ethnicities into the Thai cultural realm.[22] As an assimilation policy, all schoolteachers

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were required to give instruction in Bangkokian and all the textbooks were to be approved by the Ministry of Education.[23] In 1921, the Primary Education Act was introduced to lay foundations for a state-controlled system of education.[24]

Malay-Muslims regarded the act that required all Malay-Muslim children to spend four years studying in the national program of education as the gradual "Siamifying" of the Malays and the stamping out of the Malay language and the Muslim faith.[25] In 1922, the ex-ruler of Patani, Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin, assisted by the religious leaders, led the Malays to rebel against the Siamese authorities by refusing to pay taxes and rents on land.[26] The rebellion was defeated by the use of Thai military force that, as Scupin notes, set the stage for the consistent pattern of Malay-Muslim irredentism.[27]

M. Alagappa notes that the implementation of the administrative reforms of 1902 had three important consequences, which created discontent in both the traditional elite and the Malay-Muslim community at large: first, the deprivation of the political and religious elite of their traditional power and status in the community; second, the forced interaction of the two communities, with the minority Malay-Muslim community having to submit to a political authority based on Buddhist cosmology; and third, the fear of the minority of losing its cultural identity.[28]

As mentioned above, the Malay political elites were gradually replaced by Thai bureaucrats. Their administrative and financial powers were severely curtailed. For the religious elite whose power and influence derived from its authority to interpret and

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propagate the sacred law and religious principles, the new administrative reform that emphasized secular law and justice not only interfered with the law prescribed by God but also made their authority irrelevant. Coupled with the introduction of secular education, this implementation threatened to undermine the authority and influence of the religious elite who played a significant role in the traditional education system. The fear that religious freedom might be limited by the Buddhist State also created a great concern among the Malay-Muslim population.

When the resentments in the Patani region grew and rebellions took place, Siam tried to correct the situation. Following the mass rebellions in 1903 and 1922, King Vajiravudh reconsidered policies in the Malay provinces by establishing new guidelines for the treatment of the Malay-Muslims in the south. Some of his instructions included:[29]

1. Whatever practices or regulations appeared to oppose Islam should be abolished immediately. Any new guidelines must not be in violation of the Islamic religious teaching.
2. The level of taxation among the Malays should not be higher than what people in Malaya were required to contribute.
3. Public officials to be assigned to Patani should be honest and polite. No officials should be sent there as a punishment because of their misbehavior in other areas.

The new guidelines reflected the Siamese authority's concessions to relieve the pressure from resistance by the Malays and the threat of losing Patani from external interference. To please the Malays, Bangkok also removed the unpopular commissioner

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of Patani, Phraya Dechanuchit. From then on, there was less forceful resistance on the part of the Malays until the change of the political system in Siam.

From the 1932 "Revolution" to the First Phibul Administration (1932 - 1944)

The revolution by "the Promoter" in June 1932 resulted in the limitation of the monarchy and the promulgation of the first constitution of Thailand.[30] Although the parliaments elected during the governments of Phahon between 1933 and 1938 hardly reflected representation of the country as a whole, they did include many representatives from provincial areas.[31] The Malay-Muslims also participated in the national elections and were able to voice their views at the highest levels of Thai government. In the first general election of 1933, only a Malay-Muslim from Satun province was elected to the national parliament. In the elections of 1937 and 1938, Malay-Muslims of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat were elected as members of the parliament. This opportunity for political participation was curtailed when an ultra-nationalist government was formed under Marshal Phibul Songkhran in December 1938. From 1938 to1944, Phibul was to assume an increasingly authoritarian rule. Boonbongkarn described the political atmosphere under Phibul's government as follows:

> The Thai were allowed to elect half of the members in the legislature while the other half was appointed by the government. Although he allowed relatively free expression for the elected members of the House of Representatives, for those who appeared to be his rivals, he took strong measures against them. Key members of the alleged opposing groups were arrested and prosecuted in a special court on charges of sedition.[32]

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During this period, the masses were mobilized to support Phibul's nationalist policy to create a modern Thai nation-state. Phibul launched a comprehensive program for sociocultural reform concentrated on four aspects: culture, social and moral values, prescribed ways of life, and religion.[33] The new culture and social habits aimed to demonstrate to the world the national unity of modern Thailand. Toward this end, the people had to learn to accept the new sociocultural practices based on the culture and faith of the ethnic majority group (the Thai) and the selected cultural, moral, and social aspects decreed by the authorities.[34] This period under Phibul leadership was the turning point of the relationship between the Thai State and the Malay-Muslims that resulted in the reawakening of Malay nationalism.

In 1939, Phibul's government began the cultural campaign with the announcement of the Ratthaniyom (the State Decrees) as the means for the implementation of the basic concept of Thai-ness.[35] Under the Ratthaniyom, the use of the Malay language was outlawed and Malay customary practices were prohibited. Islamic law relating to family and inheritance matters was abolished in 1944.[36] Under Phibul's leadership, the state was "the supreme entity which demanded absolute submission from an individual covering minute details of daily life."[37] For example, State Decree number ten prescribed and demanded people to dress "properly," that is, in skirt or trousers, top, hat, and shoes. The Malays' clothing styles were specified as "improper" and hence forbidden.

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The attribute "Thai-ness" implied strongly Siamese culture and Buddhist religion.[38] Phibul argued, "Thailand belongs to the Thai and there should be no other religious groups living here."[39] Kobkua pointed out that since Buddhism was the "national" religion, failure to become Buddhist was equated with failure to perform the duty of a patriotic citizen.[40] One of the policies required that district officials must be Buddhists.[41] During this period, criticisms of the assimilation policy by members of parliament, such as Pol Sansradii of Khonkhan, Chit Vejprasit of Phuket, and Praya Prasongkhasemras of Nokhonrajsrima, were disregarded.[42]

The regulations that "contradicted the people's customs and religion" were implemented "very strictly."[43] Malays were under "the greatest pressure."[44] When they did not follow the regulations, they were fined or punished. Examples of punishment methods were cleaning the lawn of the District Offices and being forced to stand under the strong sunlight.[45] Another example that disturbed Malays was the incident in Pattani, where officials humiliated a religious teacher and his wife by giving a punishment "to carry sand to a Buddhist temple."[46] In almost every case, the officials who enforced the law were Buddhists while those being punished were Muslims. The conflict between officials (the rulers) versus people (the ruled) was perceived as religious conflict, i.e., "between Buddhists and Muslims."[47] The Malays felt that their language, religion, and cultural tradition were jeopardized. As a result, their antipathy toward the Thai State intensified.

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Ethnonationalism fed on adversity and denial.[48] The nationalism of the Thai ethnic community during Phibul's leadership stirred the reactive nationalism of the Malay-Muslims community. The consequence of Phibul's national unification effort was the alienation of the Malay-Muslims from the Thai State. They withdrew their participation from the system. In the 1943 general election, none of the members of the parliament from Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat was Malay-Muslim. As the Thai State showed intolerance for cultural and political diversity, strong ethnic movements began to flourish. This period marked the beginning of the modern Patani separatist and irredentist movements.[49]

The Civilian Governments (1944 - 1948)

When the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia in 1941, Phibul sided with Japan. Consequently, Thailand was able to reacquire slices of territory in Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, and in 1943, the four Malay states of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, and in Perlis.[50] This brought Thailand into direct confrontation with Great Britain. The convergence of interest between the irredentism aspirations of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand and Britain's long-term political and strategic goals developed during this period. During the war, key figures among the Patani Malays helped Britain in her war efforts. Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen, the second son of the last Raja of Patani (Tengku Abdul Kadir) joined the Kelantan Volunteer Force where he played a leading role in recruiting Malay guerrillas in southern Thailand and north Malaya to fight against

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the Japanese.[51] Pram Promyong, the former *chularajamontri* during Pridi's government, wrote that:

> During the war Mahyiddeen received a large sum of money from Britain to give to 3,000 Malays from Thailand that were living in financial difficulties because their sources of income were cut off due to the war situation. Upon returning to Thailand, they became religious teachers who had influence over people and became a power base for Mahyiddeen.[52]

Phibul resigned in 1944 and Khuang Aphaiwong formed a government during the end of the war period. When Japan surrendered in August 1945, the military leaders who previously had strong influence on governments were forced to withdraw from politics. Dr. Pridi Phanomyong, a more democratic-minded civilian who was one of the architects of the 1932 Revolution, gained political power. Seni Pramoj, who as head of the Free Thai Movement outside Thailand was viewed by Dr. Pridi Phanomyong and other members of the movement to be in the best position to deal with the Allies, became prime minister in September 1945.[53]

Britain assumed responsibility for post surrender tasks in Thailand, Malaya, southern Indochina, Sumatra, and Java. Clive J. Christie noted that the threat that Britain might annex Patani probably contributed to the modification of Thailand's policy toward the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand from 1945 to 1946.[54] However, another important factor must be taken into account: the change of leadership in Thailand, as mentioned earlier.

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To appease the Malays, the government produced a number of programs to promote political integration and a better relationship between the Malay-Muslims and the government.[55] The Patronage of Islam Act of 1945 was promulgated.[56] Dr. Predi was a strong promoter of this Act. According to the Act, the king's duty as sustainer and protector of the state religion (Buddhism) was extended to cover all religions within the country. The Act established the Islamic Central Committee of Thailand and the position of *chularajmontri* (*sheikh al-Islam*), who was also the head of this committee. The committee was supposed to be the highest Muslim organization in the decision-making process of the government on matters concerning Muslims.[57]

The Act also established Provincial Islamic Councils for each Muslim province in the south. According to the Act, the appointment and removal of a council member must be approved by the Ministry of Interior. Each council was authorized by the Act to appoint mosque councils in its province to administer the mosques and religious affairs in the area. These Islamic institutions at national and provincial levels have been recognized up to the present. Pitsuwan commented about the Act, "On the one hand, the government wanted to amend the alienation created by Phibul's nationalism policy between 1938-1944. On the other hand, it meant to have a control over Malay religious leaders and their activities."[58] Thus, religious activities of the Malay-Muslims have since then been under stricter control and scrutiny by the Thai State.[59] However, Anuragsa maintained that the government undertook to integrate administratively the Muslims in an "honorable" manner.[60]

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The government revived the Matrimony and Inheritance Law and the role of the *qadi* (the Muslim judge) to participate in trial courts on Muslim's matrimony and inheritance cases. A cabinet-level committee was appointed to look into the ways to improve the deteriorating situation in the south. As Dr. Pridi was inspired by a Swiss-type federalism and cultural autonomy for ethnic groups,[61] there emerged an idea among the Malays that some sort of autonomy might be granted.[62]

The circumstances of King Ananda's death on 9 June 1946 lead to Pridi's fall from power.[63] The Malay-Muslim members of parliament and active politicians were arrested shortly after Pridi was removed from office. The police accused them of plotting to support a separatist movement in the south. On 3 April 1947, Hajji Sulong Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Fatani, head of the Muslim Council of Pattani, who had been a key figure in organizing religious scholars' resistance to Phibun's assimilation decrees of 1944, led the autonomy movement. He, along with other Malay-Muslim leaders, presented a petition to the Thai government. They demanded that the government combine Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun into one region to be presided over by a locally born and elected head with full power to replace civil servants; a Muslim Council would have full charge over the affairs of the Islamic community which would be governed by Islamic law enforced by Shari 'a courts; Malay and Thai would be the official languages, but primary education was to be taught in Malay; eighty percent of the region's civil servants were to be Muslims; and all local revenues were to be spent in the Patani region.[64] It should be noted that the demands reflected the desire to have

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administrative independence in local affairs and in the legal system, not to separate from the State of Thailand. In other words, they wanted to establish an autonomous area "under Thai sovereignty."[65] The Thai government responded to these demands by granting minimal concessions.[66]

The Thai government approach, which showed moderation toward Malays, was to be changed again when Phibul regained power after the November 1947 coup. He installed Khuang Apaiwongse as the prime minister. Hajji Sulong and other autonomy movement leaders were arrested and charged with treason. Public reaction inside and outside Patani was immediate and protests were sent to the Thai government and the secretary of the United Nations. A number of politicians and religious leaders sought asylum in Malaysia.[67]

The Return of Phibul (1948 - 1957)

In April 1948, the coup leaders forced Khuang to resign to make way for the formation of a new government under Phibul. Among Phibul's supporters, General (later Field Marshal) Sarit Thanarat and General Phao Sriyanonda were the key figures. After 1951, the former came to exercise preeminent control over the army while the latter gained control of the police. Phao turned the police into agents of coercive power and often used them to suppress dissenters. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the military allowed limited political participation and occasional parliamentary elections. However,

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elected members of parliament were still checked by appointed members.[68] Half of the legislature was appointed by the military government from 1952 to 1957.

The return of Phibul caused fear among the Malay-Muslims that he would adopt an oppressive cultural assimilation policy. Only nine days after Phibul resumed power, a demonstration broke out in Pattani. The police forces suppressed the Malay-Muslims within two days. Several hundred people were killed and injured while several thousands fled to Malaya.[69] A month later, a skirmish occurred between Thai police and about 60 to 80 villagers at Dusung Nyior village in Narathiwat. Accusing these villagers of being communists, three regiments of special police were sent to quell them. After the fighting raged for 36 hours, about one hundred lives were lost and about two thousand Malay-Muslims sought refuge in Malaya.[70] The killing of the demonstrators in April, the massacre of innocent Malay peasants by the Thai police in May,[71] and the harshness with which the Thai government responded to the autonomy movement aroused Malay opinion on both sides of the border and insurgency began to flourish.

The Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR), or the Greater Patani Malay Association, formed in 1947, attempted to mobilize the Malay-Muslims who were in exile and sympathetic Malays for revolutionary action in Patani.[72] GAMPAR sent a petition requesting the British not to recognize Phibul's regime. During this time, the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan (BNPP), or National Liberation Front of Patani, was formed among Malay-Muslims in Kalantan. This organization's aim was to separate and join with Malaya.

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In 1948, GAMPAR also appealed to the UN, requesting the Security Council to investigate the condition of the Malay-Muslims in Thailand. It also requested the UN to organize a plebiscite to determine whether the Malay-Muslims wanted autonomy or to be incorporated into Malaysia.[73] The issue was not considered because Britain, which was a member of the Security Council, did not support it. In November 1948, GAMPAR's headquarters in Singapore was raided and the activities of Patani exiles in Malaya were restricted by Britain.[74]

Although the movements during this period were small, they created concern among the Thai political elite. In the mid-1950s, General Phao was determined to suppress and to crack down on any movement without compromise. One of his strategies was to get rid of the Malays' leaders. As mentioned earlier, Hajji Sulong and members of his group were arrested in 1949. Although the court dismissed charges of treason, a seven-year prison sentence for slandering the government was imposed upon them. They were imprisoned for 42 months and released in 1952.[75] In August 1954, Hajji Sulong and two other leaders were requested by the Police Intelligence chief in Songkla, Pol. Lt. Col. Boonlert Lertpriicha, to report to him for consultation. On 13 August, the three together with Hajji Sulong's eldest son were in Songkla as requested but they mysteriously disappeared. Pol. Lt. Col. Boonlert later admitted that the police murdered them by the order of General Phao. Their bodies were chained to stones and thrown into Songkla Lake.[76]

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After the disappearance of Hajji Sulong, some Malay leaders still tried to work within the Thai political system. Amin Tohmeena, the second son of Hajji Sulong, ran for a parliamentary seat representing Pattani and won the election. He and his colleague, Abdul Na Saiburi, continued to lobby among Thai politicians for the cause of autonomy. They were later arrested and charged with creating civil riots and espousing separatism.[77] After spending four years in prison, they were exiled to Malaysia. At this point, some Malay leaders concluded that the Muslims would never be able to maintain and protect themselves as a distinctive community under Thai domination.[78] By the end of the 1950s, the pattern of Malay-Muslim movements for autonomy deviated from a participatory to a nonparticipatory one.[79] Panompom Anuragsa concluded:

> Because of their failure in effecting change through the institutional network of the country during the 1950s with lawful, democratic participation, the Muslim movement has since then been forced to partake in violent underground measures. The past experience of the Malay Muslim leaders has shown them many times that peaceful methods do not work under the present system.[80]

The Sarit and the Thanom Administrations (1957 - 1973)

Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat overthrew Phibul's government in a September 1957 coup. After the elections in December 1957, Sarit and his lieutenants, General Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphat Charusathien, organized a majority of the members of the parliament in a military-based coalition government. Sarit led another coup in October 1958. From this coup to the student-led revolution of October 1973, Thailand was under the rule of an authoritarian regime.[81] Clark Neher described that during

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Sarit's and Thanom's administrations "the legislature was impotent, the political parties were for the most part forbidden to form, and corruption was rampant."[82]

During this period, Thailand was faced with external pressure from the expansion of communism in its neighbors of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Under this circumstance and with the support from the United States, the Thai government mobilized the population for the tasks of development. Socioeconomic development was the main instrument aiming to weld the population into a unified citizenry to help develop the country and to fight communism. It was believed that once the socio-economic welfare of the people was improved, it would reduce social conflict and social distance between the government and the population.[83] Thomas noted that Sarit's integrative strategies were to demonstrate to Malays that the government was trying to improve their living conditions and to make them feel that there were concrete benefits for them to be Thai citizens.[84]

During this period, roads were repaired and built to connect Bangkok with the region. The government paid attention to the improvement of the infrastructure and the living conditions of the people in the regions. It set up, among other things, a committee to develop the southern provinces, a center for mining development, community development centers, and a Teachers College in Yala. The Ministry of Education was responsible for numerous programs and projects to improve education in these provinces.[85] One of the main purposes of the educational policy was to promote the use of Thai language among the Malays. However, the measure towards the Malay

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southernmost provinces were not limited to socioeconomic development. The government also relied heavily on military suppression.[86]

Thanom's administration mainly followed policies and strategies initiated by Sarit's government.[87] However, the later administration refined and modified more projects and programs. Under Thanom, the Department of Interior's functions and responsibilities concerning the four southernmost provinces expanded to cover not only governance but also education, for which the Ministry of Education was previously responsible. The Ministry of Interior was responsible for a number of projects, including the preschool study project, the project to give scholarships to Malay students in teacher training programs, the education projects for returning students, and a project to set up television sets for the public in villages in the southernmost provinces.[88]

Other projects such as a government-sponsored Islamic *da'wah* (a religious organization aimed at the promotion of religious values through public preaching), a project to teach the Malay language and culture to government officials, Qur'an recitation contests, quotas for Malay students to study in the police academy and other universities, and the establishment of the Administrative Coordination Center in Yala were also the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. The center's main objectives were to give orientation to officials sent to work in the southernmost provinces concerning local customs and cultures and to be a center for public relations advocating the government's work that would build trust and loyalty among the people.[89]

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The Thai governments during this period were committed to building a sense of belonging to Thailand among Malay-Muslims so that this segment of the population would participate in the development of the country. However, the government's policies sometimes yielded negative results. Two of the most important integrative efforts that created adverse effects during this period were the policy to establish the Self-Help Land Settlement Project and the educational policies.

On 3 March 1960 the cabinet under Sarit's administration approved a project called the Self-Help Land Settlement Project that aimed at the "balancing of population and culture" in the Muslim provinces by providing incentives to the Thai Buddhists from northeastern provinces to migrate to the southernmost provinces.[90] This policy was a controversial one. On the one hand, it was believed that the policy would help solve political and security problems and would result in cultural assimilation of Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists.[91] On the other hand, as Suthasasna pointed out, this unnatural migration had psychological impact, for it changed the perception that the Malay-Muslims were the majority group in the four provinces.[92] Hence, eventually the area "would be thought as much a Buddhist as a Malay community."[93]

Local Malay-Muslims perceived that the policy to encourage the migration of Buddhists of the northeastern region and to provide them with land and money for settlement reflected the "insincerity" of the Thai government toward the Malays, hence they resented this policy.[94] A Thai Buddhist provincial official commented that this policy showed the "negligence and the insensitivity" of the government regarding the

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locals and became a propaganda point for the separatist groups to attract support from Malays.[95] Moreover, the migration of Buddhists from the northeast to Malay provinces led to the confrontation between the two ethnic groups.

Another important policy during the Sarit and Thanom administrations was the education policy. Compulsory education that required all children to attend at least four years of schooling was intensively implemented during this period; however, it was not well received by the majority of Malay parents. As the medium of teaching was Thai language and Thai education was linked with Buddhist religion and culture, Malays did not want their children to attend school. They found ways to avoid sending children to school, such as paying bribe money to the Thai teachers[96] or sending their children to study in Malaysia.[97] Phirayot Rahimula noted that because the memory of the bitter history with the Thai State, Malays in the past prohibited their children from learning Thai, the language of the "enemy."[98]

The policy that attracted a greater degree of dissent and evoked an immediate crisis of government's legitimacy among the Malay-Muslims was the policy to transform the Malay traditional educational system, the *pondok* system, into a system of government-sponsored private religious schools with a secular curriculum and Thai language as the medium of instruction.[99] Initially, in 1961, the government urged all the *pondoks* to register as "educational institutions." This was done on a voluntary basis and monetary support was used as an incentive. In 1966, the government prohibited the establishment of new *pondoks*. It also required that all the existing *pondoks* must register

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within six months and all were to be converted into private schools teaching Islam within three to five years.[100]

Geertz noted that this policy struck at the very roots of *pondok* schoolteachers.[101] *Tokguru* (religious teachers) and religious leaders resented the government policy. Arbitrary power and the alien origin of the state deepened their doubts and mistrust toward the state. They saw the expansion of modern secular education as a threat to the legitimacy of their traditional roles and as an attempt by the Thai State to destroy the indigenous system of education, the Malay culture, and Islam. Active opposition increased in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. The military arm of the secessionist movements formed and guerrilla actions increased in the late sixties and continued into the seventies. Its leadership came from traditional religious leaders. Dennis Walker concluded that the secessionist movement represented "a Muslim response to, and rejection of, Thai government attempts to alter the indigenous culture of the Muslim South."[102] Malays became more sensitive to the issues of cultural identity and its maintenance and formed a long-lasting suspicion of Thai motives.[103]

By the 1960s, a new and more radical leadership rose to prominence among Malay-Muslim resistance groups. These included the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional. The former was a broad-based group that was found in 1968 as an umbrella organization coordinating numerous guerrilla groups operating against the authorities.[104] It possessed the best trained and best equipped military force among the separatist groups and had an extensive network

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around the world.[105] The latter espoused Islamic socialism and its support bases were among urban Malays.

Not only the policies of the government but also the suppressive rules and injustices committed by the State and its officials nurtured resistance among the Malay-Muslims. Omar Farouk Bajunid pointed out that under military rule the State generally encouraged local repression by intolerant, irresponsible, and corrupt officials.[106] Today, the memories are still fresh in the minds of many who lived through this period. Residents of the southernmost provinces who are over forty-five years old tend to remember and can tell experiences of injustice committed by Thai officials.

A member of the Islamic Provincial Council recalled, "The people of Patani were living with fear that the Thai police might accuse them of supporting separatists or communists." They were fearful that the police could "quiet" their voices and make them "disappear."[107] Suppression was one of the main measures against separatism; however, there were cases of innocent people being imprisoned or killed.[108] Given the nature of authoritarian regimes before 1973, the cases when police killed innocent people, accusing them of involvement in communist activities, were common at that time in every region of the country. Nevertheless, for the Malay-Muslims, they felt that they were victimized because of their race and religion. A former Malay-Muslim student activist who later joined an "agitator group" recalled "growing up in a house along the bank of the Pattani River; we often saw bodies of Malays floating along the river. They were always Malays, never a Thai.... The people knew that the Thai police murdered

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them and threw their bodies into the river."[109] He also believed that the police were crueler in their suppression of Malay-Muslims. He said:

> The methods that the police adopted in torturing the Malay communists in this region were crueler than what were adopted for the Buddhist communists in other regions of the country. The method called *thang dang*, that was to burn a victim in the gasoline container alive, was used in the southern provinces only. Why? Because they thought that Muslims were not human, so they showed no mercy for these victims.[110]

This emotional content left a permanent scar on relations between the Thai State and Malay-Muslims. The results of these integration experiences of the Malays into Thai polity prior to 1973 are threefold. First, these experiences raised "conscious self-identity" that created the sense of "they" versus "we" between the two ethnic groups. Second, many of those who experienced unjust acts and crimes committed by the state apparatus withdrew and became indifferent to participation in the system while others, though small in number, joined active resistance groups. Third, domestic conflict within the Thai State was externalized by the ethnic Malays. These three elements in turn hindered government's integrative efforts in the following period.

Summary

The political system in Thailand from 1932-1946 was a "limited-participation" system in which half of the legislature was appointed members. From 1947 to 1973, the military took control of the governments. Boonbongkarn observed that in the 1950s and 1960s, parliamentary elections were merely pacifying instruments that induced

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antimilitary, civilian elements to work within the law and ultimately to accept the political domination of the military. The influence of members of parliament on policy and elite circulation was minimal.[111]

Under an authoritarian system, channels for dissident groups to express their grievances and to get their demands met were limited or closed. The Malays initially worked within the system to request the Thai State to accommodate their demands concerning their rights. When the State was not responsive, but tried to suppress their demands and oppress them, some Malays concluded that living under the Thai rule was not a logical or desirable option. They sought to separate from the Thai State.

Some of the approaches the Thai State adopted were necessary and unavoidable measures that had to be taken if it was to be developed. Others reflected the lack of understanding and, in some cases, the intolerance of Thai policy makers and officials toward the Malay-Muslims' culture and religion. While the government was suspicious of the Malays' loyalty to the State, Malays were afraid that the interference of the State might eventually destroy their way of life and their community. For both sides, the fear of the unknown and the fear of difference were marked by a psychological state of unease and a sense of loss of control. As a consequence, the government pushed harder to control the Malays' community life, while the Malays resisted the government's efforts more intensely. They persisted in the protection of their religion, culture, and identity.

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Notes

[1]Dunstan M. Wai, "Sources of Communal Conflicts and Secessionist Politics in Africa," Ethnic and Racial Studies 1.3 (July 1978): 286-305.

[2]Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds. The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), 16-45.

[3]Functional aggregation is a collection of individuals where language is "merely" a means of communication; culture is merely a way of doing certain activities; relation is merely an explanation of the meaning of the group's origins and existence; and the color of skin is merely an existing fact. See Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islam nai pratet thai [Islam in Thailand] (Bangkok: Prachandra, 1976), 9.

[6]Kobkua Suwannatat-Pian, "Siam as Portrayed in the Indigenous Malay Sources," paper presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies, 22-24 August 1984, Bangkok, 5.

[7]Ministry of Education, Fine Art Department, Praraj phongsawadarn krungratanakhosin chabab hoosamud Hang chat rachakarn tii 1-2 (Bangkok: Rongphim pisnak kharnphim, 1963), 124.

[8]They are Patani, Nongchik, Yaring, Yala, Saiburi, Raman, and Ra-ngae.

[9]Somdejchaopraya Damrong Rachanupap, Prarajphonsawadarn krungratanakhosin rachakarn tii 2. (Bangkok: Rongphim kharn sasana, 1953), 169.

[10]The policy was to appoint a Muslim governor to the state if its majority were Muslims.

[11]The main feature of Siam's strategy was a policy of balancing the British against the French.

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[12]Likhit Dhiravegin, "Centralization and Decentralization: The Dilemma of Thailand," in Ernest E. Boesch, Thai Culture: Report on the Second Thai-European Research Seminar, 1982 (Saarbruecken, FRG: University of the Saar, 1982), 48.

[13]Ibid., 47-51.

[14]Charles F. Keyes. Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 52.

[15]Ibid.

[16]The reform reorganized the seven mini-states into four provinces, namely Pattani, Yala, Saiburi, and Ranga.

[17]Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud. The Malay Unrest in South Thailand: An Issue in Malaysian-Thai Border Relations (Selangor: Institute of Malay World and Civilization, University of Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1994), 10.

[18]Tenku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin-Swettenham, 13 August 1901, CO 273/274, quoted in ibid.

[19]Raja Sai to Swettenham, 13 October 1901, encl. in Swettenham to Colonial Office, 20 November 1901, CO 273/274, quoted in ibid., 11.

[20]See a discussion on the British interest in Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 30-31. For detailed discussion of the British role and the Thai response, see in Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, 11-15.

[21]Ibid., 56.

[22]Likhit Dhiravegin, "Centralization and Decentralization: The Dilemma of Thailand," 50.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Keyes, Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State, 59.

[25]Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, 24.

[26]Ibid., 25.

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[27]Raymond Scupin, "Muslim Accommodation in Thai Society," Journal of Islamic Studies 9. 2 (1998): 234.

[28]M. Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States, 201-202.

[29]Nantawan Haemindra, "The Problem of Thai Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7.2 (September, 1976): 205.

[30] The Promoters consisted of a small number of young men, mainly members of the civil service but also some in the military, who had received their education in France or England.

[31]Charles F. Keyes, Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 65.

[32]Suchit Boonbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), 5.

[33]Kobkua Suwannatat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades 1932-1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 110.

[34]Ibid., 110-135.

[35]Chai-Anan Samudavanija noted that during Phibul's period, the state was given a specific Thai character "as a result of a combination of factors ranging from the desire to claim jurisdiction over other Tai races beyond the existing territory of Siam to the suppression of emergent ethnic Chinese influence in politics and society." See Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "State-Identity Creation, State-Building and Civil Society," in National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand, 1939-1989, Craig J. Reynolds, ed. (Victoria, Australia: Monash University, 1991), 69.

[36]Bangnara, Patani: Past-Present, 98.

[37]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 91.

[38]Arong Suthasasna, "Thai Society and the Muslim Minority," in Andrew D.W. Forbes The Muslims of Thailand: Politics of the Malay-Speaking South, Vol. 2 (Bihar: Center for South East Asian Studies, 1989), 94.

[39]Report of Cabinet Meeting, Session 24/2484, quoted in Imron Malulim, Wikroh quam khatyang rawang ratbaanthai khab muslim nai pratetthai: Koranii suksa klum muslim nai ket changwat chaidane paktai [An analysis of conflict between the Thai government and

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Muslims in Thailand: The case study of Muslims in the southern border provinces] (Bangkok: Islamic Academy Press, 1995), 107.

[40]Kobkua Suwanatat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier, 130.

[41]Nat Bintammaknong, mayor, Municipal Council of Satun, Satun, interview, 9 May 1987, quoted in Piyanat Boonnak, 98.

[42]Report of Parliamentary Meetings 2483: 273-4, 247-8, 261-2, quoted in Imron Mahrurim, 110.

[43]Dr. Mohammad Abdulkadir, director of External Education of Yala province, Yala, interview, 4 May 1987, quoted in Boonnak, 89.

[44]Paisan Yingsaman, a Muslim merchant, Yala. interview, 5 May 1987, quoted in Boonnak, 98.

[45]Dr. Mohammad Abdulkadir, interview. quoted in Boonnak, 89.

[46]Rewat Rajmukda, president of Islamic Council, Narathiwat, interview. 7 May 1987. quoted in Boonnak, 87.

[47]Dr. Mohammad Abdulkadir, interview, quoted in Boonnak, 89.

[48]Walker Connor, "Politics," 21.

[49]Clive J. Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism, and Separatism (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 177.

[50]H.E. Wilson, "Imperialism and Islam: The Impact of 'Modernization' on the Malay-Muslims of South Thailand," in Andrew Forbes (ed.), The Muslims of Thailand, Vol. II: Politics of Malay-Speaking South, 62.

[51]Christie, 178.

[52]Pram Promyong, "Phanha khan bangyak dindan pak tai," in khuam phen ekkapap khong chat kab phanha 3 changwat pak tai (Bangkok, 2517), 23.

[53]Upon waiting for Seni to return to Thailand, Thawee Boonyakeit formed a cabinet which took charge from August 31 to September 17, 1945. See historical accounts about politics in Thailand during the end of the war period in Charivat Santaputra, Thai Foreign Policy 1932-1946 (Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1985), 329-340.

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[54]Christie, 182.

[55]Uthai Hirantho. Pandinthai: Changwat chaidane paktai [The Land of Thais: The southern border provinces]. Bangkok:) Department of Governance, Ministry of Interior), 148.

[56]See a detailed discussion about this issue in Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 99-110 and 211-214.

[57]The *chularajmontri* would give counseling to the prime minister on Islamic laws, cultures, and practices. Thus, the *chularajmontri* was the intermediate agent between the government and the Malay-Muslims.

[58]Surin Pitsuwan, Nayobai phasom phasan choa malay muslim in thailand samai ratanakhosin [Assimilation policy of Malay Muslims in Thailand during Rattanakosin] (Bangkok: Thai Studies Institute, Thammasat University), 11.

[59]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 145.

[60]Panomporn Anuragsa, Political Integration Policy in Thailand: the Case of the Malay Muslim Minority (Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1984), 128.

[61]Pridi Panomyong, "Observations Concerning National Unity and Democracy," in National Unity and Problems of the Three Southern Provinces (Bangkok: National Federation of Southern Studies, 1974), 10-11.

[62]Den Tohmina, senator of Pattani, interview, 31 October 2000, Bangkok.

[63]See Keyes, Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom, 71-72.

[64]Ruth McVey, "Identity and Rebellion Among Southern Muslims," Forbes, 40. Also, Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 1985, 152.

[65]Den Tohmeena, interview.

[66]They are: 1) allowing the teaching of Malay language in the primary schools of the four provinces, 2) the announcement of Friday as school holiday, and 3) a promise to develop a plan to recruit Malay Muslim teachers for the next school year. See Haemindra, 8.1 (1977): 209.

[67]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 160.

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[68]Suchit Boonbongkarn, "Elections and Democratization in Thailand," 186.

[69]Haemindra, 8.1 (1977): 215-216.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Somboon Buoluong, "Dusung Nyior: Rou Kabob?" Thaang Nam (October 2000): 8.

[72]Tengku Abdul Jalal had headed the Force 136 Malay Division guerrilla group during the war and and had, at the time, enjoyed British support for the hope to push the Thai-Malayan border north to the Kra Isthmus. His association drew much of its support from traditional loyalties.

[73]Barbara Whittingham Jones, "Pattani Appeals to UNO," Eastern World, 2 (1948): 4-5.

[74]Astri Suhrke, "Irredentism Contained," Comparative Politics 7(January 1975): 197.

[75]Lukman Thaib, The Politics and Governments of Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: Golden Books, 1997), 98.

[76]Pornchart Boonnak and Den Tohmina. interviews.

[77]Den Tohmeena, interview.

[78]Thaib, The Politics and Governments of Southeast Asia, 98.

[79]Surin Pitsuwan, "Elites, Conflicts, and Violence: Conditions in Southern Border Provinces," Asian Review 2(October-December 1980): 36-37.

[80]Anuragsa, 142.

[81]Keyes, Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom, 75.

[82]Clark Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 27.

[83]Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 163.

[84]See M. Ladd Thomas, "Socio-Economic Approach to Political Integration of the Thai-Islam: An Appraisal." Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, monograph, 31 March 1969.

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[85]These projects include: a project to teach Thai language to Malay students in the elementary school, a project to transform the traditional Malay school (the *pondok*), a project to encourage adults returning to school, a project to give scholarships to Malay students, and a project supporting seminars for religious teachers to nominate individuals among religious teachers of southernmost provinces to receive "gifts" from the King that aimed to gain loyalty of religious leaders.

[86]See Arong Suthasasna, "Thai Society and the Muslim Minority," 99-100.

[87]Boonnak,124-5.

[88]The government hoped that it would induce the Malays to learn Thai language by being attracted to Thai television programs; deputy-governor of Pattani, interview, 20 October 2000.

[89]Boonnak,179.

[90]Suthasasna, "Thai Society and the Muslim Minority," 100.

[91]Boonnak, 157-8.

[92]Suthasasna, "The Society and the Muslim Minority," 100.

[93]Ibid.

[94]Anonymous, interview, May 1987, quoted in Boonnak, 127.

[95]Anonymous, interview, May 1987, ibid., 128.

[96]Mohammad Abdulkader, director of the Extension School, Education Center in Yala, interview, 4 May 1987, quoted in ibid., 47.

[97]Wairoj Phipitpahkdii, former member of the national parliament from Pattani, interview, 27 April 1987, ibid., 45.

[98]Interview Phirayot Rahimula, 5 May 1987, Pattani, Thailand, quoted in Boonnak, 44.

[99]Surin Pitsuwan, "Issue Affecting Border," 175-204.

[100]See the government's process in implementing this policy in Uthai Dulyakasem, "Education and Ethnic Nationalism: The Case of the Muslim-Malays in Southern

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Thailand," in Charles F. Keyes (ed) Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University, 1991), 143-144.

[101]Geertz, 184.

[102]Dennis Walker, "Conflict between the Thai and Islamic Culture in Southern Thailand, 1948-1970," The Voice of Islam (January 1973): 170.

[103]Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, "Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations in the Pattani Region: An Interpretation," in Forbes, 83.

[104] See Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 234-240.

[105] Ibid., 235.

[106]Omar Farouk Bajunid, "The Muslims in Thailand: A Review," 225.

[107]Idris Pohde (pseudonym), member, Provincial Islamic Council, Pattani, 24 October 2000. This view was also shared by a majority of the interviewees who were above 50 years of age.

[108]Maitri Youngboonrod, deputy-governor, Pattani, interview. 20 October 2000.

[109]Khalid Wasaya, interview.

[110]Ibid.

[111]Boonbongkarn, "Elections and Democratization in Thailand," 187.

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CHAPTER 4

THAILAND'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION POLICIES AND STRATEGIES (1973-2000)

The investigation of the Thai State's integration policies toward the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces from 1973 to 2000 is important to the study of the state-ethnic relations. It can lead to broader questions regarding Thailand's style of actions and what dictates such a style, the leaders' perception of the political and social situation, and the likely future of interethnic relationships. Integrative policies and strategies change over time as they respond to the changes in the political environment. The study of political integration policies of the Thai State must include an investigation of political development of Thailand. This chapter is divided into two parts: (1) the political development of Thailand between 1973-2000 and (2) the evolution of integrative policies between 1973-2000. Integrative policies and strategies are traced from a series of official policy announcements, cabinet resolutions, prime minister orders, department orders, and interviews with members of the cabinet, the parliament and the senate, civil servants who were involved in policymaking and/or policy implementation, academics, students, and local residents.

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Thailand's Political Development and Democratization

Samuel Huntington categorizes cases of democratization that had occurred from the 1970s into three types: transformations, replacements, and transplacements.[1] In transformations, the ruling elite takes the lead in carrying out reforms to transform their political systems into democracy. In transplacements, governmental cooperation with a moderate opposition guarantees a smooth democratization. The government compromises with the moderates who later will become the mainstream of the opposition, peacefully competing for power. Replacement occurs if the regime staunchly opposes political reforms. When democratic forces are strong enough to overthrow the authoritarian regime, democracy prevails.

The process of democratization in Thailand from 1973 was a mixture of replacement, transplacement, and transformation. Student uprisings in October 1973 replaced an authoritarian regime with democratic governments. The Prem administration was a good example of transplacement where cooperation between business, political, and military elements took place under the leadership of military leaders. Under Anand's leadership (1991-1992), a number of measures were adopted to transform Thailand to democracy.

After the 1973 "October Revolution" led by student demonstrators that ended the military regime of Thanom-Prapat, participation in politics by social forces increased significantly. These social forces included new pressure groups of monks, workers, farmers, and students. It was a time of a new openness in Thai politics. The student

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victory led to a nationwide election in 1975 that produced several shaky elected coalition governments led by Seni Pramoj of the Democrat Party and Kukrit Pramoj of the Social Action Party. During this unprecedented period of liberalization, a Center to Promote Knowledge of Democracy was set up.

Under the leadership of Dr. Puey Ungpakorn, a rural development project was inaugurated in three major universities to tackle the problems resulting from rural poverty.[2] It trained thousands of student volunteers to go out to investigate the problems and work with villagers.[3] During this period, Muslim student bodies, such as the Thai Muslim Student Association, were active in volunteer work as well. Their focus was on the problem of Muslims in Thailand at large. Nevertheless, their development projects were in southernmost provinces where the majority of Muslims lived.[4] Like student volunteers under Dr. Puey's project that mobilized peasants in villages, the Muslim students played a leading role in mobilizing the Muslim peasants politically.[5]

The 1973-1976 period of Open Democracy was one of great conflict and competition. Rival political groups, interests, and movements jockeyed to establish positions in a political environment while the military was in disarray and unable to mold political developments. The period that opened a new chapter of Thai politics brought anarchic chaos. Workers struck against their employers while peasants organized protests demanding higher prices for rice. Students were also moving rapidly leftward.

Toward the end of the 1970s, Thailand also found itself facing security threats from both internal and external sources. The communist threat created the greatest

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concern among the Thai elite.[6] This threat included the victory of communism in Indochina after the fall of Laos and Vietnam in April 1975, the expansion of communism with the support of the USSR into many parts of the world, and the threat of the Communist Party of Thailand with support from China. With the withdrawal of the American military bases from Thailand in 1976, Thailand was predicted to be the next domino to fall to communism. What happened both domestically and internationally was a frightening phenomenon in the eyes of the Thai military leaders. Hewison points out that when the political conflicts inside the country became violent as competition between right and left intensified, the failure of the civilian government to establish control gave the military an opportunity to stage the coup on October 6, 1976.[7]

After the Thammasat massacre[8] and the military coup, a right-wing law professor, Thanin Kraivixien, was made prime minister. The political structure and process of the Thanin government were little different from the pre-1973 authoritarian regimes. The activities of the rightist organizations during the 1973-1976 period, the military coup in 1976, and the ultra-rightist policies of the Thanin government led many of the reform-minded students and intellectuals to the conclusion that peaceful radical reform was not possible. Thus, thousands fled to join the Communist guerrillas in the northeastern jungles and embraced the revolutionary alternative offered by the Communist Party of Thailand (the CPT). The severe repression after the 1976 coup strengthened the CPT. Communist insurgencies intensified. For many observers, the combination of students and peasants raised the possibility of an insurgent victory.

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Alfred Stephen proposes three factors that promote a ruling elite to initiate democratization: (1) socioeconomic and political demands from below, (2) the existence of conflicts over a regime's legitimacy to rule, and (3) the probability that the ruling elite will retain their power via competitive elections.[9] The crisis of October 1973 and the aftermath made the military leaders realize that they could retain power to intervene, but the power was also subjected to challenge and contest. Thus, a new rule of the game had to be made for the new era of compromise between the bureaucracy, political parties, and businesses.

During the administrations of General Kriangsak and General Prem, Thailand witnessed a deliberate attempt by the government to loosen the authoritarianism of the 1976-1977 period. This included an expansion of the role of parliament and political parties. In the economic realm, under the leadership of General Prem, leaders of business associations were called in to help in the effort to create economic growth. For the first time businessmen were able to influence the government collectively through their associations and share in the making of public policy.[10] In ideological terms, the military presented itself as the guardian of national security. The military leaders also asserted the role of the military as the true defender of the interest of ordinary people against the corrupt ambitions of politicians abetted by the greed of capitalist exploitation.

The counter-insurgency doctrine, which was elaborated by General Prem and his close advisor, General Chavalit, was intended to provide a legitimating role for the military's social and political missions. To fight the war against communism, the Order

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of the Prime Minister's Office No 66/2523, issued in 1980, advocated "political means" rather than military actions and aimed to eliminate social injustice.

The subsequent Order No. 66/2525 was issued and designed to serve as a guideline for the implementation of the Order No. 66/2523. This political offensive strategy emphasized the necessity to promote popular participation. It also stressed that to win the war against the communists, the political offensive had to work hand in hand with the military operation.[11] It aimed at ending all conditions that led to revolutionary war. These conditions included economic exploitation of the poor by the rich, corruption of government officers and the "dark influence" (*ittipon moued*), or the influence of local business tycoons who had gained wealth and power through smuggling, operating gambling dens, and other illegal activities.[12] It noted that the leadership of mass organizations should be won over to destroy the subversive power of communism while the development of a "true democracy" must be promoted.[13] During the 1980s, this strategy was extended to be used with the separatist insurgency in the southernmost provinces.

Chai-Anan described the relationship between state and society in Thailand as "three-dimensions, namely security, development and participation" and "the resultant political processes involve interrelations among these three dimensions."[14] He argues that the rulers' interest in the development and participation dimensions was principally based on their recognition that they could not achieve a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects unless their preoccupation with security was tempered by their concern

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or the other dimensions. By providing increasing avenues for the participation of the citizenry in the political life of the country, the rulers hoped to enlarge their popular base of support. The ordering of the priority given to each dimension may change over time. The relative importance of security on the one hand and development and participation on the other involves the relationship between a regime's primary and secondary objectives.[15]

During this period, political participation and economic development seemed to occupy the picture of the government. However, Chai-Anan argues that on substantial issues such as national resource management, international relations, security management, decentralization, the proposed election of governors, and constitutional and political reforms, the senior military and civilian bureaucrats remained at the center of the decision-making process.[16] One of the reasons for the expansion of political space was the authoritarianism of the Thanin administration had proven divisive, driving political opposition into the arms of the underground CPT, which was mounting an increasingly effective guerrilla war.[17]

The military initiated two important programs to mobilize the masses in rural areas to counter communist subversion: the national self-defense voluntary project and the self-development and self-defense villages. The former program was launched in the communist-infiltrated areas as a measure to bring villagers back to the government side.[18] It involved education programs for villagers to instill in them the values of the nation, the religion, and the monarchy. The program was based on the principles of

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"rallying the rural population to become involved in the development and security of their village" and "organizing the administration of the village to assume responsibility for its development and security."[19] Under the program, the military personnel and government officers taught villagers subjects relevant to development, such as village security, agriculture, education, and public health. Several committees were set up in each village to manage the development programs.[20] The role of the army in maintaining internal security had given the military a chance to intervene in solving a wide range of the country's political, social and economic problems. These problems were identified (by the army) as vital to national security.[21]

As the fighting with the communists was over in the rebel areas, the military shifted its emphasis to economic development to improve economic conditions of the people. To legitimize the maintenance of its role, economic development was defined as a precondition for national security and defense. Two new development projects were created in 1988 to develop the northeast and the southern border provinces. They were the Greening of the Northeast Project (*krongkarn isarn keaw*) in the northeast and the New Hope Project (*krongkarn puea kuamwang mai*, or *Harapan Baru*) in the south. The latter program changed the role of the military in the Malay provinces from its preoccupation with suppression tasks to development tasks, which will be discussed later.

General Prem was able to head an essentially civilian government for over eight years to the satisfaction of most parties involved, although he had to deal with two coup

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attempts. After the 1988 election, under pressure from various groups and political parties demanding that the government leader be drawn from the ranks of members of parliament, he turned down the request to appoint him as the premier.

Chatichai Choonhavan, the leader of the largest political party in the 1989 election (Chart Thai Party), became the prime minister of a coalition government. For the first time since 1976, the country had an elected government headed by a prime minister who was an elected member of the parliament. During this period, business associations had great influence on government policy decisions.

From the first half of the 1980s, during the Prem administration, the military and bureaucratic elites had sought to maintain their control over the rising economic elite through a combination of strategies. They developed a mechanism to connect with emergent economic interests through the Joint Public-Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC). However, when Chatchai became prime minister in 1988, this military and civilian bureaucratic alliance was broken. Chatchai preferred to keep decision making closer to his advisors and cabinet of elected politicians. Thus, he took steps to move decision making away from the civil and military bureaucracy and into the hands of the elected politicians.

When the Chatchai government had alienated the public support due to widespread corruption by the cabinet members, the military staged a coup in February 1991. However, the attempt to install the un-elected Army Chief Suchinda Kraprayoon as prime minister in 1992 provoked an extraordinary middle-class protest. Following the

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May 1992 incident, the military's position changed significantly. The military and civilian bureaucratic elites were losing not only their influence but also their prestige and status. At the same time, political parties and politicians became the center of political life. This is due to the rapidly declining significance of security concerns. The 1992 Constitution stipulated that the prime minister must come from the members of the parliament.

Chai-Anan Samudavanija points out that the development of the modern Thai State was characterized by a dualism of power, with state and political power never effectively integrated.[22] State power had been accumulated through the creation of the nation-state, enhancing the "bureaucratic polity" and expanding the power of the bureaucratic elite.[23] By focusing on their legitimate roles of maintaining stability and security and at the same time developing the state to safeguard the "Nation, Religion and the Monarch" from communism, the military and civilian bureaucrats were able to consolidate their power. The alliance of these two forces was shaken as the new economic elite can used political parties to effectively advance their interests and demands.

Since 1992, power in society has become increasingly segmented and suppression has become more costly because of the international economic interdependence, the strengthening of civil society, and the people's growing distaste for coercion. Moreover, as O'Donnell and Schmitter suggest, a democratic transition begins with a division within the authoritarian regime itself.[24] A division in the ruling leadership in the military

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weakened the Suchinda government's ability to crack down on the opposition, while the professional military within the regime overwhelmed the hard-liners and paved the way for democratization. Thus, the process of democratization survived after the May 1992 demonstration.

From 1973 on, civil society in Thailand has increasingly been strengthened. The growth of civil society had a profound impact on Thailand. John Girling notes that the most significant forces are from political parties, academe, and religious, environmental, and rural development advocacy organizations. Their work is generated at three levels: through exemplary personal leadership; through institutional responsibility for more effective expression of social issues, such as among professionals and political parties; and through grassroots work, especially the work of NGOs.[25] The concern of the NGOs for those who do not benefit from official development policy or for those who are discriminated against by powerful officials or businessmen has helped strengthen the power of the poor. For example, the NGOs supported "the Council of the Poor" (*sapha knonjon*) to protest and negotiate with the government on social, economic, and environmental issues that affect their lives. The demonstration by villagers in Songkla against the Malaysia-Thailand gas pipe and refinery plant in October 2000 also received support and was joined by a number of NGOs.

The work of the intellectuals also has an important effect on both elite and popular attitudes about the economic, political, and social problems of development. While the NGOs work with the people and help organize them in expressing their

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concerns, the academy helps define the public agenda. Members of academia who played crucial roles in setting the agenda for the government approaches toward Malay-Muslims are, for example, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, Dr. Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Dr. Arong Suthasat, Dr. Pheerayot Rahimulla, Dr. Senii Matmarn, Dr. Imtiyaz Yusuf, Dr. Uthai Dulyakasem, and Dr. Mark Tamthai. Their writings, opinions, and involvement had directly and indirectly affected the government approaches toward the Malay-Muslims. For example, Dr. Chaiwat who advocates nonviolence as a means to solve social and political problems, is an advisor to the drafting of the current National Security Policy for Southern Border Provinces.[26] Dr. Surin, a former professor at Thammasat University and one of the authorities on the Malay-Muslims, has asserted a direct influence on government policy toward the Malay-Muslims in his capacity as a member of the parliament and the minister of foreign affairs.

The most significant evidence of democracy in Thailand is the current constitution that is also called "the People's Constitution." It was drafted by ninety-nine drafting committees who came from people of different walks of lives. For the first time in the history of Thailand, the constitution gives the Thai citizens protection from human rights violations committed by government. In accordance with the constitution, Thailand has set up a number of mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights. They are the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Administration Tribunal, and the National Commission of Human Rights.

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In October 1999, the Thai Parliament approved the organic laws to establish the National Commission of Human Rights. The commission performs its function under the supervision of the Upper House of Parliament. Eleven experts are tasked with responsibilities to advise and map out policies to promote and protect human rights and to investigate and report human rights violations.[27] This development is significant for minority groups. Although every constitution specifies equal rights to all individual citizens, the rights of the Malay-Muslims have sometimes been violated by the intolerance of the officials and sometimes by the toleration of such practices by the State. The new constitution clearly stipulates that the State has no rights to detain a person, unless it has been proven that he or she has violated the law. Under the new law, the citizen can sue the State for its violation of his or her individual rights. On the international level, Thailand has acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1996 and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Cultural Rights in 1999. By doing so, Thailand made known to the international community its commitment to the democratic values of liberty, freedom, and justice.

Another important development was the declaration of Thailand as a secular state. The current constitution no longer specifies Thailand's national religion. King Bhumiphol had an influence on this initiative, which explained why there was no resistance from the dissatisfied conservative Buddhists on this matter.[28] This fundamental change had an important impact on political integration of Thailand. When Buddhism was identified as an element of the national identity, it automatically made

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those who did not profess Buddhism feel excluded from the Thai nation. Malay-Muslim students from the border provinces expressed that they did not identify themselves as Thai "because being a Thai is being a Buddhist." [29] Hence, the decision not to specify national religion in the constitution is one of the most significant pieces of evidence for the acceptance of a multicultural and multi religious national identity of the Thai State.

The understanding of political development in Thailand is significant in the analysis of the continuity and change in the government's strategies and policies toward the ethnic Malays of the southernmost provinces. The changes in political context induced changes in the government approaches. It is now that we turn to investigate the Thai State's integration policies and strategies toward the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces of Thailand.

Political Integration Policies and Strategies

James Coleman and Carl Rosberg use the term "political integration" to refer to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community.[30] A number of factors were perceived by the Thai elite as obstacles to political integration of the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces.[31] Armed separatism was diagnosed as a result of one or more of the following: (1) The lack of socioeconomic development in the four provinces, (2) government misadministration in the border region, (3) the effort of the traditional political and religious elites to recapture political power, and (4)

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external support.[32] During the period under study, some of these perceptions changed while others remained. The change in the diagnoses necessarily influenced the emphasis of the government in its effort to solve the problem of the Malay-Muslims.

Lee Cuchheit points out that any state confronting the destructive effects of a movement for secession by a segment of its population would have the following major concerns:[33]

1. Secession will almost invariably result in a diminution of the unified State's wealth, resources, and power, thereby lowering its economic stamina, defensive capability, and potential international influence.
2. A successful secession will create a new, possibly hostile neighbor on its borders.
3. Any movement for secession creates an enormous societal trauma – particularly in those areas populated by a heterogeneous mixture of the country's population.
4. The seceding province may choose to annex itself to a traditionally antagonistic neighbor or add a part of its new territory to a hostile foreign power.

Hence, a state will resort to all the means at its disposal to integrate all ethnic groups into its polity and to prevent a secessionist movement from emerging. A state also has the option of granting a federal or an autonomous status to the region occupied by the ethnic group.

In the case of Thailand, every constitution states clearly that Thailand is a unitary state and that its territorial integrity cannot be divided. The goal of the government in harmonizing relations between the Thai and ethnic Malay as well as in promoting legitimacy and gaining the allegiance of the Malays is a long-term process. In its efforts

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to integrate Malay-Muslims of southernmost Thailand, the State has resorted to various approaches. Some of the most important approaches are political socialization, coercion, political participation, socioeconomic development, administrative reorganization and personnel management reform.

While political socialization builds a value consensus that supports the government, coercion suppresses any challenge to the regime's authority. Political participation is promoted at a controlled pace to fend off demands for autonomy that threaten the integrity of the State. Socioeconomic development is a part of the larger scheme--the national development plan. As an approach to integration, it aims at satisfying ethnic Malays or co-opting certain individuals and groups. Administrative reorganization and personnel management reform refer to efforts to restructure administrative institutions and relationships to cope with ethnic problems. It is now that we turn to investigate each integration approach in detail.

Political Socialization

Political socialization encompasses "all political learning, formal or informal, deliberated and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally non-political learning."[34] Family, school, peer groups, and mass media all mold an individual's political orientation. In a narrow sense, political socialization is "the deliberate inculcation of political information, values, and

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practices by instructional agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility."[35]

Greenstein notes that political authority is likely to be stable when citizens have learned to accept institutions and leaders as legitimate.[36] A regime uses political socialization to develop a congruent political culture, to bolster its political system, and to legitimize its rule. Like the Hill Tribes of the north of Thailand, Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces have been deliberately socialized to accept the superiority of the Three Principles of National Institutions and the legitimacy of the Thai government and to identify with the state.

The Thai governments from 1973 on faced a two-fold task of political socialization of the Malay-Muslims. First, they had to resocialize older Malay-Muslims to have them embrace the cultural-political norms and values of the Thai State. Second, they had to introduce the younger generation to the basic values of the Thai State. It was difficult to change the older generation's political attitudes because they had lived through assimilation policies and experienced authoritarian rule and hence were alienated from the Thai State. Recognizing the difficulty of resocializing older Malay-Muslims, the Thai State naturally put higher expectations on the younger generation. It hoped that the younger generation could be trained to support not only the political system but also policies of the government.

Schools are the most important instrument for the government to convey its values and norms designed to transform students into good citizens. Schools are

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accessible to government control, especially in term of teachers and curriculum design. As an educational institution, schools created a new category of elite among Malay-Muslims who became government officials and whose careers were bound up with the State.[37] Scholarships and quotas to study in public universities, the police academy, and other institutions had been granted to the Malay-Muslims in the form of an affirmative action. Compulsory education had been expanded from four to six years, then to nine years.

At the same time, as discussed in chapter two, the government kept a tight grip on *pondoks*. As an institution where young Malay-Muslims learn and socialize, it plays crucial roles in deepening and transferring primordial attachment to the new generation. In the views of the Thai elite, this institution necessarily hindered the government policy of assimilation of Malay-Muslims. Through monetary incentives and legal impositions, the State had complete control over religious schools teaching Islam. To encourage the school owners to follow the government regulations, distinctive schools were selected each year to receive rewards from his Majesty the King. For *pondoks* that did not offer secular education in their curriculum, the State also sought to control them through governmental regulations and penetrations. For example, the *pondoks*' owners were required to register and provide reports on their activities and background information on teachers and students to the Regional Education Office in Yala.[38]

Citizenship training in Thailand begins as early as primary school. Students are required to attend the national anthem ceremony in the morning before classes begin.

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Male senior-high-school students are given light military training in lieu of serving mandatory military duty. Teachers are instructed to emphasize to students that they are Thai. Students are taught the Thai official version of history that the Sukhothai King expanded his rule to cover not only the southernmost provinces of Thailand but also the Malay peninsula. The benevolence of the Thai kings has been emphasized, especially the present King Bhumiphol. All textbooks from elementary to high school are compiled by committees assigned by the Ministry of Education. The highly competitive university entrance examinations are based on these national textbooks. Students are consequently required to learn and rewarded for learning this information.

School is central to the political integration of ethnic Malays. It provides a channel to build a common language that is necessary for more meaningful communication. Thai is the sole official language. In schools, the medium of instruction is Thai. English is the required foreign language. At the high-school level, students could previously choose to study a foreign language such as French, German, and Arabic, but not Malay. This was part of the scheme to eradicate language differences between the Thai and Malay-Muslims because it was regarded by the Thai elite as a natural barrier to social harmony and integration. One of the primary goals of the National Security Policy of the Southern Border Provinces approved by the Cabinet on 24 January 1978, which was the first comprehensive policy, was "to make the people talk and like to talk in Thai."[39] When the Cabinet approved the second National Security Policy for the Border Provinces on 8 November 1987, this priority was still intact.

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The Thai government policy on language has been a success. While children in the villages who tend to attend traditional Islamic schools converse in Malay at home and at schools, those who attend private schools teaching Islam and public schools tend to converse with friends in Thai. Many young urban Malay-Muslims do not care to learn Malay because it has become fashionable and desirable to converse in Thai. Knowledge of Thai language indicates educational background and in some cases social status of the family.[40] This trend creates concern among Malay-Muslim parents in the urban areas that their children are unable to speak Malay, let alone read and write it.[41]

Apart from education, various programs and projects were initiated for the purpose of political socialization of Malay-Muslims. For example, programs under the Department of Governance, Ministry of Interior, include the Thai-language Promoting Program,[42] a program for coordination and seminar for the religious leaders, the Youth Relations Program, a program for *chularajmontri* to visit the Malay-Muslims, and a program for religious leaders to visit Bangkok. The activities conducted under these programs aim at developing patriotism and opening up Malay society.

Political socialization was reinforced by close supervision of the mass media, especially the newspapers, TV networks, and radio stations. The government banned newspaper publishing in the Malay language. In Thailand, of the five TV channels, two are the military channels (channels 5 and 7); two are the government channels (channels 3 and 9), and one is the public channel (channel 11). Every TV channel is to broadcast evening news, which reports the activities of the royal family members, the government,

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and the military. Before the end of the broadcast each night the song saluting the King is played and pictures of him and the royal family are shown. Every day, at eight o'clock in the morning and six o'clock in the evening, official news is broadcast on every radio station in Thailand. The broadcast begins with the national anthem and people are required to stand to pay respect when hearing the anthem. In villages, the news is aired through loudspeakers to make sure that official news and information reach villagers.

Another important media is television. In the past, Malay-Muslims liked to watch television programs broadcast from Malaysia. This was viewed by the government as hindering political integration of the Malay-Muslims into the Thai polity. Thus, the Internal Security Council initiated a project to set up a television set at each head-village's house in the southernmost provinces. It aimed at attracting the Malay-Muslims who usually watch TV broadcasts from Malaysia to switch to Thai programs that give official information and Thai entertainment.[43] This strategy proved successful. The Thai television programs have become very popular in the southern border provinces, especially the entertainment programs.[44]

At present, channel 11 has a local station in Yala. Since 1996, it has broadcast local news and events in Malay daily for an hour. The purpose of this local program is to produce a source of government public relations such as reporting on progress of development projects in the area and giving official accounts of events or opinions concerning security issues and governance policies.[45] All announcers of the program are local Malay-Muslims. There is also a plan to expand the broadcasting time to two hours.

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Through this access to the mass media, the government can canvass the southernmost provinces and influence the minds of the Malay-Muslims. This media is used to build loyalty to the Monarch, to promote the image of the Thai State, and to transmit government policies to the people.

As mentioned earlier, when the Thai majority organized itself as a nation, its national identity included the three central elements that are the nation, the religion (Buddhism), and the monarchy. Once the national identity is defined in a certain way, the definition generates pressure on the government to follow appropriate policies.[46] Satha-Anand argues that the Thai State "possesses inadequate understanding of the nature of the Thai society" because it confused the "unity of the Thai State" with the concept of "a monolithic society."[47] It assumed that the manifestation of the multiethnic, multicultural reality would destroy the unity of the state. Thus, the State repeatedly suppressed other cultural identities under the shadow of a state-sponsored Buddhist culture.[48] In order to promote an identity with Thailand, the State tended to disparage the importance of the Malay-Muslim culture. One of the central policies of the Thai State has been to "teach all the Malay children to speak Thai";[49] the promotion of the Thai language was sometimes accompanied by the active suppression of the Malay language. Local Malay newspapers were banned. Street names have been changed from Malay into Thai. The Muslims were not allowed to change their names from Thai to Malay or Arabic, while to change from Malay or Arabic to Thai was promoted.

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It is true that Malays who do not speak Thai are disadvantaged in competing for positions in the civil service and in modern companies since Thai language is the sole official language. However, in rural areas, where Malay is still the first language of daily life, political candidates who do not speak Malay and are not Muslims have very slim chances to win elections.[50] These social and political realities forced political parties to nominate Malay-Muslim candidates to run for parliamentary seats. As a result, political parties opened channels for Malay-Muslims to be members of the national elite and hence influence the direction of government policy in the later period. Thus, some of the above-mentioned practices have later been reversed as Malay-Muslims pressured for changes.

There is no doubt that political socialization has promoted political integration over the two decades under study. Thai has been successfully established and used in the southernmost provinces. Nevertheless, the Thai State's political socialization of the Malay society was less impressive when attempting to indoctrinate the Malay to identify themselves as Thai in terms of cultural identity (*eakkalak thai*). This attempt even created a backlash among Malay-Muslims.

When the majority organizes and behaves as a nation and seeks to mold the state in its image, minorities are led to define themselves as nations, or at least as ethnic groups.[51] Malay-Muslims in the southernmost provinces are not "Thais" in its meaning of cultural identity. They are Malays. They have repeatedly asserted their basic rights as a cultural and religious group, i.e., as Malay-Muslims. They demand respect for their

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cultural and religious identity. Government officials sometimes confused such cultural demands as political demands for separatism. They felt threatened by the resurgence of the Malay cultural consciousness and of Islamic identity. In their attempts to suppress this assertion, they sometimes committed unjust acts and mistreated the Malays. As a result, the shallow Thai-Malay mutual trust was undermined, thus hindering cooperation between the State and its Malay-Muslim populations.

Globalization of democratic values, such as liberty, freedom, and justice; the internationalization of the norm that a state must respect basic human rights of its citizens; the growth of civil society in Thailand along with the ongoing pressure from the separatist fronts all affected the Thai leaders' perceptions that their policy approaches toward Malay-Muslims needed to be changed.[52] Moreover, as social and economic forces play an increasing role in shaping government policies, the old policy that emphasized security is waning. The Thai elite recognizes that the emergence of Malay separatism is a response to the violation of religious and cultural freedom of the Malay-Muslims by the State and its apparatus. Hence, the current integrative effort no longer emphasizes the molding of the Thai national identity, which implied the eradication of the Malay identity.

The latest national security policy for the southern border provinces (1999-2003) clearly stipulates that to solve the problems of separatism, the State must accommodate Malay-Muslims to be able to "live as Muslims in Thai society."[53] Hence, while most of the political socialization programs as mentioned earlier continue, the goal is to create

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good citizens of the state, not of the nation, which is based on common *eakkalak thai*, or Thai identity.

In sum, political socialization in schools has generally been successful. It seems that the Thai government's policy that aims at making Malays speak Thai has been accomplished through education. Many younger Malay-Muslims today, especially those living in the urban areas, speak Thai more fluently than Malay. However, the assimilation policy to mold Malay-Muslims into a common national identity based on the Buddhist religion and culture has faced continuous resistance. This objective condition constrained political socialization and integration in Thailand. Only when the Thai government pursues a new goal of creating "state" citizens rather than "national" citizens does it stand a chance for success in making the Malay-Muslims identify themselves as citizens of Thailand with loyalty to the State.

Coercion and Control

Political socialization is a peaceful means for regimes to indoctrinate positive beliefs and values in citizens. By contrast, coercion usually involves threats and sanctions.[54] Pennock notes, "Coercion signifies, in general, the imposition of external regulation and control upon persons, by threat or use of force and power."[55] Authoritarian regimes tend to set up an extra-constitutional system and to use force to eliminate or suppress behavior they deem harmful to the integrity of their regimes.

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Christian Bay calls coercion "the supreme political evil" for it is incompatible with liberty and freedom.[56] Etzioni regards effective control over the means of coercion as an important indicator of the integration of a political system.[57] Since conflict is unavoidable in human society, the use of coercion may be a necessary evil to maintain social order.

In carrying its basic tasks of maintaining domestic order and its territorial integrity, the Thai State has used coercion to suppress Malay-Muslim separatist activities when it was deemed necessary. Moreover, the existence of security problems and the presence of armed guerrillas threatened to undermine the government's developmental efforts in the southernmost provinces. As the efforts at integration were continually rejected, the State adopted coercive measures in an effort to control or subdue the separatist groups.

Suppression was carried out primarily by military and police forces. There have been different sources of command, for example, the Fourth Army Region, the local police force, the Border Patrol Police, and the marines. The government usually employs two types of suppressive force: (1) regular measures carried out by the local police of each province or jointly operated with police forces of other provinces and (2) national measures composed of the police and military forces from the center sent into the provinces whenever the separatist activities rise in intensity or effort.[58]

Suthasasna describes the armed suppression units that operated in the southernmost provinces.[59] He notes that during the Thanom administration, particularly

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between 1968-69, Special Suppression Plan for the Four Southern Border Provinces was jointly operated by provincial police forces and the authorized voluntary force drawn from volunteers in the community. A special suppression unit was also created under the Special Terrorist Suppression of the Southern Region Plan. This was a special police unit with fully armed members who were recruited from young people or rank-and-file police from all over the country. Another special unit formed under the Ramkhanhaeng Plan was a joint operation by provincial police forces, regional police forces, and the Border Police Force. This unit was well known for the wide-scale suppression and injuries it brought about. Whenever the government perceived that the situation in the southern border provinces was too dangerous, it sent special military troops to the area. For example, in 1974, marine troops and the Special War Unit from Naresuon Camp in Lopburi were stationed in the southern border provinces.

During the rightist government led by Thanin Kraivixien (1976-77), Malay-Muslims who were suspected as separatists or communists were arrested, killed, or disappeared. False accusation of innocent people as members of separatist movements by police officials was widespread during this period. Fear of losing one's life or being accused frightened the majority of Malay-Muslim informal leaders away from political involvement.[60] Many Malay-Muslims engaged in everyday quiet resistance, i.e., avoidance or giving minimum cooperation with the officials. A number of young men who were accused of being involved with separatist movements fled to the jungle and joined separatist groups.[61] Others engaged in "sabotage acts" in retaliation to the

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"criminal and oppressive acts" committed by the State.[62] During this period, insurgency was intensified.

In 1978, the government announced that persons who created disruption would be warned first. If they persisted in their disruptive behaviors, they would be severely punished. To implement this policy, the Army Commander (South) had to submit a list of troublemakers. A bill was also passed enabling the government to hold terrorist suspects for 480 days without trial.[63] As discussed earlier, the Prem administration's national security policy focused on combating communist insurgency. In the southernmost provinces, the police were re-armed with modern weapons. The government took sharper military and police action against the CPM and the separatist guerrillas. While military might and its military readiness were the main principles to combat separatism, the military leaders realized that they could not win over the Malay-Muslim separatist movements by suppressive means alone. Thus, the strategy was changed to "negotiating to settle differences."[64]

From December 1975 to April 1976, a series of protests occurred that exacerbated the antagonistic feeling of the Malay-Muslims toward the Thai State and its officials. It was known as the Pattani Demonstration. It was the biggest protest in the southernmost provinces. Over a hundred thousand local Malay-Muslims, joined by students and political organizations, rallied to call for justice for five Malay-Muslim villagers who were killed by the Thai soldiers. During the peaceful demonstration in front of the Provincial Hall on December 13, a grenade was thrown from the second floor

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of the hall into the crowd.[65] People believed that the officials threw the grenade that killed twelve demonstrators and injured over forty people.[66] After the incident, more people joined the demonstration and called for justice for the families of the victims. The government eventually compromised and the demonstration dissolved.

The period under the rightist government of Thanin (1976-1977) marked the peak of the government use of coercion. Since then, the government has gradually loosened its coercive control. However, cases of arresting leaders of any social movement that the government felt threatened national security and domestic order took place occasionally. In one case, the leaders of the demonstration at Kru-se Mosque in Pattani in June 1990 were arrested;[67] in another, the government arrested the leaders of the demonstration against the Thailand-Malaysia gas pipeline and separation plant project in Songkhla in 2000.

The government has been highly successful in subduing activities of separatist insurgencies in the southern border provinces. By 1997, the deputy- secretary general of the National Security Council, Phichai Rattanaphol, commented that Thai authorities no longer had "a great concern" about the separatist movements due to the significant decrease of its members and its lack of popular support.[68] The success of the Thai government in securing cooperation from Malaysia in the beginning of 1998 has further weakened the separatist movements significantly. After the Malaysian forces handed over the separatist leaders in January, the government declared March 10 of the same year as the deadline for members of the movements to lay down arms and to join with

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other separatists in a rehabilitation program to turn them into "participants in national development."[69] At the same time, suppression has continued against the remaining separatists.

In 1998, it was believed that there were 236 active separatists (93 from the mainstream PULO, 102 from New PULO, and 131 from Barisan Revolusi Nasional). However, by 2000, it was estimated that the separatist movement now had only 60 to 80 members that are active along the Thai-Malaysian border in Narathiwat and Yala.[70] The separatist movements and activities have become what Den Tohmina called "almost meaningless" and the "least influential" elements in the area.[71]

In conclusion, between the 1960s and the 1980s, the Thai State needed to use coercion in order to prevent the country from dividing in the face of communist and separatist threats. Nevertheless, the use of coercion alone has never solved fundamental conflicts within a society. In fact, coercion cuts both ways, causing more harm than help to the political integration in the community. The use of coercion harms both a regime's legitimacy and people's identity with it. The long-standing shadow of the Pattani demonstration is a good example. People's grievances and ethnic conflicts may temporarily be submerged under coercion; they will explode again eventually with even more momentum.

Violence is a desperate means, used to control a turbulent situation, to give other relief policies a chance to work out in the hope that social integration can be reached in the long run. During the Prem administration, along with military and police suppression

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of separatist movements, the government emphasized popular participation to win the mass of Malay-Muslims to support political integration in Thailand. After 1988, democratization and civil liberalization further facilitated political participation and power sharing between the State and the ethnic Malay-Muslims.

Political Participation

Gupta maintains that the likelihood of implementation of participation policies and the degree to which these policies will be effective are both influenced by the political environment, particularly the willingness of the elite from the dominant ethnic groups to share power with minority ethnic groups and the availability of, and prospects for, access to alternative political arenas for minority groups.[72] If the ideology of the elite does not transcend the boundaries of the major ethnic group and if the subnational elites are not allowed access to elite positions and political power, the prospects for solutions to ethnic group conflicts are dim.

To a certain extent, the conflicting relationship between the Thai State and the Malay-Muslims is an issue of power distribution. The Malay-Muslim leaders revolted against the Thai State because their power was taken away. In the 1960s, when the Thai State penetrated the traditional education system, the *pondoks*, the authority of religious leaders and teachers was challenged. Under authoritarian rule, Malay-Muslims not only suffered from economic deprivation but also were excluded from the political system. Hence, they struggled to be their own master politically. A key issue in Thailand's

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political integration is, thus, how to bring the Malay-Muslims into the political system or how to expand political participation among the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces.

No regime can exclude the majority of its people from the political system and still maintain stability. Malay-Muslims are the majority population in the southern border provinces but had less than their share of power. The economic success in Thailand brought about rapid urbanization, an increase in literacy, and an expansion of communications, all of which in turn awoke people's consciousness and desire for political participation in the 1970s. A failure to respond to these demands for participation had put an end to the authoritarian rule in Thailand in 1973. This year began a new face of political development in Thailand. Although the period between 1976-77 witnessed the return of authoritarian rule in Thailand, the period from 1980 onward reflects a move toward democracy. It is in this political context that integration approaches toward Malay-Muslims have changed from coercion to political participation.

The Thai government meant three things by political participation: (1) democratization, (2) gradually bringing Malay-Muslims to support government policy and to help solve integration problems, and (3) gradually negotiating with the leaders of separatists and accommodating separatist defectors.

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Democratization

Democratization facilitates a process of power sharing between the Thai/ Chinese Buddhists and the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces. During the authoritarian rule, one of the government's policies was to increase Malay members in bureaucracy. On some occasions, Malay-Muslims were also given positions in the cabinet. In the democratization period, Malay-Muslim members of the national parliament whom people elected to represent them have had an increasing opportunity to hold cabinet positions.

In a coalition government system, the party that has the highest number of members in the parliament has an opportunity to form the government. Political parties compete for their candidates to win the election. In attracting potential candidates to run under their party banners, party leaders promise to return rewards, such as money and positions in the cabinet. This way, the Malay-Muslim members of parliament from the southern border constituencies have good chances to have cabinet positions allocated to them. For example, in the 1976 parliamentary election, the leader of the Democratic Party promised to allocate a cabinet position if its candidates in the Malay provinces won eight seats, while in the 1986 election, the ratio was one cabinet position for five parliamentary seats.[73] The New Hope Party also had an allocation ratio for its Malay-Muslim candidates. This power sharing in the government allows Malay-Muslim members of parliament to directly influence government policies. The Malay-Muslims

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from the southernmost provinces who have been cabinet members include Khun Den Tohmina, Khun Areepen Uttrasin, and Knun Wan Muhammad Noor Mata.[74]

Currently, every political party realizes the importance of the Muslim vote. It has become understood that the party must allocate positions to Muslim members and advocate policies that are responsive to the concerns of the Muslims. This was also true in the election for the governor of Bangkok in 2001 where dominant parties had a Muslim run on their team, particularly as deputy-governor. In the campaign of the last general election in 2001, the Thai Rak Thai Party, now the leading party in the coalition government, advocated policy issues for the Muslims. These include the establishment of an Islamic Bank, the expansion of the implementation of Islamic law (on inheritance and family) covering 33 provinces that have Provincial Islamic Committees, and the transfer of the Office of Chularajmontri (the spiritual leader of Muslim community) to be under the Prime Minister's Office.[75] The candidates of the New Hope Party also made quite similar proposals during the campaign.[76]

Political parties and candidates, in order to compete for votes, must accommodate the demands of their constituencies. Thus, democratic election, as an institution, works for the benefit of the Malay-Muslims in terms of the allocation of political power and the accommodation given to them. In addition, democratization in Thailand has opened a door for civil liberalization. As the civil society gets stronger, people are more involved in demanding their basic rights. Under democracy, channels for participation and protest are more open than under authoritarianism. The evidence of this assertion is the cases

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such as the *Hijab* Protest at the Teacher's College in Yala, the demonstration against the Thai-Malaysian gas pipeline, and the demand for the deregistration of the Kru-se Mosque as a historical monument. These events will be discussed in the next chapter.

Democratization has also led to decentralization that expands political participation to the local level. According to the current constitution, members of the subdistrict council must be elected. Malay- Muslims now can elect members of the sub-district council to manage and control affairs of the district instead of leaving the task in the hands of government officials who are accountable to their departments in Bangkok. Thus, the Malay-Muslims can now elect representatives to protect and promote their interests at both national and local levels.

Besides the promotion of Malay-Muslims to the upper strata of the government, the number of Malay-Muslims has been growing steadily in the bureaucracy in the southern border provinces. While the number of Malay-Muslims in high-level positions is quite low, the number is growing at the bottom level. This means that the new generation of Malay-Muslims is now beginning to catch up with their Buddhist fellow citizens in their roles in bureaucracy. The figures of district officers and assistants to district officers are presented in Table 1.

Another dimension of democratization is the adjustment of the State's values. One aspect of the political reform stipulated in the present constitution is the enhancement, protection, and guarantee of individual freedom and fundamental rights. In the past, some Thai leaders and bureaucratic officials believed that the differences of

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Table 1

Number of Muslim District Officers and Assistants to District Officers in the Southernmost Provinces in April 2001

Province	Total number District officers	Muslims	Total number Assistant district officers	Muslims
Pattani	14	2	91	32
Yala	9	1	65	13
Narathiwat	13	3	100	20
Satun	8	1	62	12

Source: The Provincial Hall of Pattani, April 2001.

culture, language and religion between Malay-Muslims and the Thai-Buddhists were the root of the problems. The diverse culture in the area was regarded as a security threat.[77] It was believed that to harmonize the society, it was necessary to homogenize it. As they had little understanding of the Malay culture and religion, differences created anxiety and appeared to be a threat. Hence, they tried to mold it under the *eakkalak Thai.* This simply led to opposition and alienation among the Malay-Muslims.

During the democratization period, values such as liberty and freedom have flourished in the Thai society. Following the current constitution that guarantees the

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basic rights of the people, the national security policy for the southern border provinces (1999-2003) emphasizes:

> the idea of "people in culture," in particular for the people in the region to be able to "live as Muslims" in Thai society in peace and unity, to see the value of cultural diversity as a creative energy for Thai society, to protect the way of life of the people in order that they may pursue their lives according to their religious beliefs in peace, safety and with equality of opportunity.[78]

Democratization has induced changes of values and norms in the Thai society. Thus, it helps shape the attitudes of the elite to cherish a pluralistic society.

Controlled Participation

To solve the integration problem, the government has attempted to induce Malay-Muslims to become involved in finding solutions to issues that affect their lives. In the past, the government used civil servants to convey government policy and to mobilize the people to support the government-initiated programs. Because of the past bitter experiences and the suspicion of the government's intention, people tended not to give full cooperation to the officials.[79] To solve this problem, a new approach had to be introduced.

As mentioned earlier, the government has set up a structure of the Islamic religious hierarchy under government patronage. The hierarchy was created for the purpose of facilitating government policies and actions toward the Malay-Muslims.[80] The government also initiated programs to socialize these informal leaders. They have

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participated in seminars. They have been brought to visit Bangkok and other parts of the country. During the trips, they meet with high-level officials and sometimes with cabinet members or even the prime minister. However, this is a passive approach.

An active approach requires that the State must "study and analyze the structure of Muslim society and to develop this structure as a basic mechanism in solving the Muslim problems."[81] The structure of Muslim society was identified as consisting of two groups. They are: (1) the informal leaders, including the president and members of Provincial Islamic Councils, *imam* and members of the mosque committee, Muslim judges in Islamic court and religious teachers, and (2) the formal leaders including heads of villages and heads of subdistricts (*phuyaiban* and *khamnan*). Under the new approach, the government would not rely only on the formal leaders as it did in the past but would try to co-opt the informal leaders to help solve integration problems.

In the past, the government officials tended to pinpoint *pondoks* as institutions that produced separatists. *Pondoks* were subjected to surveillance and interference. The officials also suspected that religious leaders in the Malay provinces, such as *imam* and *tokguru*, were the main supporters of the separatist movement.[82] However, under the new integrative approach, religious leaders were seen as an important source that could be used as intermediaries for bridging the Muslim community and the government. It was believed that by allying with Malay-Muslim elders, the integration process would be much facilitated. Because they are highly respected and honored in the Malay-Muslim community, their opinions, judgments, and advice to the young generations and parents

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are usually respected and obeyed.[83] Thus, they can influence people to cooperate with the government. If the government wins their support, they can help create a good image of the Thai government in the Muslim world.

The new approach encouraged and supported the roles of the informal leaders, i.e., religious leaders and Provincial Islamic Committees, in solving the problems and developing the area. The government officials of the southern border provinces were instructed to seek good relationships and give them recognition of their roles in the community. The new approach was implemented through the Thai-Muslims Solve Thai-Muslims' Problems Program that was initiated by the Fourth Army Commander in 1986.

The 1988 national security policy for the southern border provinces also encouraged "cooperation from Muslim leaders in solving problems." It supported the Muslim leaders playing greater roles at every level to solve the problems of the southern border provinces. The government expected that this new approach would help develop good understanding and cooperation between Muslims and the state officials. Moreover, it hoped to convey to the masses the sincerity of the government. Hence, the Muslim informal leaders would not turn against the government policy and the masses would support the policy and oppose separatism.[84] This new approach, in turn, allowed the Malay-Muslims to directly express their concern and complaints. It also gave them access to high-level officials - an important channel to lobby for their cause. Thus, this strategy seems to have benefited both the government and the Malay-Muslims.

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Accommodation to Separatist Defectors

The Prime Minister's Office Order No. 66/2523, issued in 1980, originally designed to allow communist defectors to return to normal life, was applied to accommodate suspected separatists who wanted to lay down their arms. Under General Harn Leelanonda, the army-chief of the Southern Region, the South Serene Program (Tai Rom Yen) was initiated and implemented. The army was authorized to be responsible for dealing with the communist and the separatist issues under the Communist Prevention Act. Under the "Muslim Santi" pacification program, launched in October 1987, 641 former separatists formally gave themselves up and took an oath of allegiance to the Kingdom in January 1988. It was regarded as an important step toward ending a bloody struggle of the secessionist groups. By 1990, confident about the military's success over Malay separatism, Army Commander General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh predicted that separatist movements "will be finished in no more than two years."[85]

The government has also engaged in negotiation with leaders of the separatist movements. Since the 1980s, army officials have been sent to meet with the leaders of the PULO who resided in foreign countries. The government has continued its effort in urging the separatists to surrender through group leaders. In 2000, it was estimated that there were about 70-80 armed separatists operating in the southernmost provinces and some two hundred leaders of various movements based in other countries.[86]

The Prime Minister's Office Order No. 127/2541, issued on July 12, 1998, allowed suspected separatists who have no criminal records to return to Thailand from

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self-exile abroad without facing any legal charges from the government.[87] From 1979 to September 1997, 919 separatists surrendered. But after surrendering, they were given a difficult time by officials; others faced poverty. As a result, they returned to the jungle. Following a display of Malaysian cooperation that led to the arrest of the four separatist leaders in January 1998, fifty more separatists surrendered by March 10.[88] At the same time, the government renewed its social integration policy.

The new Development of the Nation Project was initiated to accommodate the defectors. The "developer of the Nation" (*phu ruom phattana chat*) participated in development projects that in turn ensured that they would have jobs and security. The government approved a budget of 8,899,500 baht for 1988 and 1989 to provide protection and general assistance, job training, and job placement under this project.[89] By 1998, about 15 million baht had been allocated from the state budget.[90] A working team comprising a district head or his deputy, an agricultural officer, and a policeman were assigned to assist separatist returnees. The courses provided for job training include construction, electronics, and mechanics. The training scheme has proved popular and the government hopes the new order will encourage those who surrendered under the old law to remain in Thailand and attract newcomers.[91]

The Thai State has succeeded in maintaining control over the Malay-Muslims in the past three decades in part through the use of coercion along with participation. In doing so, the government has resorted to strategies such as power sharing, manipulation of religious hierarchy, rewards, and incentives. The changes in political context and the

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effectiveness of the State in maintaining control has made the Thai elite more confident of its ability to deal with the Malay-Muslims. The use of coercion has become unnecessary and impractical. Hence, the use of coercion has gradually decreased.

Socioeconomic Development

Socioeconomic development has two important aspects: economic development and social mobilization, both of which affect the political development and political integration of a country.[92] Economic development refers to the growth in economic output, transforming a society from relatively poor, rural, agrarian conditions to relatively affluent, urban, industrialized conditions.[93] Social mobilization refers to "a change in the attitudes, values, and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modern world."[94] It is the result of urbanization; increases in education, literacy, and communication; and exposure to the mass media.

For the Thai State, socioeconomic development is both a socioeconomic goal and an ideological goal on which the legitimacy of the state and its governments is based. The Thai State since the 1960s has stressed the socioeconomic approach as a means of facilitating political integration. It was believed that if the living standards of the Malay-Muslims were improved, they would not secede from the Thai State. The economic development policy for the southern border provinces was initially incorporated in the nation-wide plan (the national plan for socioeconomic development). However, the government later designed a specific plan for economic development of the southern

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border provinces. Although many socioeconomic programs adopted in the southernmost provinces have not changed drastically over time, new programs have been introduced in accordance with the change in the policy emphasis. This study will focus on two of the most distinctive schemes: (1) education and (2) agricultural, industrial, and infrastructure development. The study of the details of each program will help illuminate the continuity and change of the government policies.

Education

Like other developing countries, secular education is a basic requirement for the socioeconomic development of Thailand. Education is also used as a tool for political socialization of Malay-Muslims as discussed earlier. When primary education was introduced in the region, the majority of Malay-Muslims resisted and avoided sending their children to school. When the State changed *pondoks* into religious schools teaching Islam in the 1960s, the Malay-Muslims felt threatened and resisted the State's effort. However, at present, the attitude of the Malay-Muslims toward education has been changed. By 1987, 78.1 % of the Malay-Muslims in the southernmost provinces finished primary education, while 89.3 % of the rural population in these provinces were literate.[95] Currently, the problem the government is facing is not that parents do not want to send their children for higher education, but the schools in the area do not have the capacity to meet the demand for enrollment, specifically at the college level.[96] It is in the educational program that the government's success is distinctive.

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Since 1960, the Ministry of Education has tried various methods to solve the educational problems in the southern border provinces. One of the methods is giving scholarships to Malay-Muslim students. The Ministry of Interior asked institutions in the southern border provinces to reserve places for Malay-Muslim students without having them take the competitive entrance examination. A fixed quota was set to admit them to universities, and scholarships were granted for those enrolling in universities and maintaining good marks. With this affirmative policy, over a thousand Malay-Muslims had opportunities to attend universities and become part of the State's mechanism to help develop the area.

Another important method to solve the education problem in the area is the development and the control of the *pondoks*. As described in chapter two, initially the strategy of the State was to use incentives and threats for the owners of the *pondoks* to register and to change their *pondoks* to private schools teaching Islam. In 1965, these incentives included 10,000 baht for the first year and 3,000 baht for the following five years. The government also provided a teacher to teach secular subjects. The government later required that all *pondoks* must be registered by 1971. Those that registered prior to 1969 were entitled to receive a subsidy of 10,000 baht the first year and 3,000 baht for the following two years. Secular teachers would also be provided.[97] Thus, the subsidy included money, teaching tools, and teachers for secular subjects. By 1970, private schools teaching Islam had become more organized and better prepared and

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the students' knowledge of the Thai language had been improved. However, they were still less equipped and were academically weak.

The Private Schools Teaching Islam Subsidy Project between 1977-1981 demanded that private schools teaching Islam must meet its standard to be eligible to receive subsidies.[98] These standards included aspects such as school buildings, teaching instruments, teaching regulations, and evaluation systems. The subsidy was in the form of money, teachers for secular subjects, teaching instruments, and buildings. These schools used curricula produced or approved by the Ministry of Education and were considered to be under category 15(2) of the Private School Regulations. When some schools were developed to meet government standards, the government, in 1982, approved and upgraded them to be in the same category as regular private schools in Thailand, that is category 15 (1). This entitles the private schools teaching Islam that fall under category 15 (1) to receive subsidies to strengthen their institutions much more than they had been doing. The current subsidy is 10,000 baht per student.

Because of the high amount of the subsidy (in comparison to the real cost of operation), the school owners compete to reach government standards so that their schools will be entitled to receive subsidies.[99] Since the total amount of the subsidy is based on the student enrollment, the school owners also compete with other schools to attract students to come to their schools.[100] One way to attract students is to minimize the students' fees. This works for the benefit of the Malay people in general. The low cost of education encourages parents to send their children to school. As this type of

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school attracted more Malay students to attend, the government later allowed the schools to expand to the high school level. At the same time in 1985, the government adopted a policy of prohibiting the opening of a new private schools teaching Islam. For those that had stopped operating, they would not be allowed to re-open.[101] However, the policy was reversed in the 1990s.

Many Malay parents prefer to send their children to private schools teaching Islam because they offer both secular and religious education. Many think that religious education is important and is a requirement for Muslims. It helps one to lead his life according to Islam because, for Muslims, "the goal in life is to be successful in both *dunya* [this life] and *akhirah* [the hereafter]."[102] In 1999, the number of students in the three Malay provinces (Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat) who graduated from the sixth grade and chose to continue their education in private schools teaching Islam was 17,116 in comparison to 10,119 who went to public schools. In the case of those who graduated from the ninth grade and continued to high school, the number is more than double; 10,115 in comparison to 4,653 (Table 2).[103]

Between October 1999 and April 2000, the amount of 210,359,605 baht was given to 68 schools in category 15 (1) in the four provinces. The government subsidy policy resulted in the prosperity and the development of some schools and the termination of others. If the schools did not meet the standard, they received a small amount of subsidy while they had to take almost full responsibility for the cost of operating the schools. At the same time, they could no longer attract students who now

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had a choice to attend a better school with the same or lower fees.[104] As a consequence, in 1999, of the 326 private schools teaching Islam in the region that were registered, only 154 were open. This means that 52.24% schools were shutting down.[105] At the same time, the traditional *pondoks* that offer only religious education attracted fewer and fewer students. Among the 154 private schools teaching Islam that were open, only 37 of them were traditional *pondoks*.[106]

From the evaluation of students, grades nine and twelve, in the four southernmost provinces in 2000, the ability of students to use the Thai language is above the national standard. While Malay-Muslim youth now get to learn both secular and religious subjects, there is a concern about the students' quality from both the government and the Malay community. For the government, students graduating from these schools tend to be weak in secular subjects. Hence, currently, the educators' concern is no longer centered on the language issue but on how to upgrade the quality of the schools and raise standards in other subjects.

The integration of the southern border provinces' economy into the national economy prompted the change of education policy to follow the change in the demand for labor in the region. Between 1972 and 1981, under the Third and the Fourth National Socio-economic Plans, the focus was on the development of educational facilities in vocational and undergraduate education and the expansion of these services to rural areas. The Fifth Plan (1982-86) emphasized the acceleration and support of manpower production to match labor market demands so that manpower training would be

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Table 2

Comparing Student Enrollments in Private Schools Teaching Islam and in Public Schools

The number of students in the sixth grade

Province	Private Schools Teaching Islam	Public Schools	Percentage*
Yala	6,450	2,940	68
Pattani	6,183	3,424	64
Narathiwat	4,438	3,755	54

The number of students in the ninth grade

Province	Private Schools Teaching Islam	Public Schools	Percentage*
Yala	3,952	1,317	75
Pattani	3,722	1,656	69
Narathiwat	2,421	1,608	60

* Percentage of private schools teaching Islam of the total number of schools.

Source: Adapted from the Office of Educational, Religious, and Cultural Development, Region 2. The Statistics of Private Schools Teaching Islam Education,1999 Budget Year (Yala, 1999).

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consistent with labor market demands.[107] Since the early 1990s, to support the plan for industrial development and commercial activities at the regional level, many tertiary institutions have been offering courses in, for example, mechanical engineering, industrial engineering, banking, marketing, and accounting. Moreover, the course offerings at private schools teaching Islam have also been changed to include more general and vocational subjects.[108] The Education Office (Region 2) also proposed that they teach vocational subjects to students.[109]

Concurrently, to improve quality of education, the Education Region 2 has laid down new regulations and initiated programs, such as quality-control regulations, seminars, and training for teachers and managers, to improve the quality of education.[110] However, in practice, the emphasis is on tangible qualities that are easy to measure, such as classroom (building) standards and the filing system of school information, which is not the heart of education improvement.[111] Managers and teachers are pressured to devote their energy and time to make these tangible improvements at the expense of the quality of education of their students. Thus, quality has not been improved to meet the expected standard.

For the community, the concern is not limited to the low quality of education in secular subjects; they are also concerned about religious education. Malay-Muslim students graduating from private schools teaching Islam are not excellent in either religious education or in secular education, or as Dr. Surin remarked, "The products are half-baked."[112] While the government emphasizes improving and strengthening students

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in subjects such as mathematics and sciences, some Malay-Muslims stress the necessity to maintain the traditional Islamic schools (*pondoks*) as sources to produce "knowledgeable Muslims." The failure of the private schools teaching Islam confirms for some *pondok* owners and students that the existence and the preservation of the Islamic traditional schools are critical to the Malay-Muslim communities.[113]

At present, the government has tried to accommodate the Malay-Muslims' concerns and demands for Islamic studies and practices in a number of ways. A class on Islamic studies is allowed to be offered in primary schools with an enrollment of more than 50 % Muslims. The decision of the Department of Education to allow female Muslim teachers and students to wear Islamic dress to schools was made on October 7, 1995. Currently, a number of public schools and institutions for higher education follow this policy decision. A number of public schools have changed their regulations regarding students' uniforms to fit the Islamic requirements. The forerunner is the Baankaatong School in Yala province where the administrators made a decision to change the school regulations to accommodate their students.

According to the government policy, the Malay-Muslims no longer need to suppress their identity in order to attend schools. However, a number of school administrators resist complying with the government policy by prohibiting and/ or punishing students who wear Islamic dress. Student protests against the administrators who do not comply with the policy guidelines, by groups or individuals, have surfaced repeatedly. This phenomenon reflects two things. First, there are state officials who are

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dissatisfied with the government policies of accommodation and have disregarded the government policies. Second, the Malay-Muslims now have the freedom to demand that their basic rights be respected and there are channels for them to take petitions to higher authorities (mainly the Muslim members of the parliament) against those officials who do not follow the policy guidelines. To prevent the explosion of ethnic tensions, the attitudes of officials who implement the government policies must be adjusted and changed according to the changing policies and political context of the society.

The government accommodations enable and attract more Malay-Muslim parents to send their children to schools.[114] The government also allowed the opening of a private Islamic college in Yala in 1998. Yala Islamic College was established under financial support from the Islamic Development Bank. The college hopes to provide Islamic higher education with the same standards as Islamic institutions in Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia. Currently, there are three institutions offering Islamic studies in the southern border provinces. They are Prince Songkla University in Pattani, Teacher's College in Yala, and the newly opened Yala Islamic College.

The latest socioeconomic plan emphasizes education that is suitable to each region and has respect for the local intellect. It aims to develop human potential and morality. Religious teachings, either Buddhism or Islam, are seen as "good" in helping solve social problems, particularly the drug problem that is currently critical in Thailand. Moreover, the current constitution has decentralized the control of schools to the district level. It encourages public participation in designing curricula that suits each

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community. Thus, the shift in policy and political context guarantees the continuing support for religious education, which is a priority of many Malay-Muslims.

While the quota privilege for Malay-Muslim students to study in universities has been reduced, new scholarships are granted. The aim is to provide educational opportunities and to upgrade the quality of education.[115] In terms of the number of scholarships and budgets granted, the biggest portion is for the Kuruthayat program. This program was initiated to give a four-year college scholarship to students who are residents in the four southernmost provinces. After graduation, these scholarship recipients are to teach in the southernmost provinces. This program hopes to solve an old problem that teachers do not understand the language, culture, and religion of the students, which has sometimes created ethnic tension. Between 1994-1996, twenty-nine million baht was granted for 1,100 scholarships under the Department of Teacher Training and 160 scholarships under the Department of Vocational Education, respectively.[116] During this period, ninety scholarships were granted for students to study in the field of Islamic studies at Prince Songkla University and Teacher's College in Yala.[117] After graduation, these scholarship recipients will be assigned to teach Islamic studies in schools in the region. In the future, these graduates will replace teachers that graduated from colleges in Muslim countries.

The government policy on education has been a success. The number of Malay-Muslims enrolling in schools and in institutions of higher education has been increasing continuously. One bit of evidence is the demonstration at Yala Teacher's College in

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1998, where parents and students called for an increase in the number of students admitted. As the State adapts its policy and approaches to accommodate Malay-Muslims, it naturally changes Malay-Muslims' attitudes regarding Thai education. However, the government still faces the task of improving the quality of students so that they can genuinely become a force for development in the country.

Agricultural, Industrial, and Infrastructure Development

The government has launched socioeconomic development programs to improve the standard of living of the population of the southernmost provinces since the 1950s. The strategy has been to expand the production base and link it to the southern region and the rest of the nation. However, the government programs have not had much success. Tugby and Tugby described the economic conditions of the Malay-Muslims in the late 1970s as follows:[118]

> The transition to a cash economy has left the peasants economically vulnerable; the invasion of capital into the fishing industry and the intrusion of big operators into the near coastal waters have reduced the return for peasant fishermen. Living standards in the south as a whole deteriorated in the seventies. Rubber replanting has lagged behind the progress in this field elsewhere; new rubber technology has not been put to use widely at the village level. Some dams have been built, but the water has not reached the rice fields.

The 1975-76 socioeconomic survey shows that poverty in rural areas of the Muslim provinces approximated, and in some cases exceeded, the poverty of northeast Thailand, which has been the traditional reference point for extreme rural poverty in the

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country.[119] In order to raise the level of income and living conditions of the people of the area, the 1977-1981 economic plan concentrated on a number of projects. The dam at Bangrang in Bannanstar district of Yala was built with a budget of 2,737 million baht to generate electricity and to develop agricultural and irrigation systems, covering the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani.[120] The electricity distribution program with the budget of 150 million baht was launched in order to extend service to 300 villages in these provinces.[121] To improve communication networks, national highways and small roads were constructed and repaired to link the various districts and rural areas. The government also continued its programs designed to increase the yield of agriculture, especially rubber plantations and the double cropping of rice. To improve local agriculture and thereby the national economy, the Office of the Department of Agricultural Extension in Yala has taken the role of passing on new technology and practices to farmers. The Rubber Plantation Board in Yala carried out programs and research to improve rubber production.

The southern border provinces development plan of 1985-1987 emphasized the acceleration of infrastructure development in the rural areas, especially in road construction, electricity and water providence, and dam construction for irrigation purposes. However, many of government projects were delayed. The national per capita income for the five southernmost provinces[122] in 1985 was 15,449 baht compared to 20,263 baht for national per capita and to 18,635 baht for the southern region.[123] By 1988, the government recognized that poverty was still the basic problem of the region.

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The Administration Center in Yala evaluated the economic condition of the southernmost provinces and found that "most of the people are in poverty and cannot depend on themselves economically."[124] This was partly due to the economic structure of the Malay provinces: eighty percent of the population was in agriculture which had low productivity because of the lack of modern technology.[125] In addition, many were fishermen who used primitive technology; others were laborers on the fishing ships who earned very low wages.

In parallel with the military's New Hope Project initiated in 1986,[126] the second comprehensive National Security Policy for the Border Provinces (NSPBP) of 1988-1992 that was approved by the Cabinet in November 1988 emphasized economic goals as an important aspect of the policy.[127] Apart from the continuing improvement of the infrastructure and agricultural production, the Cabinet Order of March 4, 1989, approved the opening of an industrial zone in Pattani for the processing of seafood, producing soft drinks and food, and other small industries.[128] The main objective of the New Hope Project, which was overseen by the Combined Civil-Police-Military Force Unit 43, was to instill into Malay-Muslims a sense of "Thai-ness" and to make them understand that they were Thai citizens and would never be forsaken by the State. The project also emphasized, among other things, the quick response to solving economic problems by using short-term economic programs. The goal was to improve the economic well being of the villagers in the southern border provinces. The amount of 619.09 million baht was approved to carry out 95 projects under its umbrella.[129]

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By 1992, there were 8,738 factories in the five southernmost provinces. They were mostly involved in processing agricultural commodities and fisheries products. They employed 53,397 workers with a combined investment of 12,402 million baht. Major products included smoked rubber sheets, canned and frozen seafood, palm oil, and rubber resin.[130] In terms of trade and finance, there were 664 companies registered in the area with the combined capital investment of 1,238.2 million baht. Malaysia and Singapore were the dominant trading partners of the five provinces. In 1991, the five provinces gained a trade surplus of about 17,423.79 million baht, with total exports of 28,465.96 million baht and imports of 11,042.17 million baht. Major exports included rubber and rubber products, natural gas, seafood, canned food, and plastic.[131] In 1989, the per capita income of the five provinces was 19,389.20 baht, compared to 21, 953 baht in all of southern Thailand.[132]

The economic growth of the five southernmost provinces had political implications at the national level. As there was a steady growth in business, a close relationship between business associations and governmental technocrats in pursuit of market-oriented reforms was developed. This growth in business coincided with the initiation by Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, the prime minister of Malaysia, of economic cooperation between northern Malaysia, northern Sumatra of Indonesia, and southernmost Thailand (Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle or IMT-GT). When the Thai Cabinet approved the economic cooperation scheme in December 1993, there emerged a need to develop this area to support the scheme. Hence, there was a shift

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of the emphasis of government policy toward the southernmost provinces. In 1994, the National Security Policy for the Border Provinces stipulated economic development as its first priority. It emphasized the upgrading of infrastructure and facilities in order "to attract domestic and foreign investors."[133] The slogan of the Administrative Center for Southern Border Provinces in 1994 also reflected the priority of economic policy: "economic leads, public relations follows, peace and order supports."[134]

The Office of the National Social and Economic Development emphasized three aspects: the increase of trade and investment, the increase of exports, and the improvement of living conditions of the people in the area. Since then, the development budget of the southernmost provinces has increased every year, from 1,250 million baht in 1994 to 4,827 million baht in 1997.[135] Mostly, the budget was used to improve the basic economic infrastructure and communication networks. This includes the expansion of roads into four lanes and the development of industrial zones. Under the "offensive plan" for cooperation in IMT-GT, five strategies were identified (see Table 3). The special focus of the plan is on the development of infrastructure-related investment, specifically the gas pipeline between Malaysia and Thailand. As business associations and private-sector investment have come to play key roles in the economic life of the southern border provinces, they have driven a change in the goal of economic development of the southernmost provinces.

While the logic of socio-economic development in the past stressed the material improvement in the lives of the Malay-Muslims to satisfy them and to make them feel

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that there were benefits of being Thai citizens, the 1994 plan emphasized the improvement of socio-economic conditions "to attract foreign and domestic investment." Priority has been shifted to serve the interests of business associations.

Table 3

Budget Allocation of the Offensive Plan under IMT-GT

Development Strategy	Budget	percentage
1. Human resource development	518.3	17.60
2. Natural resource management	212.7	7.12
3. Economic infrastructure development	1,974.0	66.12
4. Agricultural and industrial development	179.5	6.01
5. Expansion of economic zone in border areas	101.0	3.38
Total budget	2,985.5	100.00

Source: The Office of Economic and Social Development Board, Operation Plan for the 1999-2001 Budget Year under Development Plan for five Southern Border Provinces, 4 April 1998.

As many new investments flow into the region, there is a need for development of skilled labor to work for the new industries. The vision of the present NSPBP (1999-2003) has been broadened to develop not only the economy but also "the potential of human resources and society."[136] The State also recognizes the necessity to adjust and develop "the surrounding environment." This surrounding environment emphasized not only the development of physical conditions but also of socio-psychological conditions,

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which include safety in life and property and equal opportunity and fairness.[137] The ultimate goal is "for the area to become a peaceful land under cultural diversity, and become a better place to live, visit, and invest in."[138]

The Thai government has an intense interest in the Malaysia-initiated IMT-GT project. The National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand (NESDB) set the objectives of IMT-GT in the sub region of the three countries as bringing about increased trade, investment, and exports and improving the livelihood of the population in the areas.[139] The shift of interest (from security-oriented toward business-oriented) reflects the change of the elite's perception of ethnic Malays in the southernmost provinces. Diversification of ethnicity, religion, and cultures is no longer viewed as a barrier to development, but as an advantage. The Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand have become an asset to "open the door to the Muslim world."[140] Pattani is to become a center for *halal* (kosher) food processing to be exported to markets in Muslim countries. Knowledge of the Malay language is also an advantage in dealing with the Malaysian and Indonesian counterparts.

It can be seen that the emphasis of strategy and the pace of the socioeconomic development have changed over time. When the communist insurgency was intensified in northeast Thailand, the government paid attention to the development of that region at the expense of neglecting the southernmost provinces.[141] The pouring of government resources to develop the southern border provinces in the later period is partly a result of the pressure of business associations. While the government efforts have improved the

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living conditions of the Malay-Muslims, its programs tend to benefit big business more than the small farmers, the small rubber planters, and the coastal water fishermen who are mostly Malay-Muslims. Hence, the gap between the per capita income of the rich (mainly Chinese business owners) and the poor (the majority of the Malay-Muslims) is getting bigger. This gap is also reflected in the per capita income of Songkla (Buddhist Thai/Chinese majority) in comparison to Pattani and Narathiwat, where the majority of the people are small farmers and fishermen.

In 1989, the per capita income of the five provinces was 19,389.20 baht while that of Songkla was 21,446 baht, compared to 13,921 baht for Pattani. The progress of economic development in the two Muslim provinces, specifically Narathiwat and Pattani, still lags far behind. There has been a concern that the government economic policy that promotes investment will benefit the big businesses which are mainly owned by the Chinese much more than the Malay-Muslims. This policy will make Malay-Muslims become wage laborers for Chinese business owners. Thus, it will reinforce the cultural division of labor which has already exists in the region. The uneven impact of both modernization and development policies of the government is likely to increase the homogeneity of interests of the Malay-Muslims and, thus, promote ethno regional solidarity. This relative group position of the Malay-Muslims in the political and economic structure can become an essential source of ethnic conflict.[142] Table 4 illustrates per capita income of the five provinces in 1989.

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Table 4

Gross Provincial Product and Per Capita Income of the Five Provinces in 1989

	Satun	Songkhla	Pattani	Yala	Narathiwat
GPP (billion baht)	5,182	26,447	7,721	7,415	9,700
per capita income (baht)	22,630	23,446	13,912	20,252	16,693

Source: Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces, Phan phattana changwat chaidane paktai nai choung khong phan phattana settakit lae sangkhom hangchat chabab tii 7 (2535-2539), 2nd ed. (1993).

Apart from the criticism of the bias of the government's projects on economic development, two other reasons were identified as contributing to the slow progress of development. They include the lack of cooperation from the Malay-Muslims and the ineffectiveness of the departments and the civil servants who carry out the projects. To solve these two problems, one of the government approaches was the reorganization of the administration in the southern border provinces, which is the subject of discussion in the following section.

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Institutional Reorganization and Administrative Management Reform

Following Keller's definition, the term "reorganization" in this study refers to efforts of the State to restructure the administrative institutions and relationships in order to cope with strains that have the potential for threatening state survival.[143] The main function of the reorganization policy is to strengthen the hand of the centralized state power or to redistribute political power to accommodate the demands of certain groups.[144]

The restructuring of the Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces in 1981 was an effort to install permanent measures to handle Malay-Muslim affairs. There were two main problems in the administration of the Malay-Muslims border provinces: (1) the uncoordinated political integration programs in the area due to the failure of the Coordination Center and (2) the low quality of the civil servants who, through their corruption and prejudice, alienated the Malay-Muslims.

When the Cabinet approved the reorganization in 1980, it expected the new Administrative Center to play an effective role in local planning and coordinating diverse projects among departments and transforming them into coherent and integrated policies under its sole supervision. Moreover, the new Administrative Center was different from the old Coordination Center for it incorporated the army and police into its administration. Hence, one of its main tasks was to coordinate civilian organizations, which are under its direct line of command, and the suppression units of the army and police offices. The center was also intended to control the civil servants' behavior

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through its power of punishment and rewards and to orient incoming officials in dealing with the Malay-Muslims.[145]

The Reorganization of the Administrative Center

The administrative restructuring plan was approved by the Cabinet on December 16, 1980, and by the prime minister in the following year. Anuragsa notes that this restructuring produced four major changes for the administration of the southern border provinces as follows:

1. It gave a clarification of lines of command and responsibilities in Malay-Muslim affairs. The prime minister was to be responsible for overall direct control and to command the policy of the southern border provinces. The commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army Region was solely responsible for policy implementation at the local level.

2. It established clear lines of authority in the area of civilian and suppression activities under the Fourth Army. There were two parts of the administrative policy for integration in the Malay-Muslim provinces: civilian tasks and suppression tasks. Both of these areas were under the supervision of the commander-in-chief, who was responsible for local decisions as described above.

3. The Ministry of Interior was responsible for establishing the Administrative Center that monitors civilian activities in the southern border provinces. Its function was to coordinate various works of governmental departments in the area and cooperate with the suppression unit.

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4. The Internal Security Operation Council (ISOC) was responsible for regrouping and organizing as well as administering and controlling all local organizations that were involved in suppression operations. All these organizations are under a single commanding organization called the Civilian-Police-Army Unit 43, which is based in Yala. This new suppression unit hence became a local leader, parallel with the Administrative Center for civilian activities.

Thus, it was clear that the Cabinet intended to establish two separate but related organizations--the Administrative Center, for coordination of diverse programs among civilian departments and ministries, and the Civilian-Police-Army Unit 43, for a local command center for the suppression missions. Both of these organizations were under the control and directorship of the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army Region. As the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army Region was solely responsible for the implementation of policies at the local level, planning and policy making eventually rested with him for the most part. In practice, the authority of the Administrative Center was more or less a secretariat function. The reorganization of the Administrative Center in 1980 marked a new era in which the army obtained more access and control over the civilian integration projects. It was not surprising that a number of nonsuppressive measures such as the South Serene Program (*tai rom yen*) and the Thai Muslims Solving Thai Muslims' Problems Program were initiated and operated by the Civilian-Police-Army Unit 43.

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The decline of the military's influence in Thai politics after the middle-class demonstration in May in 1992 that led to the fall of General Suchinda's administration had an impact in the reorganization of the Administrative and Coordination Center for the Southern Border Provinces. The Prime Minister Order no. 56/ 2539 of 1996 stipulates that the center is responsible for coordination of diverse programs among civilian departments and ministries and is under the direct line of command of the Ministry of Interior. The Civilian-Police-Army Unit 43 is responsible for a local command center for the suppression missions and is under the control and directorship of the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army. The result of this order is that the role and responsibility in administration of the civil departments are no longer vested in the military.

In practice, the important role of the Administrative Center was not as a central policy planner and authoritative voice in the national political integration process. Nevertheless, it restored other political integration functions, particularly the promotion of better understanding among Malay-Muslims of the Thai State and its bureaucratic apparatus. Since its inception, the Administrative Center has held numerous seminars in which thousands of local Malay-Muslim leaders participated. The increasing number of those who appear at each meeting suggest their recognition of the Thai authority and government as a governing body.[146] They are an important bridge between the State and the Malay-Muslim population. The seminar provides a forum to inform citizens about the government policy on governance, security, and development.[147]

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The contacts made in the seminars are a means of better communication. Malay-Muslim leaders used this institution as a way of giving their opinions regarding the government policy and a way to give complaints about the abuse and mistreatment of the Malay-Muslims by government officials. The latter is an old issue that almost every government has had to face. This issue was addressed through the personnel management reform.

Personnel Administrative Reform

Civil servants implement policies laid down by the government. These officials are significant because of their roles as mediators between the State and its citizens. The success of a policy is necessarily dependent upon the effectiveness of the civil servants. However, in the Malay provinces, civil servants have played a crucial role in creating "conditions" for the intensification of separatist activities.[148] One of the important issues that demanded attention in the reorganization in the 1980s was the mistreatment and misbehavior of the civil servants toward the Malay-Muslims, which leads to distrust, rejection of the authority of the Thai government among the Malay-Muslims, and separatist demands.

General Kitti Ratnachaya who initiated the Malay-Muslims Solving Malay-Muslims' Problems Program, noted the Malays perceived the Thai officials as insincere, tending to humiliate Muslims, unjust and biased against Muslims, and out to destroy Islam.[149] The grievances of the Malay-Muslim community were the result of the Thai

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bureaucrats' ignorance about Malay society, its language, religion, and culture and of the bureaucrats' arrogant and corrupt behavior. The Thai leadership had long ago recognized these problems. The Thai government leaders also noted that many civil officials in this area were inefficient and did not meet the needs of the people.[150]

The problems of corruption and abusive behavior of officials had driven several people to sympathize or join with separatist movements. These problems prompted an urgent response from the military leaders. In its effort at personnel management reform, the 1980 Cabinet decision gave authority to the director of the Administrative Center to give recommendations to the commander-in-chief to punish or reward civil servants in the southern border provinces. During the implementation of the Tai Rom Yehn Program in the early 1980s, under General Harn Leelanonda's leadership, it was generally acknowledged that there was less violence in the southern border provinces. General Harn was strict in making sure that the civil servants were doing their jobs effectively and that the "dark influences" were controlled. Moreover, since the army was authorized to be responsible for dealing with the communist and the separatist issues under the Communist Prevention Act, other organizations have to give full cooperation. Thus, the line of command was unified.[151]

Currently, the Administrative Center has the authority to recommend that the prime minister transfer "bad" officers out of the region. From 1978-1995, more than one hundred civil servants were transferred. Over eighty percent of them were police officers. In 1999, sixteen were transferred. The charges included corruption and

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mistreatment of people.[152] However, the civil servants problem remains far from being solved. While bad officers in the area are transferred out, those from other areas are sent to the southern border provinces for punishment.[153] This undermines the reform effort.

The Administration Center also provides orientation for new civil servants posted in the area. The three-day orientations emphasize government policies and basic knowledge about the area, including religion, culture, and people's way of living. It also attempts to shape the attitude of the incoming officials.[154] But attitude is hard to change in a short time. Thus, complaints against civil servants such as looking down upon Muslims, making things more difficult for the Muslims, and being biased against Muslims are common.[155] Although the government has tried to accommodate the Malay-Muslims especially on the cultural and religious issues, several of the officials, due to their bias against the Malays, simply do not follow the policies.[156] The examples are numerous, such as teachers harassing students who wear *hijab* or school principals not allowing students to wear *hijab* to schools; officials did not allow the female Muslims to wear headscarves (covering the hair) when taking identification pictures; and officials did not allow or made it difficult for Muslims to have Malay or Arabic names.

In the meeting with civil servants in the southern border provinces on December 13, 1999, Phalakorn Suwannarat, the director of the Administration Center, said, "There are many state officials...[who] do not understand the essence of the policy. Some criticize that this policy is to please the Muslims...[and] will only make them make further demands with no limit...."[157] This reflects that there are some officials who are

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not comfortable with the government accommodation approach toward the Malay-Muslims. Their attitudes are potential obstacles to the government integration efforts.

While citizens complain civilian officials are biased, they complain that police are corrupt, oppressive, and violate the basic human rights of the people. Some police demand bribe money from the people and are involved in goods smuggling across the border and in the drug trade.[158] Since 1998, the office of the ombudsman located in the Administrative Center in Yala has been responsible for collecting and investigating the complaints people have made against the civil servants in the five southernmost provinces. The Provincial Office in each of the southernmost provinces has also set up a Center for Justice (*soon phadung dhamma*) at the provincial hall. The center has become another channel for the locals to make complaints against civil servants. There were cases in which officers were removed when proven guilty of the charges. At the provincial Center for Justice in Yala, eighty percent of the complaints against civil servants were against police officers;[159] the count was sixty percent at the office of the ombudsman in the Administrative Center.[160]

Officers are also believed to have some involvement in the violence, which has occurred in the southern border provinces. Up to the present, arson attacks and bombings have taken place occasionally. From the interviews, most of the observers of southern politics, such as politicians, high-level government officials, academicians, news reporters, and informal Muslim leaders, agreed that the involvement of the officers could not be ruled out.

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While the local "dark influences," business competition, and separatist movements were claimed by the army to be responsible for the continuing violence in the southern border provinces, it is believed that the separatist groups no longer had the capacity to organize such violent incidents at the existing level.[161] The remaining thorns, however, are extortion gangs, which exploit the names of the separatist movements for their own financial gain. One official commented, "Almost all the bandits in the area are supported by either the police or the army officers. If they receive no protection from the officers, they cannot survive the suppression." In practice, when a violent incident occurred and the police could not find the criminal, they tended to conclude it was the act of the separatist groups so that the case would be closed.[162] In some cases, by accusing the separatists, i.e., local Malay-Muslims, the police needed not to deal with the influential figures who were behind the incidents. Thus, some Malay-Muslims had become scapegoats. This situation created confusion and an atmosphere of insecurity in the area. It had affected investment and social psychology and complicated the problems in the Malay-Muslim provinces. It bred suspicion and distrust and proved the weakness of the State to enforce law and order.

The torching of schools in Pattani, Yala, and Narithiwat on August 1,1993, that burned over thirty schools in one night was an example. This incident was labeled the act of a separatist group. Over ten local Malay-Muslims were arrested and jailed. All were later acquitted because of the lack of evidence. Among the villagers and local observers, these suspects were seen as poor farmers who simply were not capable of

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burning down over thirty schools in three different provinces in one night. They were just scapegoats.[163] The authorities had never found the criminals, and the incident was simply being forgotten. Different opinions were given regarding who was responsible for such an act. The possible answers included: (1) separatist groups to gain publicity and reassert influence or to seek revenge on the officials, (2) officers who were afraid of losing power once peace comes to the region, (3) a political party to discredit its rivals, (4) business groups to threaten or prevent newcomers, and (5) gangsters or bandits posing as separatists.[164]

The 1994 Hat Yai train explosion was another example of the ineffectiveness of the law enforcement. After the incident, four religious teachers were arrested, charged, and imprisoned. They were identified as separatist members. During their trials, the Supreme Court acquitted all of them. The arrest and imprisonment of the religious teachers had created a wave of resentment among Malay-Muslims. One Malay-Muslim college student commented, "if these good and highly respected persons were subjected to accusation and being jailed without being proven guilty, what fate do the Malay-Muslim villagers have under the Thai rules?"[165] Cases of police arresting the locals with false charges, accusing innocent people as separatist members, and officials violating basic rights of people still exist. Thus, the government policies are useless when the civil servants do not implement them.[166]

Mistreatment of the people by officials, social injustice, and inequality can be found in every region of Thailand. However, when it happens in the southernmost

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provinces, it easily can turn into a condition to be used against the State. This is because in the eyes of those who are suppressed by the officials, "the State's apparatus represents the State."[167] The separatist groups have used this issue to appeal for and to legitimize their causes both inside and outside the country. The Thai leaders recognize this sensitive problem and the possibility that it will create a condition that helps stir the wave of separatism.[168] Personnel management of the local civil service has become an urgent issue that the Thai government is now tackling because the success of the policy depends on the machinery of the state, which has a crucial role in its implementation.

Summary

During the period under study, democratic transitions of the Thai State have led to a change in the relationship between the State and society. The first democratic transition, which began in October 1973, ended the authoritarian rule under military leadership. The political situation during the military coup in 1976 and its aftermath and the threat of communist expansion in the late 1970s made the military leaders realize that they needed to expand political participation to other groups in society. The second democratic transition initiated by the military in 1977 led to a relaxation of the authoritarian rule of 1976-77. It resulted in the consolidation of a semidemocratic regime whose persistence created the opportunity for political parties to develop and for civil society to expand and strengthen.

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Under the Chatchai coalition government, politicians and business elites were in the center while the political space of the military and bureaucracy was shrinking. The military fought back and regained power in the 1991 coup; however, the army leaders' attempt to stay in power prompted a response from the masses that involved what was known as the middle-class demonstration against the military. The event in May 1992 that marked the third democratic transition was another turning point in Thailand's political history. It reflected the growing and strengthening of civil society in Thailand and it has led to a period of civil liberalization. The 1998 Constitution is the clear evidence of such freedom and liberty.

The type of political system dictated the government's approach toward its citizens. As far as the government's political integration policies toward the Malay-Muslims are concerned, every Thai government has held the basic assumption that the territorial integration of the country is not to be violated. Thus, separatist activities were subjected to military suppression. Under the authoritarian regime, coercion was used as a common means to suppress dissidents. It alienated the population and intensified separatist insurgencies. The Thai elite has learned that alternative means must be employed to cope with separatism.

While military suppression stands ready to operate, other approaches have been emphasized and new strategies initiated. Under the period studied, the government integration strategies included economic development, political socialization, political control and participation, administrative reorganization, and personnel reform. Under the

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authoritarian regime of 1976-77, military suppression and coercion were the primary means to fight against the separatist movements. However, this approach further alienated the Malay-Muslims. There is a distinctive difference between approaches during the semidemocratic period of 1977-88 and the democratic periods of 1973-76 and 1989-2000. During the semidemocratic period controlled participation was intensively promoted and the State's goal focused on the formation of *ekkalak* Thai. Although the semidemocratic government had relieved the Malay-Muslims from the suppression by the State and its apparatus during the authoritarian regime, it was not a true democracy in which people's freedom and liberty were protected.

During the period of democracy, especially from 1992 on, we witnessed a transfer of power from bureaucratic elites to political bosses, from the civil bureaucracy and the military to political parties, and from national political institutions to local authorities.[169] Elections became a mechanism for institutionalizing access to power. The expansion of democracy in Thailand also meant liberalization of the political system. It enabled forces in society such as academia, business associations, NGOs, and people as collective groups to directly and indirectly influence the government policy decisions. While politicians and political parties are at the center of policy making, business associations have a significant role in shaping government policy. Civil society has also been able to insert its influences on policy formation and policy decisions. Thus, along with the focuses on economic growth and development, liberty, freedom, justice, and basic human rights (the heart of democracy that is guaranteed by the current constitution of Thailand)

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have become the bases for the current policy of political integration of the Malay-Muslims.

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Notes

[1]Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1991), 109-161.

[2]John Girling, Interpreting Development: Capitalism, Democracy, and the Middle Class in Thailand (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1996), 63.

[3]A former instructor, Rural Development Voluntary Program, Thammasat University. telephone interview. 28 December 2000.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Omar Farouk Bajunid, "The Political Integration of the Muslims in Burma and Thailand: A Cross-National Analysis," Ethnic Studies Report 1 (January 1987): 13.

[6]See Ornanong Noiwong, Khamphucha: Nayobai thang prathet thai samai poleak prem tinsulanond [Cambodia: Thai Foreign Policy under the Prem's Government]. (Bangkok, Thailand: Thammasat University Press, 1998).

[7]Kevin Hewison, Political Change in Thailand, 14. The discussion of this period in the following section owes much to Hewison's work.

[8]At least forty-six people died, hundreds more were injured, and 1,300 students were arrested and put in a special detention center waiting for trail. Arrests made elsewhere brought the total number of detainees to 3,059. See ibid.

[9]Alfred Stephen, "Path toward Democratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Guilermo A. Donnell et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 73.

[10]Elliot Kulick and Dick Wilson, Thailand's Turn: Profile of a New Dragon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 113-114.

[11]See Suchit Boonbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics 1981-86 (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), Appendix 2.

[12]Ibid., Appendix 3.

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[13]The government argument was that how the leaders came to power did not matter. What counts was how they governed. If the government governed for the benefit and interest of the people then it could be classified as a democracy. See Suchit Boonbongkarn and Danala Sukhapanij-Khantaprab, "National Security and the Contemporary Political Role of the Thai Military," paper presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies, Bangkok, Thailand, 22-24 August 1984, 10.

[14]Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "The Three-Dimensional State," in Rethinking Third World Politics, ed. James Manor (New York: Longman Inc., 1991), 19.

[15]Ibid., 19-22.

[16]Chai-Anan, "The Military, Bureaucracy and Globalization," 51.

[17]Kevin Hewison, Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, ed. Kevin Hewison (New York: Routledge, 1997), 14.

[18]Internal Security Operation Command, Paper no. 2, "A Lecture on Civil Affairs Operation of ISOC," paper presented at the meeting for the Understanding of a Policy to Win the Communist Fighting B.E. 2524, 10.

[19]Saiyud Kerdphol, The Struggle of Thailand: Counter Insurgency 1965-1985, 82-6.

[20]Internal Security Operation Command, Paper no. 3. "Self Development and Self Defense Village Program." A paper presented at the meeting for the Understanding of Policy to Win the Communist Fighting B.E. 2524.

[21]See Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse and Suchit Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to Political Offensive (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1990), 78-79.

[22]Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "The Military, Bureaucracy and Globalization," in Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, ed. Kevin Hewison (New York: Routledge, 1997), 49-50.

[23]Ibid., 50.

[24]Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter, eds. Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15-64.

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[25]Girling, 63.

[26]Pornchat Boonnak, assistant director, Administrative Center for the Border Provinces, interview, 26 September 2000.

[27]Royal Thai Embassy, Washington DC, "Social Issues: Thailand and Human Rights," February 2000, <http://www.thaiembdc.org/index.html> (20 September 2001).

[28]Surin Pitsuwan, minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, interview, 7 December 2000.

[29]Manii Kurusa (pseudonym), student, Bangkok University. 1 October 2000.

[30]James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., Introduction, " in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966), PP. 8-9.

[31]See also Nantawan Haemindra, "The Problem of the Thai-Muslims," 105, 215.

[32]M. Alagappa. The National Security of Developing States, 216-217.

[33]Lee Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 27.

[34]Fred L. Greenstein, "Political Socialization," in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. XV (New York: Macmillan and Free Press Publishing Company, 1968), 551.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Fred L. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1965), 2.

[37]See M. Ladd Thomas, "Socio-Economic Approach to Political Integration of the Thai-Islam: An Appraisal," Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 31 March 1969.

[38]Mohammad Adam, owner and teacher, Nurulsalam Pumewitty, Yaring, Pattani, interview. 23 October, 2000.

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[39]Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces, Phan phatibat kam phattana settakit khanmuang lea sangkhom chitvittaya prajampii 2536 (Operational Plan for Economic, Political, and Psychological Development, 1993), 75.

[40]Laila Akebkurai, assistant manager, Satree Pattana School, Kruse, Pattanii, interview, 23 October 2000.

[41]Ahmad Abayae, assistant director, Education and Cultural Development Center, Regional 2, Yala, interview, 17 October 2000. This opinion is also shared by a number of interviewees.

[42]The department trains selected formal and informal leaders and youth leaders in southernmost provinces to be agents to promote the use of Thai language among the locals.

[43]Maitri Youngboonrod, deputy-governor, Pattani, interview, 20 Ocotber, 2000.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Director, Channel 11 local station in Yala, interview, 17 October 2000.

[46]Bhikhu Parekh, "Defining National Identity in A Multicultural Society," in People, Nation, and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism, eds. Edward Mortimer and Robert Fine. (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 72.

[47]Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the Four Southern Provinces, Thailand, 1976-1981," USF Monographs in Religion and Public Policy, No. 2 (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 1987), 27.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Department of Education Report No. 4, 1911, quoted in Uthai Dulyakasem, "Muslim-Malay Separatism in Southern Thailand: Factors underlying the Political Revolt," Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, ed. Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 229.

[50]Halim Minsa, candidate for Parliament, Thai Rak Thai Party, interview, 18 October 2000.

[51]Parekh, 7.

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[52]Pornchat Boonnak, Interview.

[53]National Security Council, Nayobai khaum mankhong hang chart kew khab changwat chaidane paktai: 2542-2546) (National Security Policy for the Southern Border Provinces, 1999-2003) (Bangkok: National Security Council,), 4.

[54]See Michael D. Bayles, "A Concept of Coercion," in Coercion, ed. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton Inc., 1972), 16-29.

[55]Ronal Pennock, "Coercion: An Overview," in Pennock and Chapman, eds., 1.

[56]Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), 92.

[57]Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), 4.

[58]Arong Suthasasna, "Thai Society and the Muslim Minority," in Forbes, 99.

[59]Ibid., 99-100.

[60]Idris Pohde (pseudonym), Member, Provincial Islamic Council, interview, 22 October 2000.

[61]Walid Buduo (pseudo name), former member, BNPP. interview, 18 October 2000.

[62]Khalid Wasaya (pseudonym), former member of agitator group, interview, 19 October 2000.

[63]Tugby and Tugby, "Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations," 87.

[64]Lt-Gen Visit Artkhumwong, Fourth Army Commander, interview, Bangkok Post 20 Jan. 1988: 1.

[65]Khalid Wisaya, Interview.

[66]See the detailed accounts and analysis of the Pattani demonstration in Arong Suthasasna, Phanha khuam khatyang nai si changwat paktai (Political Conflict in the Four Southernmost Provinces) (Bangkok: Phitakpracha, 1976).

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[67]This gathering was to call the government to remove the registration of this 17th-century mosque as a historical monument (hence the public is prohibited from using it as a place of worship). A military commando was sent to Pattani during the gathering.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Bangkok Post.12 March 1998.

[70]Bangkok Post. 27 February 1999.

[71]Den Tohmeena. Senator, Pattani. Interview. (August, 1996); 6.

[72]Gupta, 237-238.

[73]Den Tohmeena, interview.

[74]Khun Den Tohmeena was the former deputy-minister of public health and later of interior. Khun Arepen was the former deputy-minister of education. Khun Wan Muhammad Noor Mata was the former deputy-minister of communications and the president of the parliament. He is currently the minister of communications.

[75]Halim Minsa, interview.

[76]Areepen Uttrasin. Narathiwat candidate for Parliament, New Hope Party, interview. 21 October 2000.

[77]Phichai Rattanapol, deputy-security general, National Security Council. Interview. Bangkok Post. (18 September 1999).

[78]The Office of National Security Council, National Security Policy for the Southern Border Provinces, 1999-2003, 80.

[79]See a detailed case study in Andrew Cornish, Whose Place is This? (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1997).

[80]Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 213.

[81]The Fourth Army, Ad hoc Committee for Thai Muslims to Solve the Thai Muslims' Problems, "Thai muslim khae phanha thai muslim, " no dated, 1.

[82]Sutasasna, "Thai Society and the Muslim Minority," 109.

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[83]Anuragsa, 338.

[84]Ibid., 14.

[85]Bangkok Post (20 September 1990).

[86]Bangkok Post (4 August 2000).

[87]Bangkok Post, (24 July 1998).

[88]Bangkok Post, (12 March 1998).

[89]Bangkok Post, (27 September 1988).

[90]Bangkok Post, (12 March 1998).

[91]Bangkok Post, (27 September 1988).

[92]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 33-34.

[93]Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 42-78.

[94]Ibid., 33.

[95]Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces , Phan phattana changwat chaidan paktai: 2535-2539), (Yala: ACSBP, no date) 52.

[96]Ahamad Abayae, interview.

[97]With the ratio of students per teachers as follows: 50-149 students per 1 teacher, 150-229 students per 2 teachers, and 300-449 students per 3 teachers. Office of Educational, Religious, and Cultural Development, District 2, "Sathiti karnsuksa rongrean eakkachon sorn sasana Islam, 2542" [Statistical data of Private Schools teaching Islam, 1999], (Yala, 1999), 4.

[98]The private schools teaching Islam that opened after 1974 are not to receive subsidy in accordance with the Cabinet Resolution 15 June 1974. Also, the government gives no subsidy to traditional *pondoks*.

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[99]Ahamad Abayae, interview.

[100]Laila Akeburai, interview.

[101]Letter from the secretary-general of the Office of National Security Council to the permanant secretary of Education Ministry, no. 1415/2077, dated 23 August 1985, quoted in the Wahdah, New Aspiration Party, Bontanon karnmuang thai [On the Path of Thai Politics] (Bangkok: Muslim News), 37.
[102]Hammad Abidee, student, Bangkok University, interview, 1 October 2000.

[103] In Satun where the Malay-Muslims use Thai language as a means of communication, the numbers are reversed. The comparison for the sixth grade is 1,465 to 3070 while it was 692 to 1,735 in the ninth grade. Office of Educational, Religious, and Cultural Development, Region 2. Satiti karnsuksa rongreian ekkachon sorn sassana islam (p.s. 2542), 69-71.

[104]Of 117 schools in the four provinces, 38.98 % offer free Islamic education, 59.33% charge lower than 1,5000 baht for religious education, and only 1.69 % charge more than 1,500 baht. While 38.45% charge less than 1,200 baht for secular education fees, 28.21% offer it free of charge. Ibid., 55-58.

[105]Ibid., 63.

[106]The ratio of schools teaching both religious and secular subjects (private schools teaching Islam) to schools teaching only religious subjects (pondoks) is: Yala 25: 3, Pattani 40: 18, Narathiwas 40: 16, Satun 12: 0. Ibid., 10.

[107]Pawee Thimkham et al. "Muslim Society, Higher Education and Development: The Case of Thailand," in Muslim Society, Higher Education and Development in Southeast Asia, eds. Sharom Ahmat and Sharon Siddique (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, 1987), 184.

[108]Ibid., 177-88.

[109]Mohammad Adam, interview.

[110]Ahamad Abayaa, interview.

[111]Laila Akeburai, interview.

[112]Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, interview.

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[113]Mohammad Adam, interview.

[114]There were cases where parents withdrew the students from primary schools because the schools did not allow students to wear Islamic attire to school. However, the most controversial case was the 1988 Yala Teacher College Demonstration. During the demonstration, over ten thousand Muslim students, parents, politicians, academics, and a number of Muslim associations joined hands protesting Yala Teacher's College because it had prohibited and punished female students who were following Islamic dress codes.

[115]Letter from the Office of National Education Committee to the secretary of the Cabinet, no. no. ro. 1304/1451 dated 28 May 1993.

[116]The Ministry of Education, Phan phattana karn suksa changwat chaidane phaktai (no date), 2.

[117]Ibid., 29.

[118]Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, "Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations in the Pattani Region: An Interpretation," in Forbes, 88.

[119]Astri Suhkre, "The Muslims of Southern Thailand," 4.

[120]Ministry of Interior, Department of Governance, Phandin Thai: Changwat chaidane paktai (not dated), 49.

[121]Ibid., 50.

[122]Before the 1980s, the government defined the southern border provinces as the provinces where the population was predominantly Malay-Muslim, including Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun. The province of Songkla, where Malay-Muslims predominated in the districts of Theepha, Chana, and Sadao, was later included in the definition of the southern border provinces.

[123]Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces, Khomoon changwat chaidane paktai, 2523 [Information about the Southern Border Provinces]. (Yala, ACSBP, 1987), 13.

[124]Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces. "Nayobai quaummankhong hang chat changwat chaidane paktai lae bot baht knohg so oh boh toh," [National Security Policy in the southernmost Provinces and the Role of The Southern Border

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Provinces Administration Center], Ekkhasarn prakob kharn phathom nithet: Khlongkarn phathom nithet kharajchakarn nai changwat chaidane paktai (Yala: ACSBP, 1989), 24.

[125]National Security Council, Phanha changwat chaidane paktai, (Bangkok: National Security Council, 1988), 3.

[126]The name of the project was changed to Thaksin Phattana Project in 1996.

[127]The policy was divided into five aspects: social-psychology, politics, international relations, economy, and peace and security.

[128]Anusarn Chaotai, (January-June, 1988): 56.

[129]Ibid., 64.

[130]Administration Center for the Southern Border Provinces , Phan phattana changwat chaidane paktai nai chuong khong phan phattana settakit lae sangkhom hangchat chabab tii 7 (p.s. 2535-2539) 2nd ed. (Yala: SBPAC, 1993) , Appendix.

[131]Ibid.

[132]Ibid.

[133]Administration Center for the Southern Border Provinces, Phan phattana changwat chaidane paktai nai choung khong phan phattana settakit lae sangkhom hangchat chabab tii 8 (po.so. 2540-2544) (Yala: SBPAC, 1994), 22.

[134]Ibid., 28.

[135]Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces (2541), 269, quoted in Srisomphob Jitpirom et.al., Raignan karnsamruoat prajampee: Krongkarn suksa wikrao sathanakarn karnpeinplang (Pattani: Social Science Research Center, Prince Songkla University, 1999), 56.

[136]National Security Council. Nayobai khaum mankhong hang chart kew khab changwat chaidane paktai (po.so. 2542-2546) (Bangkok: National Security Council), 6.

[137]Ibid., 87.

[138]Ibid.

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[139]NESDB, "Paktai: Karn sumruoat tuopai 2540," (Bangkok: Center of Southern Development, NESDB, 1998): 263, in Jitpiromsri et al., 42.

[140]Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, interview

[141]Pornchat Boonnak, interview.

[142]Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 141-228.

[143]Edmond J. Keller, "The State, Public Policy and the Mediation of Ethnic Conflict in Africa," 257.

[144]Ibid., 266.

[145]Anuragsa, 314-15.

[146] Ibid., 115.

[147]A civil servant, Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces, interview, 17 October 2000.

[148]Khitti Khittichokwattana, governor of Yala, interview, 21 October 2000.

[149]See Kitti Ratnachaya. Phanha kuam samphan rawang chao thaiphut lah chao thai muslim nai changwat chai dane paktai (The problem of the relationship between the Buddhists and the Thai-Muslims in the southern border provinces), Thesis, Wittayalai Pongkan Raj Anachak,1990.

[150]Haemindra, 215.

[151]General Harn Leelanonda, former chief, Forth Army, interview. Thangnum (August 1990): 7.

[152]Pornchat Boonnak, interview.

[153]Khitti Khittichokwattana, nterview.

[154]Pornchat Boonnak, interview.

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[155]Ahmad Somboon Buoluong, Prince Songkla University, Pattani, interview. 16 October 2000.

[156]Den Tohmeena, interview.

[157]Thangnum (February 2000): 2.

[158]Parinya Udomsab, governor of Narathiwat, interview, 20 October 2000.

[159]Peerasakdi Pattaranitikul, assistant district officer, Yala, interview. 21 October 2000.

[160]The Office of Secretariat of the Senate, Raikyan karn phicharana khong khanakarmkarn wasaman suksa phanha ha changwat chaidan paktai (The Report of the Senate Subcommittee on the Problems of the Five Southern Border Provinces (1999), 4-25.

[161]Phichai Rattanaphol, interview, Thangnum, (October, 1997); 6.

[162]Peerasakdi Pattaranitikul, interview.

[163]Two of them later sued the Interior Ministry and the police for compensation.

[164]Interviews with residents, politicians, and officials in the southernmost provinces, October-November 2000.

[165]Raheem Malidaka (psuedonym), student, Bangkok University, interview. 1 October 2000.

[166]Sulaymal Wongwanit, senator, interview, Thangnum (November 1999): 4.

[167]Khalid Wisaya, interview.

[168]Palakorn Suwanrat, director, SBPAC, speech, Thangnum. (February 2000): 4.

[169]Suchit Boonbongkarn, "Elections and Democratization in Thailand," in R.H. Taylor (ed.) The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 191.

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CHAPTER 5

THE RESPONSES FROM THE MALAY-MUSLIMS

Two different ethnic groups can reside peacefully together while the collection of groups' languages, cultures, religions, and skin colors remain merely a functional aggregation.[1] An ethnic group may remain invisible or tend toward assimilation within a larger society as long as its interests are not directly threatened and its aspiration is not blocked or frustrated by another group.[2] If the awareness of other groups as obstacles to their aspirations increases, the level of conscious self-identity increases and the "we" versus "they" syndrome intensifies. At this stage of the integrative process, ethnic characteristics are likely to be transformed into symbols of their identity, as badges of honor and pride that must be defended.

Joseph Rothchild points out that the relationship of differentially positioned ethnic actors in the reticulated social space on the one hand and their interaction with the states on the other hand shapes the form, intensity, and outcome of ethnic politics.[3] He maintains that in addition to psychological and cultural substance that ethnicity supplies and on which it draws, ethnicity is likely to be politicized:

> (1) If the patterned correlation among ethnic categories, socioeconomic categories, and political power distributions is such as to generate systems of structured interethnic inequality and (2) if those with a conscious interest in maintaining or changing these existing patterns, distributions, and structures determine that it would be instrumentally useful to them to mobilize ethnicity from a psychological or cultural or social datum into a political resource and lever of action.[4]

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He notes that once an ethnic group moves from (1) an aggregation of sharers of primordial markers, through (2) mobilization, and on to (3) politicization, it is very difficult to reverse.[5]

Any ethnic revival carries with it the potential for political action, but of itself does not determine the nature, extent, or intensity of such action.[6] The ethnic strategic decisions are in large part dependent on its members' and leaders' perceptions of the state's social and political system as a whole--its nature, flexibility, and resilience; the benevolence and strength of its authorities; and the possibilities and necessities of coalition politics.[7] Thus, the ethnic group's strategic decisions are responses to the state's capacity to earn and to project legitimacy.

Shaheen Mozaffar argues that political institutions "restrain as well as activate, channel, and mold ethnicity and its political dynamic."[8] The institutional framework allows for systematic conceptualization and explication of: (a) the institutionally circumscribed choice of social actors in selecting the combination of ascribing criteria to define ethnic identity, (b) the creation of the organization forms for the expression of reconstituted ethnicity, (c) the process by which ethnic leaders and followers negotiate quid pro quo to restrain their passions and promote mutual interests, and (d) the general pattern of interaction between these various processes and the state. In other words, "variations in the mobilization of ethnicity in politics will correlate with variations in institutional arrangements."[9] As social actors move from one rule-configured social situation to another, their structure of incentives and the accompanying behavioral

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repertoire change, as do their embedded identities, expectations and interests, and patterns of interaction.

Scholars propose a variation of the spectrum of ethnic groups' potential goals and strategies. For example, Rothchild enlists full assimilation, full political and life-chance integration with officially protected cultural autonomy, political-territorial autonomy, secession to full political independence, and domination.[10] Smith proposes six main strategies, including isolation, accommodation, communalism, autonomy, separatism and irredentism.[11]

The direct Thai political rule in the Patani region had led to an unprecedented cultural confrontation in the area between the Malay population and the new Thai bureaucrats sent to rule them from Bangkok.[12] As the Thai State tightened control over them and tried to suppress their religion, cultural and language identities, they strove to protect their identity and their basic rights.[13] Under the authoritarian regimes, the Malays' efforts to maintain their religion and language were suspected by the government "of being linked with separatist movements."[14] However, under democratic regimes, the government approach toward the Malay-Muslim minority changed. This change, in turn, affected the strategies of the Malay-Muslims.

Since its inclusion into the Thai State, the Malay-Muslim leaders have adopted several strategic goals including secession, irredentism, political-territorial autonomy, cultural autonomy, and full political and life-chance integration but with protection of cultural autonomy. From 1973 onward, the distinctive strategies have included the full political and life-chance strategy (communalism and accommodation) and secession

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(separatism). Astri Suhkre divided the responses of the Malay-Muslims toward the Thai policies into four categories: (1) improving ethnic understanding, (2) active resistance, (3) participation in the administrative and political process, and (4) withdrawal.[15] This study focuses on two main strategies adopted by the Malay-Muslims, including resistance and accommodation and communalism. These responses are critical in determining the relationship between the Thai State and the ethnic Malay-Muslims and the success or failure of the integration efforts of the Thai State.

Resistance

The Malay-Muslims have adopted two forms of resistance to the Thai rule: first, overt resistance in the form of separatism and, second, everyday forms of resistance. Smith notes that separatism is "the classic political goal of ethnonational self-determination.... The aim is to secede from one's own sovereign state, with little or no connection with former rules."[16] Everyday forms of resistance are generally adopted by the weak. In this case, as pointed out by Cornish, they aim at minimizing the penetration of the State into the Malay-Muslim villages.[17]

Seyoum Hameso notes that demands for autonomy or secession emanating from ethnicity indicate the lack of economic and social justice within the State. "The fact that the task of state building was practiced with brutal domination, suppression and uneven regional/ ethnic development inevitably resulted in marginalization of excluded ethnic groups."[18] The most important factor affecting the emergence and the growth of Malay-Muslim separatist movements has been their interactions with the authoritarian regime of

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the Thai State. Coercive control by the Thai State contributed to the emergence of the separatist movements. In an authoritarian system, interactions between a regime and its dissident groups create a spiral. The regime suppresses the Malay-Muslim dissidents and excludes them from the political system. The dissidents, in turn, denounce the legitimacy of the regime and frequently resort to violence in order to separate from the state. This violent characteristic of the separatists threatens the regime even more.

The first formal Malay-Muslim political organization in the post-World War II period, the Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya (GAMPAR), or the Association of Malays of Greater Pattani, was launched in 1948, aimed at promoting and protecting Malay-Muslim interests in Malaya and Thailand.[19] By the end of the 1948, the activities of the association were outlawed and their leaders arrested by the British authorities in Malaya. Malaysian independence on 31 August 1957 and the resurgence of Indonesian nationalism rekindled Malay-Muslim hopes of realizing their own independence. Under this context, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Malay Patani (Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front or BRN) was formed in 1960 under the leadership of Abdul Karim Hassan (Ustaz Karim), a former headmaster of an Islamic school in Narathiwat.

After the BRN went underground in 1964, it attracted more popular support and established the front's armed wing, Angkatan Bersenjata Revolusi Islam Patani (ABRIP), in 1968. Its aim was a complete succession of the four Muslim provinces and the western part of Songkla to reconstruct the sovereign Malay-Muslim state of Patani, and to incorporate it within a wider Malay nation held together by pan-Malay nationalism. It had an Islamic-socialist platform with a small-armed unit in Pattani and Narathiwat. Its

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main support came from the liberal Muslim elite and intellectuals. It was perhaps closer to countries such as Libya, Algeria, and Syria. It also sought closer ties with the PLO and considered it as an important ally.

The nationalist and socialist outlook of the BRN antagonized the more conservative religious-minded supporters, leading to the breakaway and formation of the Parti Revolusi Nasional (PARNAS) in 1965. However, under Cikgu Din Adam, the well-equipped guerrilla unit organized by the BRN was active in the mid-1970s. After his death in 1977, the unit disintegrated into a number of small factions.[20] There were attempts to unite the front in the later period, and the guerrilla unit under the BRN Congress continued conducting activities in the Malay-Muslim provinces.

The Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) was formally formed on 10 September 1971 by a splinter group of the BRN, under the leadership of Tengku Abdul Jalal bin Tengku Abdul Muttalib (Adul Na Saiburi), a former aristocrat and a member of the Thai parliament, with Idris bin Mat Diah (Por Yeh) as its guerrilla leader.[21] Its aim was the liberation of all Muslim areas in the south from the Thai State and the establishment of an independent and sovereign Islamic State of Patani.[22] Most of the BNPP leaders and supporters have been generally conservative Muslim elite and intellectuals in the Malay provinces and Malay-Muslim exiles in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The BNPP had a good international network with representatives in many Arab countries and organizations, including the Islamic Secretariat and the Arab League. From time to time, its members were sent abroad for military training courses. Each training course lasted several months and all expenditures were borne by the host countries.[23] Apart

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from financial contributions of local members, local supporters, and foreign members, the BNPP's major source of financing came from contributions made by various agencies, organizations, and wealthy Muslims in several Arab countries. Most of the funds were given in the form of charity. The BNPP had closer relations to conservative Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, while keeping its distance from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This is because the BNPP leaders regarded the PLO as more radical in terms of ideology.[24]

According to Che Man, the BNPP was the most powerful separatist front during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. It organized the most powerful guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army of the Patani. It had a large permanent guerrilla base and had seven organization branches in foreign countries, including Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and the United States. The overseas headquarters where policies and decisions were made was in Malaysia. The Mecca branch contributed the most financial support to the organization, and it was frequently used for contact with the Arab countries. The Hajj season also provided an opportunity to recruit new members.

Through the BNPP efforts, many private Islamic schools and religious teachers received financial aid in the form of grants or monthly salaries from various foreign sources that, in turn, increased its popular support. The BNPP was led by Tengku Yala Nasir until his death in 1977. After that, the leadership was changed to a 15-man central committee led by Badri Hamdan, a university graduate from Al-Azhar University in Cairo and a former lecturer at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, who attracted many

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graduates of West Asian and American universities to form a more aggressive leadership group.[25]

Like the BNPP, the Pertubuhan Persantuan Pemvevasan Patani (Patani United Liberation Organization, or PULO) viewed the Thai administration as "a colonial power with which no compromise is possible and stressed independence through armed struggle."[26] It was founded in January 1967 by Tengku Bira Kotanila, a former aristocrat and a political science graduate from Aligarh Muslim University, India. Its leadership included university graduates (mostly from Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia), religious teachers, and some former gang leaders (in the armed wings). Many of its members were nationalists and young militant Malay-Muslims. Overseas groups organized by PULO include those in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and Libya. However, it was closer to militant countries like Libya and Syria. Many of its members attended a six-month guerrilla-training course with the PLO.[27] Some maintain that the PULO was the most effective and best organized guerrilla organization operating in the southernmost provinces of Thailand.

The ideology of PULO is Religion, Race, Homeland, and Humanitarianism (Ugama, Bangsa, Tanah Air, and Perikemanusiaan). While it aimed to liberate the Muslim provinces from Thailand and sanctioned violence as a means to achieve its goal, it adopted a strategy that underlined the need for a long-term preparation for the goals of separation. Thus, it promoted the improvement of educational standards among the Malays in both secular and religious spheres.[28] Thai government intelligence sources believe that the PULO leadership was behind the 1975-76 Pattani Demonstration that

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was highly successful in soliciting support from the traditionally passive masses. The effect of its effort was a deeper cleavage between the majority Malay-Muslims and the minority Thai-Buddhists associated with the central government bureaucracy.[29] Moreover, this demonstration was, as Pitsuwan notes, "the most important factor which helped to raise the political awareness among the Malay-Muslim masses."[30]

Heamindra notes that although the BRN, BNPP, and PULO hold different ideologies, they were all involved in common activities. They conducted ambushes, attacked police installations to obtain weapons, and sometimes used terrorism to remind both the government and the villagers of their existence. Their tactics included creating an insecure environment to prove the lack of authority and legitimacy of the Thai government. Routine operations were confined to extortion, conducting roadblocks or kidnapping for ransom, and closing the rubber plantations in order to collect funds for further strengthening of the organizations. The military operations also included planting bombs at public places such as rail stations, airports, and bridges; burning public schools; ambushing government forces; and attacking police bases.[31] During the 1960s and 1970s they became the "invisible governments" in the region to whom the villagers, local businessmen, and plantation owners "willingly" paid the "protection money" so that they could live in peace.[32]

The level of conflict was heightened during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. There were over 100 cases of extortion through kidnapping, closure of rubber plantations, and protection against harassment in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani. Those who refused to pay the protection money would in almost all cases be killed. Most of

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these victims were either Thai-Buddhist or Chinese merchants.[33] This terror campaign was designed, in part, to counter the intense government efforts to establish the self-help resettlement program that encouraged the migration of the landless Thai Buddhist farmers from the northeast region to the Malay-Muslim provinces.[34] Between January 1979 and March 1980 there were 26 cases of burning schools, bombing buildings, and destroying bridges. There were cases of killing and kidnapping Buddhist teachers, which generated waves of protests and demonstrations among Buddhist teachers in the provincial cities demanding better security and protection from the government. As a result of this insecure environment, the teachers refused to go to teach in schools in remote Malay villages.[35]

The campaign, which received a high level of public attention, included attacks on high government officials, international communication centers, and royal functions. The bombing of the Don Muang International Airport in Bangkok on June 4, 1977, the bomb attack during the royal visit to Yala province on September 22, 1977, and the bombing of the Hat Yai Train Station on February 8, 1980, also captured wide international attention.[36] The bomb attack during the royal visit allegedly led to the fall of the Thanin government.

Satha-Anand analyzed terrorist attacks between October 1976 and December 1981 that captured wide publicity among the three most influential newspapers in Thailand, namely the Daily News, the Thai Rat, and the Bangkok Post. He found that there were 127 reports of violent attacks that accounted for about 500 casualties (including about 200 dead). There were 25 killed and 74 injured in the four incidents

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that were most publicized: the bomb attack during the royal visit to Yala province in 1977, the firing at people in a gambling place in Yala on December 14, 1977, the bombing of the Yala Train Station on October 4, 1981, and the random firing into a crowd on a street in Yala on February 21, 1982.[37] The attacks by separatist fronts accounted for the loss of lives of innocent victims and state officials and the destruction of public properties such as government buildings, particularly schools and police stations. It made the Thai government appear to lose control of the situation and created adverse effects upon the central government in terms of potential investment loss, diversion of prospective domestic and foreign tourists, and psychological effects upon the Thai people in general.[38]

Apart from their success in challenging the Thai State domestically, Malay-Muslim separatist fronts were also successful in propagating their causes and attracting wider external publicity, particularly in the Arab countries. Since the mid-1970s, the three separatist fronts have placed greater emphasis on obtaining external recognition and support. In 1974, the BNPP, under the leadership of Tengku Abdul Jalal, called on the ICMF to support Patani independence and to effect an oil embargo against Thailand.[39] By 1976, the BNPP and other fronts were allowed to attend the conference as unofficial observers. The problem of Patani was discussed behind closed doors.

In the same year, starting from July 6, a Libyan journalist, Muhammad A. Warieth, who spent several days with the guerrillas a month earlier, had his series of articles entitled "Besuar Patani" (With Patani Revolutionists) published for forty-three consecutive days in a Libyan daily newspaper, Al-Jihad.[40] The articles described the

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Muslim liberation movement and the problems faced by the guerrillas in the mountains. Che Man maintains that this series of articles probably contributed to greater Arab awareness and then sympathy for the Patani movement.[41] During the Islamic Summit Conference in Mecca and Taif in January 1981, appeals issued by the PULO were circulated. Although it failed to capture any official attention, it was later published in the Journal of the Muslim World League (April 1981, 47-49) with the title "Patani Plea for Muslim Help."[42]

From the early 1980s, the Thai government was determined to crack down on the separatist fronts. The intensification of military operations resulted in the arrests and killing of many of the guerrilla leaders. The government policies, especially the Prime Minister Order No. 66/ 2523 of 1980 that was applied to accommodate the separatists by allowing them to return to normal life, led many of the separatist members to give themselves up. Moreover, internal conflicts within the leadership of these fronts led to factionalization and hence weakened the movements even further.

From 1985, personal and ideological conflicts among the PULO leaders led to the break up of the front. In 1989, Pertubuhan Pembebasan Patani Bersatu (PPPB, or the New PULO) was formed under the leadership of Arong Muleng. Another wave of internal conflict led Arong Muleng to set up a new group called Abujihad in 1994, while Haji Hasem Abdulrahman became the leader of the New PULO. The BNPP also had gone through some changes. Its leaders shifted emphasis to the development of political organization and external political contacts and support rather than conducting insurgent

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activities against the government. The front later changed its name to Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani Liberation Islamic Front (BIPP).

To solve the problem of disintegration, the Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan Patani (BERSATU) was set up in 1989, aimed to unite and coordinate the Malay-Muslim separatist movements and their activities, namely the BRN Congress, BIPP, Mujahidin Patani (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani),[43] and the New PULO. The BERSATU announced "Operation Falling Leaves" in September 1997, which aimed to kill state officials in Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala "one by one, in the same way that leaves fall off trees."[44] The new heightening of the terrorist attacks; bomb explosions, and arson led the police director, Pracha Promnok, to travel to Malaysia in December to seek cooperation from Malaysian police authorities to help solve the problem. On the same week, the Deputy Foreign Minister, M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, went to Malaysia and met Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to discuss ways to crush the separatist movements. The Malaysian foreign minister said Malaysia was ready to give full cooperation and reiterated its policy to refuse admission to any terrorist group. [45]

The turning point that weakened the separatist fronts significantly occurred when the Malaysian police arrested and handed over the four leaders of the PULO and the New PULO to the Thai authorities in January 1998. Within a month following this close cooperation from Malaysia, ten leading separatist figures, who then felt insecure in Malaysia, which was once their safe haven, left the country.[46] In July 1998, the Cabinet approved the Prime Minister's Office Order 127/ 2541, which allows suspected separatists who have no criminal records to return to Thailand from self-exile without

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fear of legal charges. This policy further attracted more separatist members to surrender. By July 1998, the Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces reported that only about 20 members of the New PULO, a number of insurgents of the mainstream PULO, and members of the three factions of the BRN remained in the five provinces.[47]

In 1999, the PULO launched an internet campaign, another form of resurrection of the front.[48] It was to be a global step to take the movement's propaganda campaign to a new height. The site claims large numbers of followers in Malaysia as well as in the three Muslim provinces. The information in the web page is in English and Malay. The information includes the history of Patani since 1786 and the movement's struggles to free the Malay provinces from Thai rule. It accused Thai authorities of ordering military suppression in order to gain a larger share of the government budget and claimed that in many arson cases only scapegoats had been caught.[49] It also denied the organization's involvement in the bomb attack during the royal visit to Yala province in September 1977.

Based on the data collected by the Civilian, Police, and Army Unit 43, there were 660 violent acts in the southernmost provinces between 1988 and 1997. Among them, 156 acts were claimed by separatist movements such as BRN and PULO. However, 126 terrorist acts were committed without claim by any front while 378 acts were classified as general criminal acts. During this period, the PULO were responsible for 93 terrorist acts while the BRN claimed responsibility for 38 activities.[50] After the cooperation from Malaysia in 1998, extortion, kidnapping, and other acts of terrorism in the Malay-Muslim provinces continued. Nevertheless, they were believed to be largely the work of bandits

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posing as separatists.[51] For example, from October 1998 to September 1999, of 55 reported cases classified as acts of terrorism, at least 70% were found to be attacks directed by ordinary criminals or stemming from personal conflict.[52] Small-scale separatist attacks were random and carried out to reinforce their presence and influence as well as to showcase of their achievements.

It can be concluded that the Malay-Muslim separatist movements are now at their weakest. One of the PULO former leaders, Daloh Samaae, noted that at present, there are only a small number of separatists who uphold the ideology of the movements. They are divided and many of their members are bandits.[53] The separatist movements that used to receive sympathy for their causes from the Malay-Muslims and who were perceived as liberationists/ freedom fighters are now disappearing. Their public images have been deteriorating. In the perceptions of the general public, those who are active at present are merely bandits who create an atmosphere of insecurity for people in the southernmost provinces.[54]

There are many factors contributing to the weakening of the Malay-Muslim liberation fronts and their inability to incite mass insurrection. The government policies of military suppression, the amnesty program, and the diplomatic efforts to influence foreign countries and groups to stop giving support to separatist fronts have had a great impact in weakening the capability of the separatist movements. The division within and among the fronts has lessened their ability to conduct united and forceful military actions and to galvanize broad support for secession. Moreover, the inclusion of gang leaders and members into the armed wings of the fronts also contributed to the inability of the

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front leaders to control their members' actions that, in turn, ruined their images among the local Malay-Muslims. However, it must be noted that while the separatist fronts have not succeeded in inciting mass insurrection, a number of political observers believe that their military activities and their international propaganda have influenced and re-directed the Thai State's approaches toward the Malay-Muslims, i.e., to pay more attention to socioeconomic development in the Malay-Muslim provinces, to widen political participation and to grant greater cultural concession to the Malay-Muslims.

Malay resistance to the Thai State has not been limited to the overt active resistance in the form of separatism only. In his field research in Yala, Cornish observed that the Malay-Muslims, especially those in the rural areas, although not becoming active members of separatist fronts, have developed their own mechanism of "everyday resistance" to Thai penetration of their villages through small daily strategies which have been developed through a process of regular interaction with Thai officials.[55] There is no doubt that the Malay-Muslims are eager to improve their economic circumstances. However, they are also concerned about how to preserve the existing economic structures in their villages and how to exclude Thai officials from gaining any control over these economic structures. Cornish maintains, "The Thai state has spent huge amounts of money and deployed substantial resources in its attempts to assimilate Malays, but the accumulated actions of hundreds of thousands of rural Malays in their day-to-day dealings with Thai administrators have effectively undermined the best efforts of the state."[56]

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Cornish's observation was also acknowledged by state officials in the Malay provinces. For example, a district officer in Narathiwat explained the failure of a project to help people find a new source of income by breeding fish as follows:

> Local officials were the ones who did almost all the work. The rural people were simply passive participants in the project.... When the central officials were coming to evaluate the progress of the project, we [the local officials] had to get things done because we had received the budget and must have some results to show them.[57]

He attributed the failure to the fact that people were not allowed to be involved or influence the decision making and the direction of the developmental project. Because the state designed what they should do, they had no sense of ownership and little ability to control the direction of the project. This discouraged them from participating in the project.

The accounts given by Cornish and the district officer parallel that of a current offer by the Educational Office, District 2, to give vocational training to students not being well received by owners of *pondoks*. The owners are ignoring state regulations, such as one requiring owners of *pondoks* to provide background information about teachers and students. A *pondok* owner explained the rejection of help from the state as a mechanism to "avoid conditions and control" that he believed would necessarily come with the given help. Thus, it seems that while active resistance has been significantly reduced, "everyday resistance" continues. Only when people feel confident that life in their community is not being threatened by interaction and cooperation with the state will this resistance decline.

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Some important developments in the southernmost provinces that help secure the confidence of the Malay-Muslims in their dealing with the State are (1) the growing and strengthening of civil society in Thailand, especially in the region, and (2) the ability of the Malay-Muslim elite to form a group to bargain effectively with political parties to promote and protect the interests of Malay-Muslims. These developments have raised the confidence of the Malay-Muslims and encouraged two-way communication between the ruled and the rulers during the last decade. It is at this junction that we turn to investigate another important form of response of the Malay-Muslims toward the Thai government policies of integration.

Accommodation and Communalism

Smith defines accommodation as "a situation when the ethnic community aims to adjust to its host society by encouraging its members to participate in the social and political life of that society and its state." Under this strategy, individual members often try to "assimilate to the host society, or at least become acculturated, for individual advancement."[58] Communalism is a more dynamic and active form of accommodation. However, its basic collective focus marks it off from the accommodation strategy. The aim is "communal control over communal affairs in those geographical areas where the ethnic community forms a demographic majority.... The overall aim is to influence the direction of state policy toward the interests of the ethnic community."[59]

Bhikhu Parekh maintains that every political community tends to, and needs to, form some general conception of its identity.[60] It forms some view of the kind of

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community it is and would like to be, what it stands for, and how it differs from others. The definition of national identity matters "because it can de-legitimize minorities, damage their material and other interests, and make it difficult for them to identify with the political community."[61] As described in the previous chapter, political development or democratization in Thailand affects both the conception of the Thai State's identity and its policies and strategies toward the Malay-Muslims, helping to successfully promote the roles of accomodationist and communalist.

The Muslim intelligentsia has played influential roles in voicing, representing, and articulating the demands of Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces in particular and of Thai-Muslims in general.[62] Their work emphasizes the protection of the Malay culture, identity, and religion and the protection of human rights. The expansion of political space under the democratic regimes allows these Muslims to influence State policies. Moreover, it allows the Malay-Muslim politicians to play a role in bargaining with the political parties and the State to bring about accommodation for the Malay-Muslims.

The governor of Narathiwat who has worked in the region for over two decades made an observation about the role of Malay-Muslim traditional religious leaders as follows:

> Traditional religious leaders from the central part of Thailand tended to be submissive to the ruling class [officials], while the Tokguru in the southernmost provinces, especially those who graduated from foreign countries, were more assertive. They have played an important role in educating Thai State officials about Islam and Muslim society. They have taken a leading role in calling the State to grant concessions to Muslims in political-religious and cultural aspects.[63]

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He maintained that much of the input for the recent Cabinet Resolutions concerning religious and cultural issues of the southernmost provinces came from Malay-Muslim religious leaders.[64]

A graduate from a university in Saudi Arabia and an owner of a *pondok* that has been in operation for many decades was determined to keep his institution in operation (with no subsidy from the government). He saw the necessity to maintain this traditional institution to preserve and promote Islamic education. However, he also perceived the importance of maintaining contact and cooperating with the government. On several occasions, having been invited by the Khrongkarn Thaksin Phattana (the Southern Development Program), he has given lectures to state officials to inform them about Islam and the Muslims' way of life. He expressed:

> Political and social conditions in the past created problems for the people. Now the context has changed. Imams are now less afraid to speak up and give comments about the government policy.... Now we don't fight with the government. We fight with the moral decay in our society... and we work to spread the messages of Islam.[65]

The existence of the Islamic communalist trend in Thailand was influenced by Islamic modernism that was conveyed through hundreds of Thai Muslim scholars educated at al-Azhar in Egypt and at Saudi Arabian universities and also through cross-regional intellectual influences from Malaysia and Indonesia.[66] Imtiyaz Yusuf defines the "Islamic accommodationism" as "a new intellectual and sociopolitical tendency among Thai Muslims who, having grown up as an integral part of the evolving Thai nation, assert that over the decades they have sacrificed much and faced many hardships

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in order to attain political recognition as a distinct religious community."[67] In their relations with the Buddhists and other religions, they were influenced by "the new interiorized approach to da'wah based on the Qur'anic principle of *al-amar bi-l-ma'ruf,* to do good toward all humanity, and to seek the reform of Muslim society at the level of the *Umma*"[68] They emphasized the Qur'anic principle stipulating that there is no compulsion in religion hence Islam justified co-existence with other religions.

The Islamic accommodationists asserted the ability of Islam to manipulate and reconfigure the meaning of the new situation in ways that have helped to keep change within the essence of Islam. For example, Dr. Ismail Ali, a Ph.D. graduate from Saudi Arabia and the director of Islamic College of Yala, argued, "Islam does not oppose changes. Islam is not an obstacle to industrialization. However, we must study how economic and material development affect morality, ethics, culture and tradition of the society."[69] In his seminar presentation at the Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces, he argued that although the Muslims and the Buddhists hold different religious beliefs, there are many ways that they can work together. However, he noted, "In some aspects, we cannot and [the Buddhist officials] must understand why [we] cannot."[70] This argument clearly shows willingness to work within the system while seeking and demanding some exemptions for the protection of the religious and cultural rights of the Muslims.

Another important element among the accommodationists and communalists is the Muslim intellectuals, especially those who hold degrees from educational institutions in Thailand or in the Western countries. They have come to occupy distinctive structural

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positions, carrying out a variety of social and political functions that can have important, sometimes decisive, historical consequences. They include members of academia, state officials, politicians, lawyers, doctors, and other professions. They forcefully called upon the government to respect the human rights of the Malay-Muslim minority. Through their writings, public comments, and lectures, they have called upon the State to make concessions to the Malay-Muslims in the realms of cultural and religious matters. Through their involvement in the protection of those whose rights have been violated by the States or state officials, in some cases they have effectively helped protect the Malay-Muslims from the abuse of power by the State.

Muslim members of academia, such as Dr. Surin Pitsuwan (who was formerly a lecturer at Thammasat University), Dr. Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Dr. Arong Suthasatna, Dr. Pheerayot Rahimullah, Sawanee Jitmuoat, and Ahmad Somboon Bualuong, have not only written and given lectures to educate the public but also advised the government, NGOs, and associations concerning various aspects of Malay-Muslim issues. Some of them, such as Dr. Surin, who later became the foreign minister of Thailand and Professor Chaiwat, who in his capacity as an advisor to Office of the National Security Council provided significant input to the current national security policy for the southern border provinces, have made direct impacts on the government approaches toward the Malay-Muslims.

A Muslim lawyer like Somchai Neelapaichit and other members of the Muslim Lawyer Association (Thailand) have been involved in a number of important court cases to defend innocent Malay-Muslims who were charged by the State with conducting

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terrorist or separatist acts. They were successful in proving to the court the innocence of the four religious leaders accused of the bombing of Hat Yai Train Station.

Dr. Arong Suthasatna, a Pattani Malay-Muslim and a lecturer at Chulalongkorn University, noted that Muslims with "modern education" were more articulate in their communication with the State. He noted that pressure from the Muslim members of academia and Muslim politicians were important factors that led to positive changes in government approaches during the democratization period.[71] In his presentation at a seminar on the application of Islamic law in Thailand in 1999, he proposed that Thailand follow the model of Sri Lanka by passing a separate Islamic law to be used for Muslims in Thailand.[72] By doing so, he argued at the seminar, the Malay-Muslims would feel that they are being taken care by the State and would not feel that they were treated as second-class citizens.[73]

Another good example of the communalist approaches is manifested by Worawit Baru of the Humanities and Social Science Department, Prince of Songkla University, who proposed that the Thai government development policy in the southernmost provinces should follow the Malaysian model, which stipulates that economic development must go hand in hand with moral development.[74] He argued that the Malaysian government required owners of factories to provide time and space for Muslim workers to perform their prayers, to hire religious leaders to lead the prayers and give consultations to the workers regarding religious issues, and to limit work time for female workers to only the day shift so that the family institution would not be destroyed. Hence, the Thai government should consider the Malaysian model and apply it to

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regulate factories in the southernmost provinces where it is applicable so that it would meet the needs of the community.

Since the political environment in Thailand, especially from the 1990s, has facilitated cultural-political dialogue and social accord within the country, the communalists' moderate approaches have become relevant and prominent. At present, the priority among the majority of Malay-Muslims is not focused on the possibility and viability of a separate Patani State, but on how to respond, influence, and manipulate the situation under Thai rule so that it will best serve them and their community. During the democratization period, the Malay-Muslims have become more assertive in demanding and protecting their rights. For example, during the Patani Demonstration in 1975-76, over a hundred thousand demonstrators demanded that the State take responsibility for the killing of the five innocent Malay-Muslims by marine officers. In 1988, the "Hijab Demonstration" in Yala took place, where over ten thousand students and parents joined together to oppose the Teacher's College's regulation that prohibited female Muslim students from wearing Islamic attire to school. Over 50,000 Muslims gathered at the Krue-se Mosque, calling for the State to withdraw the legislation making the mosque an historical monument (hence, prohibiting Muslims from performing their prayers at the mosque).

Records show that the Malay-Muslims were actively involved in giving input at the public hearing of the draft of the 1998 Constitution. Their comments clearly reflect their utmost desire to have their cultural and religious rights protected under the Thai Constitution.[75] In October 2000, when the government neglected the opinions of Malay-

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Muslim residents of villages in Songkla where the Thai-Malaysia natural gas pipeline would come ashore (hence, directly affecting their lives and their villages), they protested.

In each demonstration and protest, the masses found support of various forms. For example, during the Pattani Demonstration, whose focus was on justice for the relatives of the victims, various student clubs and the National Student Center of Thailand supported and joined the demonstration. In the Hijab Demonstration whose focus was on religious freedom, students in Yala found support from other Muslim students and professional organizations such as the Thai Muslim Student Association, the Muslim Siam Club, the Ramkhamhang University Muslim Student Club, and the Muslim Lawyers Club. They also received support from members of academia from Bangkok.[76] During the recent protest against the Thai-Malaysian Gas Pipeline, which focused on environmental damages, destruction of the community life, and the economic impact on communities, protesters found the broadest and strongest bases of support, especially among the NGOs and members of academia.

Another important channel that has been opened for the Malay-Muslims to effectively exert their influence on government policies during the democratization period is political representation. A number of the demands by the Malay-Muslims, including those made through demonstrations and protests, found their way to the government via Malay-Muslim members of parliament. As mentioned earlier, until 1973, there was basically no representative government in Thailand. When Thailand was experiencing the first democratic transition between 1973-76, the Muslim reformers

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(*khana mai*) formed a political party called the Peace Front Political Party.[77] It aimed to promote legal rights of the Muslims and other minority groups in Thailand. It also emphasized providing political input to reform the official Islamic bureaucratic structure in Thailand. The party sponsored one Buddhist and eleven Muslim candidates for the parliamentary election. Among the eleven Muslim candidates, four were from the southern provinces. However, the party failed to get any of its candidates elected.

Under the current constitution, which no longer requires that a political party must have at least 50,000 members, Muslim reformers have been able to revitalize their political party--The Peace Party. The founders of the party include Dr. Umnuoy Suwankitbarihan, a Ph.D. graduate from the United States and private owner of Kasembandit University in Bangkok, and Witaya Wisesratna, a former member of the Thai parliament and a well-known Thai Muslim scholar. The party policy follows the guidelines of Islamic morality and ethics, which also finds common causes in the general society in Thailand.[78] Under the new constitution, the State is responsible to provide some financial support to political parties. With financial support, the party can send its candidates to compete for election and to use the party as a forum to organize activities that help spread the teaching and promote the understanding of Islam.[79] At this stage, it is too early to evaluate the impact of the party on Thai society. However, the party mirrors the mainstream Muslims in Thailand who are willing to work within the system and seek to find ways to protect and promote Islam and to support better understanding between the Muslims and the non-Muslims in Thailand.

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The political organization that aims to protect the rights of Muslims in Thailand and has effectively pursued the Malay-Muslim interests in the Thai National Assembly, Al-Wahdah (The Unity), emerged during the second democratic transition period. Al-Wahdah was founded in 1986 by Malay-Muslim politicians, members of Provincial Islamic Committees in Pattani, and religious leaders in the four southernmost provinces. Members of Wahdah shared the same views regarding the problems of the Muslims in this area and how to solve such problems. Parliamentary candidates who ran under the Wahdah were comprised of both Muslims and Buddhists. Its strategy was to bargain with political parties to adopt a package of the group's policy guidelines for the southernmost provinces and to allocate at least one cabinet position to the group members.[80]

Since its inception, the Wahdah has been affiliated with different political parties such as the Democrat Party, the Unity Party,[81] and the New Hope Party. Its role has become prominent since it joined with the New Aspiration Party (NAP) in 1992. General Chawalit Yongchaiyuhd, the founder and the leader of the NAP, accepted the Wahdah's proposal that if the party became a member of the coalition government, it would (1) allocate at least one cabinet seat for a member of the Wahdah, (2) support the changes in the Islamic Administration Law, and (3) support the establishment of a separate Islamic Court (the Shari'a court).[82] In the 1992 election, the Wahdah won all eight parliamentary seats in the four southernmost provinces.

Members of the Wahdah were recognized as political actors on the national level when the NAP became a member of the coalition government in 1992 and, from 1996-

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97, the leading party of the coalition government. Since 1992, under the NAP, members of the Wahdah have taken important positions at the national level. For example, Den Tohmeena, a Pattani representative, became the deputy-minister of Interior. He is currently a Senator. Wan Muhammad Noor Mata, the Yala representative, became the speaker of the House of Representatives, the president of the National Assembly, and the deputy-minister of Communication. He is currently the minister of Communication. Areepehn Utarasin was deputy-minister of Education and is currently a member of the parliament. As cabinet members who are directly involved in government policy decision making, members of the Wahdah have been able to exert their influence over State policies regarding Malay-Muslims.[83]

Apart from emphasizing socio-economic development of its constituencies, the Wahdah has influenced the Thai State to expand concessions and accommodate Malay-Muslims on religious and cultural dimensions. Its activities include: opposition to the project to change the Muslim names from Arabic or Malay into Thai (1985), opposition to the Ministry of Education's project to set a Buddha image in every primary school all over the country (1985), requesting exemption for schools in which the majority of students are Muslims, and change of the regulation of identity pictures that prohibited female Muslims to wear headdresses (1994). The Wahdah also supports the Muslim Lawyers Association in its effort to protect Malay-Muslims in court cases against the abuse of power by state officials. It has also been successful in influencing the government to accommodate Muslims in their religious observances, such as to designate prayer rooms for Muslim travelers at Donmuang and Hat Yai airports, the main railway

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stations in the southern provinces, and at the government offices such as Yala Central Hospital; and to build a *Haj* terminal at the Hat Yai airport exclusively for those traveling to or returning from performing their pilgrimage in Mecca. It also influenced the government's decision to allocate financial assistance to Islamic preschools (*Rongreian tadeeka*), *pondoks*, and Private schools teaching Islam and to adopt primary school uniform regulations to accommodate Muslim students in accordance with the Islamic dress code. The adoption of an initial stage of an Islamic banking system by the government-owned Thanakan Oomsin (Oomsin Bank) was also a result of the Wahdah's effort.

The democratic system makes available channels for people to express their demands and provides a mechanism to have these demands met. Democratic institutions enhanced the viability of the accommodationists and communalists. While at present there are many issues and problems pending resolution, especially issues regarding the behaviors and attitudes of state officials toward the Malay-Muslims, the accommodationists and communalists have proven to the masses that by working within the system they can influence the direction of government approaches for the betterment of Malay-Muslims. For many, communalism seems to be the best strategy to pursue under the current political context.

Summary

The Thai State under authoritarian rule contributed to the rise and the strengthening of the Malay-Muslim separatist movement. In an authoritarian system,

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which closes any channel for dissidents to express their grievances, the dissident groups naturally become anti-system. Abuse by the authorities reinforces ideological differences, which in turn make the dissidents more radical and less likely to compromise. The State policies of assimilation and integration that appeared to show little sensitivity toward the religion, culture, and social life of the ethnic group were resisted by the ethnic members and gave life to liberation movements.

While the separatist fronts were not able to incite mass insurrection against the Thai State, their military operations caused the loss of lives and property and damaged the legitimacy of the State. Moreover, from the late 1960s, the movements received wider external publicity, particularly in the Arab countries, which concerned the Thai government. External support was crucial for the existence of the separatist fronts. The division within and among the fronts, the Thai government determination to crush the separatists while softening its approaches toward the defectors and accommodating Malay-Muslims, and the change in Malaysian policy have significantly contributed to the weakening and the disintegration of the Malay-Muslim separatist fronts.

At the same time, democratization in Thailand has facilitated political integration. Democracy provides channels for dissidents to legally express their demands. The growth of the civil society and the ability of the communalists to negotiate and bargain effectively with the State to promote and protect the interests of Malay-Muslims raises the confidence of the Malay-Muslims that they can have their demands met by working within the system. This strategy has become the most effective one to promote and protect the interests of the Malay-Muslims in the current political context.

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Notes

[1] Functional aggregation is a collection of individuals where language is "merely" a means of communication; culture is merely a way of doing certain activities; relation is merely an explanation of the meaning of the group's origins and existence; and the color of skin is merely an existing fact. See Dov Ronen The Quest for Self-determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Joseph Rothchild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[4] Ibid., 248.

[5] Ibid., 28.

[6] Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Revival, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), 135.

[7] Ibid., 29.

[8] Shaheen Mozaffar, "The Institutional Logic of Ethnic Politics: A Prolegomenon," in Harvey Glickman, ed., Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa (Atlanta, Georgia: The African Studies Association Press, 1995), 37. He defines institutions as "configurations of rules that engender patterned regularity in political life."

[9] Ibid., 46.

[10] Rothchild, Ethnopolitics, 150-152.

[11] Smith, 15-17.

[12] Omar Farouk Bajunid, "The Muslims in Thailand: A Review," Southeast Asian Studies, 37.2 (September 1999): 221.

[13] Phirayot Rahimula, quoted in Phiyanat Boonnak, Nayobai karn pokkrong khong rataban thai toh chao thai muslim in jankwat chaidane paktai, (poh soh 2475-2516) [The Thai government policy toward Thai-Muslims in southern border provinces, 1933-73] (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1991).

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[14]Ronald Provencher, "Islam in Malaysia and Thailand," in Raphael Israeli, ed., The Crescent in the East (London: Curzon Press Ltd., 1982), 140.

[15]Astri Suhkre, "The Muslims of Southern Thailand," in The Muslims of Thailand, ed. Andrew Forbes (Bihar, India: Center for South East Asian Studies, 1989), 8-17.

[16]See Smith, The Ethnic Revival, 14-15.

[17]See Cornish. Whose Place Is This?.

[18]Seyoum Y. Hameso. Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa (Commack, New York: Nava Science Publishers, Inc., 1997), 149.

[19]Omar Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand," in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. , eds., Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 237.

[20]Wan Kadir bin Che Man, Muslim Elites and Politics in Southern Thailand, master's thesis, University of Malaysia, 1983, 138-41.

[21]Information regarding the BNPP comes mainly from Che Man's fieldwork in 1983. See ibid., 144-66.

[22]"The Muslim Struggle for Survival in South Thailand," document presented to the 7th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers at Istanbul, Turkey, 1976, prepared by the National Liberation Front of Patani, Bukit Budor, Patani, 1 April 1976, 2 quoted in Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand," 241.

[23]Interviews with several men who had been trained in Libya, April 1980, in Che Man, Muslim Elites, 153.

[24]Omar Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand," 241.

[25]Asiaweek, April 4, 1980, 25 quoted in Wan Kadir bin Che Man, Muslim Elites and Politics in Southern Thailand, 134.

[26]Ibid., 87.

[27]Interview with a former PULO guerrilla trainer, Pattani, 18 October 2000.

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[28]Uthai Dulayakasem, "Muslim-Malay Separatism in Southern Thailand: Factors Underlying the Political Revolt," in Joo-Jock and Wani S., 242.

[29]Suthasasna, Panha khuamsamphan. 89-101.

[30]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 235.

[31]Ibid., 233.

[32]Wan Kadir bin Che Man, Muslim Elites and Politics in Southern Thailand, 87-88.

[33]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 241.

[34]John McBeth. "Separatism Is the Goal and Religion is the Weapon," Far Eastern Economic Review (June 20, 1980): 21.

[35]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 242.

[36]Ibid., 243.

[37]Pitsuwan and Satha-Anand, Sichangwat paktai. 97.

[38]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 242-43.

[39]Omar Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand," 250.

[40]Wan Kadir bin Che Man, Muslim Elites and Politics in Southern Thailand, 130-1.

[41]Ibid., 131.

[42]Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 263-4.

[43]The GMIP was established 1986 under Suedi Ngi Ngor. It was a small group, active only in Rangae and Rueso districts in Narathiwat and in Mayo and Yaring districts in Pattani.

[44]Bangkok Post. (February 1, 1998): 5.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Bangkok Post, (February 22, 1998).

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[47]Bangkok Post, (July 24, 1998).

[48]The site's location is: hhtp://www.pulo.org.

[49]Bangkok Post, (10 November 1999).

[50]Chumphot Phongsuwan, "Karnwikroh preabteab kewkhab sathannakarn karnkhokarnrai lah karnkhokhuammaisaknob nai changwat chaidane paktai: pii 2531-2540," Department of Public Administration, Prince Songkla University, 1998, 80-88.

[51]Maj-General Wanchai Kanpropa, Commander of the 43th Army Unit, quoted in Bangkok Post. (27 September 1999): 3.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Thangnum (October 1997): 6.

[54] This opinion is widely shared by many Malay-Muslims whom I interviewed and in the expressions found in seminar reports and newspapers.

[55]Cornish, 17.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Interview a district officer, Narathiwat, 22 October 2000.

[58]Smith, The Ethnic Revival, 15.

[59]Ibid., 16.

[60]Bhikhu Parekh, "Defining National Identity in a Multicultural Society," in Edward Mortimer and Robert Fine, People, Nation, and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 66.

[61]Ibid., 74.

[62]They include the educated Malay-Muslims and Thai-Muslims with secular education and/or with religious education from universities abroad.

[63]Parinya Udonsab, governor of Narathiwat, interview, 21 October 2000.

[64]Ibid.

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[65]Mohammad Adam, religious teacher and owner, Nurulsalam Pumewitty, Yaring, Pattani, interview, 23 October 2001.

[66]Imtiyaz Yusuf, "Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming the Office of Chularajmontri/ *Shakikh al-Islam*," Journal of Islamic Studies 9:2 (1988): 281.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Ibid., 282.

[69]Thangnum (February 1996): 8.

[70]Thangnum (June 2000): 4.

[71]Arong Suthasasna, associate professor, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, interview. 9 October 2001.

[72]Arong Suthasasna, interview.

[73]Interviews with Toh Quadi, and Khun Den Tohminah

[74]Thangnum, (February 1996): 8.

[75]See Raikyan karsammana wikroh lae saroob phon karn rabfang khuamkidhen khong chowthai muslim nai changwat chaidane paktai tho rang rattammanoon chabab prachachon (23-24 April 1997).

[76]See Khong Bannathikarn Chapohkit, 18 pii hijab (Hatyai: Offset Press, no date): 12-20.

[77]See Raymond Scupin, "The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand," Asian Survey (February 1995): 194-99.

[78]Witaya Wisesratna. deputy-leader, The Peace Party, Interview, 6 November, 2000.

[79]Ibid.

[80]See Den, Tohmeena. Khuamwangmai khab thanakhan islam [The new aspiration and the Islamic bank] (Bangkok: The Muslim News, 1998), 231-36.

[81]The Unity Party was an umbrella party of smaller parties such as the People's Party, the Thai Unity Party, the People's Action Party, and the Progressive Party.

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[82]Den Tohmeena, interview, 31 October 2000.

[83]Areephen Utrasin, member of the parliament, Narathiwat, interview, 21 October 2000.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The boundary of the political community is an issue that manifests itself in the answers to three questions: Who is a citizen? Among citizens, who have what privileges? And whose norms and practices are symbolically aligned with those of the state?[1] Constitutionally, all citizens of Thailand are equal under the law of the land and the Thai State guarantees religious freedom. However, a close study of the integration experience of the Malay-Muslims into the Thai State shows that there has been a discrepancy in the formal policies and practices of the State toward the Malay ethnic minority.

During the authoritarian period, the Thai elite tended to distrust the political loyalty of the minority groups in Thailand who were different from the Thai majority in terms of religion, culture, and race. They perceived differences as a threat and believed that the threat could be removed only through the assimilation of the minority groups.[2] This assimilation was assisted by a deliberate effort on part of the government to eradicate ethnic loyalties and to stimulate artificially national sentiment through the three national institutions: nation, religion, and monarch. The goal of nation building emphasized that all citizens of Thailand, including the Malay-Muslims, must be made to assume Thai identity regardless of their religious and cultural differences.[3] Resistance to assimilation policies of Bangkok was viewed as a threat to national security which had to

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be subdued. Hence, nation building created tensions between the State and ethnic minorities. The Thai government deliberately played down the relevance of the historical uniqueness and cultural differences of the Malay ethnic group. Granting historical uniqueness might easily lead to autonomy and independence that were unacceptable.

A sense of community among the Malay-Muslims was built upon the shared historical legacy, religion, culture, and language, which differentiated them from other ethnic groups in Thailand. When the State tried to interfere with their religion and culture and when the nation building at the state level entailed the destruction of their ethnicity, they resisted. Islam was used as an ideological force to unify the Malay-Muslims to struggle against the encroachment of the State.

The Thai State attempted to create a single national culture that overrode ethnic cultures, but drew many of its symbols from the heritage of the central Thai ethnic community. These symbols reinforced the sense of grievance and alienation felt by the Malay-Muslim community. The more confrontational the approach employed by the Thai State, the more the Malays felt alienated and resisted its efforts. Ethnonationalism clearly fed on adversity.[4] The government's determination to press comprehensively integrationist nation building (not just state building) goals on resisting ethnic Malay-Muslims proved counterproductive for the stability, progress, and legitimacy of the State.

For the greater part of the modern history of Thailand, the country was ruled under authoritarian regimes where the military and the bureaucracy were the center of power. Under an authoritarian system, channels for dissident groups to express their interests and

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grievances and to require their demands to be met were closed. Moreover, a political atmosphere of fear under authoritarian rule undermined mutual trust among people. Without mutual trust, neither side was likely to compromise. Coercive control not only damaged human and social relations of the border provinces, but it also reduced the regime's legitimacy and people's identity with the state. Feeling that their lives and rights were repeatedly violated by the State, Malay-Muslims came to the conclusion that violence was the only means to fight back and separatism was the most practical and desirable goal.

The uniqueness of their historical heritage and their religious and cultural identities, while alienating Malay-Muslims from the Thai majority, facilitated the linkage of the ethnic group to the outside world, especially to their lost brethren in Malaysia and to the Muslim *ummah*. The surge of power of the Arab oil producing countries, the worldwide resurgence of Islam, and the concern expressed by international Islamic forums have had important impacts on both the capacity and the morale of the separatist movements and the approaches of the Thai government toward them. The Muslim countries have exerted some influence over the Thai government's approaches toward its Malay Muslim minority. At the same time, some countries, individuals, groups and organizations provided safe havens, financial support and military training to separatists to fight the Thai State.

Guerrilla warfare conducted by separatist fronts challenged the legitimacy of the Thai government. Under authoritarian regimes, the Malay-Muslims found no channel to

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express their grievances. These fronts, to a large extent, represented their voices about the continuing hardship they had to endure, and the unjust treatment, suppression and violation of human rights by the state officials. Domestically and internationally, the movements performed a public service by raising the issues of subordination of the Malay-Muslim minority in terms of political, economic, cultural, and civil-legal deprivation.

As outlined in the second and third chapters, internal and external factors affected Thailand's political integration. Some factors helped, others disrupted the government integration efforts. Some factors had a degenerative power that both weakened the positive factors and hindered the integration process. Mitigation of these negative factors and the promotion of positive factors helped to increase Thailand's integration. The historical heritage of the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces, socio-economic development of the region, Islam, cultural identity and language difference all played significant roles in supporting the maintenance of a separate Malay ethnic community within the Thai State.

The change in political context, domestically and internationally, influenced the change in the State's approaches toward the Malay-Muslims. The Thai elite realized that alternative means must be employed to cope with the problem of separatism. From its experiences in fighting communism, Thai military leaders learned that they would not succeed in eradicating separatism by emphasizing the use of force. They needed to win the hearts and minds of the people. Moreover, the student demonstration in 1973 and

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succeeding period made the military leaders realized that they needed to expand political participation to other groups in the country. The Prime Minister's Office Order No. 66/ 2523 was adopted as a guideline to fight separatism. While offering amnesty to separatist defectors, the State adopted more accommodative approaches toward the Malay-Muslims.

This study discusses the main strategies adopted by the Thai government since 1973. They are socialization, socioeconomic development, control and coercion, political participation and reorganization. It also addresses Thailand's diplomatic effort to contain or mitigate the separatist movements' activities. The diplomatic measures aimed to obtain cooperation and to convince the Muslim countries, organizations and individuals to end support to the separatist movements.

The transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system consists of two simultaneous processes--the disintegration of an authoritarian regime and the institutionalization of democracy.[5] In these processes, change occurs both in the political system and in the society. Changes in the political system include the reorganization of the regime's leadership, the expansion of political participation, and the legitimization of political parties. Changes in the society include the emergence of social forces, the strengthening of civil society and the adjustment of relations between ethnic groups. Thus, democratization helped bring about changes in favor of political integration.

Political democratization in Thailand has led to a significant change in the relationship between the State and its society. Democratization in Thailand began in 1973. The first democratic transition in October 1973 ended the authoritarian rule.

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Though it lasted for only three years, it awakened the political consciousness of people all over Thailand, including the southernmost provinces. After the massacre at Thammasat University on October 6, 1976, which was followed by a military coup, the whole Thai society went through tremendous soul searching. Ideas of freedom and equality became pervasive among the intelligentsia. The harsh measures against the students and intelligentsia drove thousands to join the communist insurgency.

The political tensions and the threat of communism in the late 1970s made the military leaders realize that they needed to expand political participation to other groups in the society. The military and bureaucratic State realized the limitation of its roles, power and legitimacy. Hence, it relaxed its rule, marking the second democratic transition. During the second democratic transition, between 1977-88, which resulted in the consolidation of a semi-democratic regime, the military leaders allowed groups in society to participate in setting the policy agenda. Nevertheless, as Chai-Anand pointed out, on the significant issues, such as security, decision-making was still in the hands of the military-bureaucracy leadership. During this period, the military and bureaucracy were at the center of policy decision-making regarding matters concerning the Malay-Muslims. At the same time, the government encouraged Malay informal leaders to participate and be involved in government's programs concerning Malay-Muslims.

The period of semi-democratic government had an important impact on political development in Thailand in the later period because it created the opportunity for political parties to develop and for civil society to expand and strengthen. The May 1992 incident

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that marked the third democratic transition, resulted in civil liberalization and the continuous growth of civil society. It was in this period that democratization produced the most profound effects and changed the relationship between the State and its society.

The type of political regime influences leaders' perception of problems, hence influences the choices of approaches to solve perceived problems. Under the military regime where security concerns dominated government activities, differences in culture, language, and religion were seen as a threat to the unity of the State. The government diagnosed Malay separatism as caused by from primordial elements and by mobilization by the Malay traditional elite and foreign supporters. While every administration of Thailand had held the basic assumption that territorial integration of the country was not to be violated, the authoritarian regimes tended to use coercive measures as a common means to suppress those who were suspected of being separatists. This measure led to more human rights violations and alienated the population, while intensifying separatist retaliation against the government.

Because primordial attachment was analyzed as an obstacle to integration, the government sought to suppress traditional structures and values. Socio-economic development strategies were aimed at modernizing the ethnic Malay-Muslims with the expectation that such modernization would lead to a decline in the political significance of ethnicity. Government officials believed that if the living standards of the Malays were improved and the society was modernized, the importance of primordial elements would decline and the result would be national assimilation. The government

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emphasized the development of agriculture, industry, infrastructure and the expansion of general education. Education was a basic requirement for the socio-economic development of the country and was necessary to close the gap between the ruler and the ruled. Most of the socio-economic programs did not change drastically when democratization took place in Thailand, although, some new projects were initiated to catch up with the changing emphasis of development plans at each stage. Nevertheless, the goal of socio-economic development changed when the country moved into the third democratic transition, i.e. the government no longer aimed at eradicating the ethnic loyalty of its ethnic minority.

School, as an institution, was an important means for the Thai government to convey its values and norms. It is a means for political socialization. It provides a channel to build a common language that is necessary for a more meaningful communication between the State and its citizens, which is central to political integration. Other instruments employed for the purpose of political socialization include the mass media. It was used to build loyalty to the Monarch, to promote the image of the State, and to transmit State policies to its population.

Political socialization in schools was generally successful. The Thai government policy that aimed to make the Malays speak Thai was accomplished through education. Affirmative Action and scholarships were given to Malay-Muslims to expand their opportunities for education. The number of Malay-Muslims enrolling in schools and in institutions of higher education increased continuously. However, the government was

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still left with the task of improving the quality of students so that they could become a genuine force for development in the country.

The assimilation policy to mold Malay-Muslims into a common national identity, or *ekkarak thai,* based on the Buddhist religion and culture was a focus of the government's policies until the period of semi-democracy. It had faced continuous resistance from Malay-Muslims who feared that their culture and religion would be destroyed. Only when the Thai government substituted state building (which emphasized a unity of the state) with that of nation building (which stressed a unity of the state and a monolithic society) would it have a chance of successful integration. Under the new goal, which is clearly reflected in the current national security policies for the southern border provinces, the Malay-Muslims identified themselves as citizens of Thailand and had loyalty to the State without having to give up their ethnic loyalties and identities. Success for integration came after the State had changed its goal and shown tolerance for the differences in its society.

In terms of economic development, aimed at improving the standard of living of the Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces, progress has been slow. From the time that the first national socio-economic development plan was implemented in the 1960s, the economic activity within the southern border provinces was concentrated in the hands of the Chinese. During the democratization period, the pattern of cultural division of labor in the region, as suggested by Che Man, did not change. This lack of change can be attributed to the bias of government projects that tend to benefit big

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business. The slowness of economic improvement has also been attributed to lack of cooperation from the Malay-Muslims and the ineffectiveness of the departments and state officials who carry out the development programs and projects.

The reorganization of the Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces was an effort of the government to install permanent measures to handle Malay-Muslims affairs. It aimed to coordinate political programs of various government agencies and to improve the quality of the civil servants in the area. The Administrative Center has become an important bridge between the State and the Malay-Muslim population. It became a channel for Malay-Muslims to give their opinions regarding the government policies and to register complaints about the misbehaviors of the state officials.

For over a half a century of its modern history, the Thai government had continuously used force to subdue separatist guerrillas. However, these efforts were not completely successful in eliminating military operations by the separatist fronts. During the 1960s and the early 1980s, the attacks by separatist fronts accounted for the loss of lives of innocents, state officials and public property, such as government buildings, particularly schools and police stations. The attack at a royal function and attacks on the international airports and train stations sent a clear message that the government had failed to deter violent acts organized by separatist groups. It made the Thai government appear to lose control of the situation. It also created adverse effects upon the central

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government in terms of potential investment loss, diversion of prospective domestic and foreign tourists, and psychological effects upon the general public.[6]

The separatist fronts not only challenged the Thai State domestically, but also propagated their causes and attracted wider external publicity, particularly in the Muslim world. From the early 1980s, the Thai government was determined to crack down on the separatist fronts. The intensification of military operations resulted in the arresting and killing of many of the guerrilla leaders. Nevertheless, it was the government amnesty policy as reflected in the Prime Minister's Order No. 66/ 2523 that induced many of the separatist members to surrender. Internal conflicts within the leadership of these fronts weakened the movements even further.

When the movements attempted to unite and heightened violent attacks in the mid-1990s, the Thai government sought cooperation from Malaysian authorities to help eradicate the separatist fronts. After the Malaysian police handed over four separatist leaders residing in Malaysia to the Thai authorities in 1998, separatist fronts fell into disarray. Thus, through diplomatic efforts, Thailand succeeded in securing support from Malaysia, which significantly reduced the separatist fronts' capacity to organize their activities. At the same time, the government approved the new amnesty program under the Prime Minister's Office Order 127/ 254. By allowing suspected separatists who have no criminal records to return to Thailand without fear of legal charges, the order encouraged more separatist members to surrender.

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The growth and strength of the civil society, the desire of political parties to attract the Malay vote, economic interdependence, and globalization of values such as democracy and human rights protection had influenced the government approaches toward the Malay-Muslims. The democratic political system permitted Malay-Muslims who were previously largely excluded from the political system to have a new venue to express their distinctive demands. While they were steadfast in protecting and demanding their rights as a distinctive cultural community, in the process of working for their demands, the Malay-Muslims increasingly were socialized into the values of the wider political community. The political inclusion and shift of decision-making power were essential to cure the political alienation and assuage the grievances of the Malay-Muslims. Most Malays of southernmost Thailand had come to agree that it was in their best interest to be Thai citizens and participate in the system. They felt confident that democratic institutions could effectively provide mechanisms to protect their lives, religion, culture and general interests.

The process of political openness that began in 1973 has led to what Dr. Surin referred to as "enlightened interaction" between the State and its ethnic minority.[7] The Thai elite had learned, through their interaction with the Malay-Muslim leaders, that they could attract support and cooperation from the Malay-Muslims through an accommodative approach. The success of the approach indicated that a viable political community could be built in Thailand on the basis of the recognition of separate cultural

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communities. As the Thai leaders became more confident in their approaches, they were willing to give more concessions to accommodate the demands of the Malay-Muslims.

Nevertheless, this study points out that that the Thai State's relaxation of coercive control is, in part, a function of the rise of the cost of its use. Economically, both domestic and foreign trade and investment need a stable environment to create and maintain economic growth. Diplomatically, Thailand needed to win the good faith of other Muslim countries to protect its image and promote its political and economic interests with these states. As Thailand became a partner in various international agreements concerning human rights protection, it was obligated to abide by the agreements. The Thai democratic elite realized that violation of human rights by the State damaged its image in the international community. Domestically, the younger generations of Malay-Muslims and Thai Muslims, better educated and more democratic minded, were more willing to challenge the practices of the officials through the courts and take issues to the public. Among the best known cases were the torching of the thirty-five schools in 1992 and the Hat Yai train explosion in 1994. Moreover, as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle became more vital, the diversity of culture, religion, and language became an open door for Thailand to the Malay world. The Thai leadership no longer saw these differences as threats but as assets that could be used to promote the country's international trade, investment and relations.

The study shows that, in the case of Thailand, variation in the mobilization of ethnicity in politics correlates with variations in the state approaches and institutional

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arrangements.[8] The form, political manifestations and political consequences of ethnicity are not fixed, but depend to a significant extent upon variations in the character of the state. When the State closed channels for dissidents to express their demands, those dissidents resorted to violence as a means to have their demands met. When channels of expression were available, violence became unnecessary.

This study notes that institutional arrangements and rules under democratic regimes, especially after 1992 after democracy was consolidated, are the most important factors that reshape the relationship between the Thai State and ethnic Malay-Muslims. One of the most important channels that had been opened for the Malay-Muslims to effectively exert their influence on government policies under democratic governments was political representation. Since 1973, the Malay-Muslims have dominated almost all parliamentary seats in the four southernmost provinces. It is evident that, under democratic rules, Malay-Muslims can choose their people to represent their interests and to protect and promote their rights in the Thai parliament. Nevertheless, until 1988, the center of decision-making was still with the military and the bureaucracy. After 1992, power and control over policy directions shifted to the hand of politicians. The Malay-Muslim representatives were given important positions at the national level such as Cabinet posts and the President of the Parliament and were able to influence the policy decisions, especially on matters concerning the Malay-Muslims. They played an important role in bargaining with the political parties and the State to accommodate the

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Malay-Muslims. This reality boosted confidence of the minority Malay-Muslims in their relation with the Buddhist majority and the State.

Al-Wahdah (The Unity), the political organization that effectively protected and promoted the rights of the Malay-Muslims, was founded in 1986 by Malay-Muslim politicians, members of Provincial Islamic Committees in Pattani, and religious leaders in the four southernmost provinces. The group has been successful in bargaining with political parties to adopt a package of the group's policy guidelines for the southernmost provinces. Members of the Wahdah have been recognized as effective political actors on the national level and have been able to exert their influence over the State policy toward the Malay-Muslims.

The Muslim intelligentsia, have played influential roles in voicing, representing, and articulating the demands of Malay-Muslims of the southernmost provinces. Their works emphasizes the protection of Malay culture, identity and religion, and the promotion of social and economic equality and justice. The Muslim intelligentsia has come to occupy distinctive structural positions, carrying out a variety of social and political functions that can have important, sometimes decisive, historic consequences. They include members of academia, state officials, politicians, lawyers, doctors, and other professions. They forcefully called upon the government to respect human rights of the Malay-Muslim minority. Through their writings, public comments and lectures, they called upon and influenced the State to give concession to the Malay-Muslims in the cultural and religious realms. They also called the attention of the State and the public to

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the issues of injustice and inequality. Through their involvement in the protection of those whose rights have been violated by the States or state officials, they, in some cases, effectively helped the Malay-Muslims to deal with the abuse of power by the State. The expansion of political space in the democratic period allowed these Muslims to influence State policies. In their work to preserve and promote their ethnic and religious identity, they have deployed legitimate and legal approaches.

One factor emphasized in the definition of integration is a "belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have agreed on at least one point that common social problems must, and can be solved by the processes of peaceful change."[9] The study finds that up through the year 2000, there were still many issues and problems pending for resolution, especially issues regarding the behavior and attitudes of state officials towards the Malay-Muslims and social and economic inequality. Nevertheless, the Malay-Muslim accommodationists and communalists proved to the masses that through working within the system, the Malay-Muslims could effectively influence the direction of government approaches for the betterment of their community. The political environment allowed the moderate Malay-Muslims to show, with credibility, the Malay dissident groups that it is unnecessary to resort to violence when they are dissatisfied with the State. They can protect and promote their rights without violence. Thus, they learned to accommodate and to effectively respond to the Thai State approaches.

Because political rules and arrangements under a democratic system allowed the moderate Malay-Muslims to take leadership roles in organizing and protecting of their

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community interests, it resulted in de-radicalization (but not necessary de-politicization) of ethnic mobilization. The Malay-Muslim political leaders provide leadership in coordinating and articulating the interests of diverse group members who are linked to each other and to the leaders by an inclusive ethnic identity. Malay-Muslims had realized that the best strategy to pursue in this political context was not separatism but communalism. They opted to participate in the social and political life of the State while using peaceful means to seek control over communal affairs and to influence the direction of state policy towards the interests of the ethnic community.

As Thailand's democratization progressed, its political integration also advanced. Democratic mechanisms have been used effectively as a means to deal with ethnic cleavages in Thailand. Political elites, both the Thai and the Malay-Muslims interviewed by the author, all had a positive view regarding the prospect of Thailand's further political integration. They also shared a mutual understanding that if the authoritarian regimes ever return to power, closing the legitimate channels for ethnic minorities to have their demands met, separatism will come back to the political life of Thailand.

While believing that separatist fronts are no longer capable of launching effective guerrilla warfare, the Thai authorities acknowledge that conditions originating from mistreatment of the people by state officials, oppression, injustice and inequality, can easily stimulate feelings of alienation and exclusion that might bring back the idea of separatism into the minds of the Malay-Muslims. They realize that the idea of a separate Patani State is still alive among some Malay-Muslims and that the separatists might use

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these conditions to mobilize the masses against the State in the future. Moreover, the inability of the government to improve these conditions can raise doubt among the Malay-Muslims about the government's sincerity. Thus, the government is trying to get rid of these conditions. Personnel administration of the local civil servants is becoming an urgent issue that the government is trying to tackle.

Currently, Malay-Muslim separatist fronts are at their weakest stage. Their operational activities have been severely disrupted by the surrender and arrest of some of their leaders. Nevertheless, the crackdown on separatist strongholds and the arrest of military leaders does not guarantee that threats from separatism have been completely eradicated. As long as long-term solutions for the southern border provinces have not been met, separatist ideology can be revitalized. However, at this point, the Thai elite is optimistic and confident that the government will be able to manage this challenge. The Malay-Muslims are also confident in their ability to deal with the State, to influence the State's policy, and to protect and promote the rights of the Malay-Muslims. They realize that the democratic form of government provides them with the most effective channel to articulate their interests. They have seized the opportunity to participate in the political system.

Over the past two decades, Thailand's political integration has accelerated because of the effects of democratization on the political system, beginning in 1973 and intensifying after 1992. The system has opened channels for Malay-Muslims to participate in the social and political life of the State and to effectively influence the

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direction of state policy towards the interests of their community. The current Security Policy for the Southern Border Provinces and the appointments of the Malay-Muslims to the positions of national leaders prove the tolerance of the Thai society under a democratic political system. Moreover, the government's diplomatic efforts have been successful in reducing foreign support for the separatist fronts, weakening the fronts' capacity to mobilize. However, sustainable political integration in Thailand will not be attained if the government is unable to turn its most tolerant policy, as written in the current National Security Policy for the Southernmost Provinces, into practice. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that Thailand seems to have gone through the thorniest stage in its way toward the integration of its political ethnic Malay community.

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Notes

[1]Donald Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 41-2.

[2]Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States: Lesson From Thailand, (Dover, MA: Auburn House Publishing Company), 214.

[3]Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 199-200.

[4]Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," Journal of International Affairs, 27, no. 1 (1973): 21, see also Walker Cornor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?," 319-355.

[5]Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 56.

[6]Surin, 242-43.

[7]Surin Pitsuwan. Minister of Foreign Affairs. Interview. November 8, 2000.

[8]Surin, 46.

[9]Karl Deutsch et al., "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area," International Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden City, NY: Doubleday& Company Inc., 1966), 2.

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(Note: As is the Thai custom, authors will be listed first name first instead of last name first.)

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